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In February of 1980 the Supreme Court ended fifteen
years of redistricting controversy in Mississippi with
its decision in United States v. State of Mississippi.
In this decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the
District Court for the District of Columbia and, thereby
approved the first constitutionally sound redistricting
plan for that State since the "one man, one vote" rulings
of the 1960's.

This dissertation is a chronicle of the

process which brought that Plan into existence, and of
the controversies and technical difficulties encountered
by all parties in that process.

Hopefully, this work

will serve as a warning of the pitfalls of court involvement in redistricting, and will help others to avoid the
difficulties in the technical process.
The composition of districts -- even when they are
of equal population -- is probably going to be the main
issue of redistricting lawsuits of the 1980's.

Missis-

sippi's difficulties with racial representation, and the
solutions of those problems can serve as a guide to those
operating under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act.
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INTRODUCTION
This is a study of the 1977-78 redistricting of the
Mississippi State Legislature.

It was a process that saw

the culmination of a struggle between the civil rights
forces and the "Establishment" in Mississippi, but its
origins span almost the entire period of the "reapportionment revolution" in the United States.
The importance of the redistricting conflict in
Mississippi is that it touched nearly all the constitutional issues concerning representation that were
addressed by the courts in the 1970s.

Indeed, it

presented practical illustrations of many of the problems
the courts encountered.
The Mississippi case history serves particularly
well to highlight the difficulties of evaluating what is
"fair" representation and how "fairness" can be measured.
It also serves as a pointed example of the dangers that
confront courts when they attempt to perform the legislative function of redistricting--especially when they do
so without proper technical support.
The United States Supreme Court first entered the
redistricting process in 1962 with its landmark decision

. Ba k er vs. Carr. 1
in

The clear intention of the Warren

1
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Court was to provide remedies for the problems of malapportionment--problerns that had been created by dramatic
population movements of the previous half-century.

The

growth of metropolitan areas in many states had resulted

.

in pressures on entrenched, rurally dominated legislatures
to redistrict and to recognize the new population power of
urban areas.

This transfer of power, however, had been

resisted by the rural politicians through two devices.
The first was a flat refusal to redistrict at all--the
case in Tennessee, which precipitated the Baker decision.
The second was the use of the "federal systern"--or the
apportionment of the lower house on the basis of population and of the upper house on geographic areas.
Having entered the redistricting process by its
declaration that such matters were justiciable, the Court
then faced the inevitable problem of determining what
constituted compliance with the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court anticipated the diffi-

culty of this determination by refusing, for almost six
years, to set any finite standard below which population
deviations could become acceptable.

The Court merely

declared that a de minirnus standard required a good faith
effort to achieve exact equality.

As the redistricting

process following the 1970 Census began, the assumption
was that only very minute variations in district populations would be allowed by the courts.

The "one man, one

vote" rule, it was thought, would be strictly applied to

3

all redistricting situations.
Having experimented, however, with the application
of mathematical exactness as the paramount redistricting
criterion, courts began to realize, perhaps in light of
their own difficulties in drawing plans, that exact
mathematical equality created serious problems of its own.
Applying, for example, a 1 percent standard to congressional districting was logical because congressional
districts contained more than 400,000 persons.

Applica-

tion of the same 1 percent standard in states with small
populations and large legislatures, however, demonstrated
the absurdity of the principle.

In the state in which

the ideal district size was 20,000 persons, 1 percent
would constitute no more than 200 persons--well under the
average size of enumeration districts and even many city
blocks.

There were, of course, sheer technical difficul-

ties in meeting this demanding standard, and its application produced serious fragmentation of local units of
government, even of neighborhoods.

The emphasis on popu-

lation equality to the exclusion of all other factors
also opened the door to a series

of gross abuses--not

least the partisan gerrymander--which could be justified
on the basis of compliance with the "one man, one vote"
rule.
The Court was finally faced with the realization
that "one man, one vote" was a two-edged sword--it struck
down rnalapportionment, but it strengthened the gerry-

mander.

The Court now turned to a policy of re-estab-

lishing some of the constraints on the gerrymander; but
this was a process that would require some relaxation of
the rule of mathematical exactness.
The retreat from exact equality was enunciated in
the Gaffney decision in Connecticut, the Mahan decision in
Virginia, and the White decision in Texas.

The Court

restated the de minirnus rule for state legislatures by
ruling that the 5 percent deviations on either side of
ideal district population would be considered sufficiently
exact.

Any greater deviations were to be based on some

rational state policy and could not be insidiously and
systematically applied to the detriment of any area of the
state or of any minority group.
Mississippi was uniquely illustrative of such
problems.

Numerous plans were drawn by all parties in an

attempt to balance the requirement of equality of population with other desirable criteria, such as minority
representation, county integrity, and compactness.

By

comparing the different plans that were drawn in
Mississippi, it is possible to trace the effects of
various levels of population exactitude on the other
traditional criteria used in redistricting.
The other major issue in redistricting is minority
representation.

Having opened the door to challenges on

the basis of how many persons the boundary of a district
enclosed, the courts were soon faced with additional

4
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challenges based upon what kinds of people lived within
the lines.
Redistricting has always been a principal tool of
majority control, and the temptation to strengthen
majority dominance has generally been too great to resist.
Just as many voters felt that they were denied equal
exercise of individual voting power through malapportionment, others felt that their political influence as
members of minority groups had been diluted in redistricting.

Thus far, the Supreme Court has managed to sidestep

all issues of minority representation except those pertaining to blacks and Hispanic-Americans.

Most discuss-

ions of minority representation, therefore, center around
these two minority groups.
The defense of minority representation in redistricting has taken two paths.

One is a series of decisions

by federal courts based on the Fourteenth Amendment.

In

these cases plaintiffs have been able to carry the burden
of proof that the districting plans have been discriminatory.

The second path has been through a series of

decisions based on the application of the 1965 Civil
Rights Act through Section 5 of that statute.

This

statute grants the Attorney General of the United States
extensive powers to police all aspects of the voting
process--including redistricting plans.

In Section 5

cases, the burden of proof has been on the redistricting
authorities to prove that they did not discriminate.

6

The Mississippi experience, again, offers an
excellent opportunity to study this aspect of the redistricting process.

It combines both the regular line of

redistricting decisions and the Section 5 decisions.
Indeed, it brings the racial aspects into the sharpest
possible focus because of the unusual distribution of the
black population in the State.

Significant black popula-

tion is found in many parts of Mississippi, both in urban
and rural areas.

Blacks are also found in all levels of

concentration.
Mississippi's racial situation, as contrasted with
the demographics involved in other cases--where blacks
have been concentrated in ghettos--requires more detailed
investigation to determine if "racial gerrymandering" has
indeed occurred.

In theory, perhaps, there is a "fair"

number of seats to which any minority is entitled.

But

the practice of the matter is that minorities may be
divided among districts in such a way that they exercise
more or less power in varying degrees of political influence in relation to what is proper or fair.

In the

Mississippi context, the lines between "too little,"
"just right," and "too much" are not clearly or readily
defined.

The parties to the Connor cases and to the

Mississippi case were forced, therefore, to address these
quantitative issues in detail.

As a result, some tenta-

tive conclusions on "fairness" in minority redistricting
may be drawn from the Mississippi experience.

7

Mississippi is the last State to be redistricted in
the 1970s.

It is also, in the opinion of some, the State

that practices the most blatant forms of racial discrimination and that is most resistant to electoral reform.
Whether or not this may be true, it is certainly the State
with the largest and most widely distributed minority population.

Its redistricting, therefore, offerred the courts

the last chance in the decade of the seventies to address
issues of gerrymandering and minority representation.
Moreover, in deciding this case, the Supreme Court will
have had the benefit of time to examine the results of its
previous experiments in applying redistricting rulings.
One may conclude, therefore, that the Mississippi redistricting, and the court decisions generated by it, will set
the stage for all the state redistrictings of the 1980s.
Although there is a very large scholarly literature
on redistricting, few studies deal with the details of the
line-drawing process.

Yet these details (the calculation

in different ways of population deviations, the use of different units of political and census geography, the application of various cartographic techniques, the use of different computer technologies, etc.) actually decide the
shape of districts and, thus, the character of the representative process.

In this study, therefore, close atten-

tion has been paid to all technical aspects of the
Mississippi redistricting.

Only in this way can different

outcomes of redistricting be fully explored and understood.

8
Footnotes to Introduction
1

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186

(1962).

CHAPTER I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF APPORTIONMENT AND
DISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES
Overview
The "Reapportionment Revolution" of the 1960s, a
series of Supreme Court decisions that enforced equal
population as the basis for the allocation of legislative
and congressional seats, marks a watershed in the theory
and practice of representative government in this country.
Population was only one basis for apportionment prior to
1964.

Land--units of territory, such as counties or

parishes or townships--had served as another, often
competing basis.
The proper weight that should be given to population
or to land in apportionment had always troubled representative governments.

In England, the "rotten borough"--Old

Sarum, a medieval town that had lost its population, but
not its parliamentary representatives, was the classic
example--became an issue of controversy as early as the
seventeenth century. 1

In America, the colonies also used

both population and land units as bases for apportionment.
Controversies arose, even then, over the population
inequities of land-based systems.
9

Thomas Jefferson, for

10
example, sharply criticized Virginia's county-based
system (in which the smallest county had 951 voters, while
the largest had 22,105), because "among those who share
the representation, the shares are unequal. 112

The

Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established a population basis
for the apportionment of territorial legislative seats
("one for every 500 free male inhabitants").

But the U.S.

Constitution, guaranteeing two U.S. Senators to each stat~
regardless of population, returned to a partially landbased system.
After 1787, state legislatures differed widely in
apportionment practices.

A majority of the states admit-

ted to the Union employed population as the basis for
apportionment; but several states followed the "national
plan" of basing one house on population, the other on land
units; and others, although they employed population as
the principal basis for apportionment, modified it with
requirements that each county have a minimum of one representative or that no county have more than some set
maximum of representatives.
In the twentieth century, land-based systems of
representation came under increasing pressure: mass movements of population and the growth of great industrial
centers produced ever greater population disparities among
counties and other electoral units in the states.

Yet

state legislators, because they owed their election to the
existent system, were often unwilling to reapportion.

11

Indeed, in several states, rurally dominated legislatures
sought to perpetuate themselves by adopting new land-based
apportionment schemes or by freezing existing plans into
law.
Finally, in the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court acted
to impose population as the basis of representation.

The

doctrine of "one man - one vote" was used to comoel
states
.,_
to apportion both houses of their legislatures on population and to create substantially equal state legislative
and congressional districts.

Land units--except only the

states, whose status was guaranteed in the Constitution-lost their role in the federal-state representative
system.
Judicial intervention failed to end the controversy
surrounding questions of representation.

Indeed, new

issues, debated with no less heat than in former eras,
followed fast upon the Court's decisions.

Today, reap-

portionment and redistricting remain at the center of
political battles in every state in the Union.
The purpose of this brief history is to introduce
some of the main themes in redistricting from earliest
times to the present.
The Early View:

What is Representation

Or What Should Be Represented?
To understand the early American view of apportionment it is first necessary to gain some perspective on
what Americans then meant by the concept of "representa-

12

tion."

The justification of modern representative govern-

ment rested then, as it does now, on the ideals of direct,
participatory democracy--but, at the same time, on its
absolute impracticality.

The people are sovereign, but if

they attempt to exercise that sovereignty by deliberating
as a collective body, government would be utterly impossible.

The people are therefore understood to select

representatives who are their surrogates and by virtue of
that status accountable to the people.

In this sense, the

representative is not so much a representative of "the
people" as he is a representative of the opinions, attitudes, and the interests of a particular people who live
in a particular place.3
Consistent with this view of representative government, the early Americans seemed to recognize three principal bases for the apportionment of representation:
population, taxable income, and local communities.

Con-

troversy arose on the question of what role each of these
should play in a particular system of representation.
The usual arguments for representing territory or
political subdivisions as well as relative population
turned on the perceived differences within each state.
The social and economic and political interests of the
coastal towns and counties, for example, were seen as
different from those of the hinterlands.

What was

considered significant to the larger cities was quite
different from the smaller towns and rural areas, since

13
one was the center of trade and commerce and the other of
agriculture.

The population of the cities might also be

composed of a greater percentage of "newcomers."
Similarly, the urban and rural areas might have different
understandings of how to distribute the unsettled land of
the state or of the future of "the western lands."

To

link representation to population alone, then, would be to
give the larger cities disproportionate influence in
deciding policies that would affect the entire population
of the state.

As was noted by John McMahon in 1813 in his

description of the government of the State of Maryland:
• . . for a long time anterior to the Revolution
the same equality of county representation prevailed, and the same number of delegates were
allotted to each county. This was the system
under which the framers of the Constitution had
grown up . . . . It was also accommodated to
their shore and county jealousies; . . . It is
probable that any attempt to repudiate it, and to
substitute in its stead a representation based
upon territory, property, or population, or on a
ratio compounded on any or all of these, would
have alerted the jealousies of the smaller
counties and would have left the state the prey of
internal dissensions.4
The representation of territory, therefore, was thought to
be the necessary means to secure the loyalty of the citizens and to insure an adequate representation of the
variety of opinions throughout the State.

To add to the

representation of counties or other political subdivision~
in this perspective, was no more than to affirm their
"right to be heard."
The issue of malapportionment, or blatant over-

14
representation of the rural areas, was only occasionally
raised in the early period.

Always, in those days, there

were more rural than urban counties in a state.

There-

fore, the smaller counties were necessarily more "representative" of the population of a particular state than
the cities or commercially oriented counties.
There is evidence of wide popular support for the
broad notion that representation should somehow be allocated by reference to areas and interests of the state as
well as by reference to population.

Yet the precise

balancing of the factors of geographic area and population
was recurrently an issue of controversy.

Almost all the

states were sharply divided into urban and rural areas,
and the adjustments necessary to achieve an appropriate
balance between them were difficult and frequently controverted.

From the very beginning, then, the battle over

apportionment was drawn over the competing interests of
these two camps.
Even though there was a consensus regarding the
nature and needs of representation, the disputes as to how
to implement the particular districting plans promoted
substantial variations in practice.

To explore these

differences and to broaden our perspective on the period,
it is instructive to review the constitutional provisions
of the original states in some detail.

15
The Original Thirteen State Constitutions
The original apportionment provisions, as we have
already suggested, generally aimed to balance three
factors:

(1) population,

(2) citizens with some financial

stake in the state, and (3) significant divisions of
interest or opinion identified with particular areas or
political subdivisions.

Reflecting these concerns, most

states chose, in one or both legislative chambers, to
guarantee to their important political subdivisions either
equality of representation, or at least, a degree of
representation irrespective of the distribution of population (see

table

1).

The only consistent rule in this

period, however, was the rule of variety and experimentation.

Delaware, for example, guaranteed each county equal

representation in both houses.

Since Delaware had ten

counties, this formula meant a Senate of 30 members (3 per
county) and a lower house of 70 representatives (7 per
county) . 5

Both the upper and lower house legislators were

elected at large within their counties.

In four other

states (Georgia, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island)
political subdivisions were guaranteed equal representation only in the upper house.

Probably the most frequent

practice was to guarantee each county (or town in
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut) at least
one representative and then to apportion more representatives as population disparities required.

This usage

varied in both directions, but two examples will

16

TABLE 1
APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE OF THE THIRTEEN
ORIGINAL STATES (1790)
Apportionment
Formulae

Upper House

Percent

Lower House

Percent

Equality of county
or town

Delaware
N. Carolina
Rhode Island
Georgia
New Jersey

38%

Delaware
Connecticut
New Jersey

23%

Combination of
(1) County guarantee of minimum
representation

Maryland
S. Carolina
Virginia

23%

New Hampshire
Georgia
Maryland
Massachusetts
New York
N. Carolina
S. Carolina
Virginia
Rhode Island

70%

23%

Pennsylvania

Massachusetts
By District,
New Hampshire
apportioned to
taxable inhabitants. Each
County guaranteed
. .
minimum representation
By District,
apportioned by
population of
freeholders

New York

7%

Elected at-large

Connecticut

7%

Sources:

7%

Benjamin Poore, The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other
Organic Laws of the United States (1878}.
Francis N. Thorpe, The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other
Organic Laws of the United States . . . {1906).
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illustrate:

In Pennsylvania, a state with a population of

300,000 dispersed over eleven counties, the lower house
was apportioned in two stages.

The first stage was to

guarantee to each county and to the City of Philadelphia
at least one representative; the second stage allotted
additional representation to counties on the basis of the
number of taxable inhabitants. 6

In the Constitution of

South Carolina, on the other hand, each parish was given
from one to three representatives, depending on populatio~
with an additional guarantee that the parish of
Charleston--the largest metropolitan area of the South-would receive fifteen representatives. 7
In all of these constitutional schemes, the essential ingredient was the provision for as broad a basis of
representation as practicable.

Recognizing the striking

differences, both social and economic, among the many
heterogeneous areas within the states, and given their
different and often conflicting political interests,
representation seemed to require much more than attention
to the number of voters.

The interests of the coastal

towns were frequently in tension with, and, indeed, sometimes in direct competition with the counties and towns of
the hinterlands.

What was considered necessary policy to

the centers of trade and commerce was, therefore, often
contradictory to the fundamental needs of the agricultural
areas.

Equally threatening, the population of the cities

might be composed of a greater percentage of "newcomers,"
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leading the cities to take a different interest in distributing the unsettled lands of the state or in negotiating with other states over the use and development of the
disputed "western lands."

It was then generally thought

that, if representation were linked solely to population,
the larger cities (the ports of entry) would have disproportionate influence in deciding policy affecting the
entire state.

More specifically, if policy in any way

adversely affected the value of land, it might drastically
affect the fortunes of less populous areas and counties of
the state.
The Issue of Malapportionment and Districting
The question remains:

did these complex early

apportionment formulae lead to malapportionment or to
large disparities in population in the various legislative
districts?
The State Legislatures
In the four most populous states--Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina--there can be
no question that malapportionment was significant.

In the

remaining smaller states there is, with the exception of
Rhode Island, some doubt. 8

Although relevant information

is scanty, the great majority of the states rarely drew
radically new district lines.

Generally, they chose to

follow established county and city boundaries; this was
done even in those states where counties or cities were

19
not guaranteed equal or minimal representation. 9

These

original counties, of course, had generally been drawn
with some reference to population--when estimates were
available--but they also recognized geographical
restraints (mountains, forests, rivers, and other natural
obstacles to transportation and commerce).

Legislative

districts conformed to such traditional political
boundaries, then, rarely possessed exactly equal population.

It would be unfair, however, to be too critical of

these practices.

Population estimates in the period were

either unavailable or unreliable; only two state constitutions required periodic censuses (and their methodology
is unknown).

Moreover, the counties were the basic units

of state administration and, as such, were designed for
the convenience of their residents: since voting booths
were located at the County Court House or Sheriff's
office, the general rule of thumb seems to have been that
all voters should be within a half-day's travel of these
centers of local government.lo
In the less populous states, therefore, the process
of districting did not seem to give rise to significant
malapportionrnent.

At least, it appears that rural

counties, and thereby the majority of legislative district~
were roughly equal in population.

In the larger states

with the high density urban areas along the coast and
inland port towns, however, malapportionment was frequently the rule .
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It should be noted, of course, that population
totals were not the prime consideration in this period.
Until the 1830s, all the states restricted suffrage to
male, twenty-one-year-olds (in two states, eighteen if
married) who had resided in the state for usually more
than three months (in six states, one year), and who
could also demonstrate some financial stake in the community (generally, cash or property valued at SOL or more).
The net effect of these restrictions, of course, varied
from state to state or from region to region within the
state, depending on the economy and character of the population.

In Georgia, where rural land was relatively

inexpensive, a county of 200 people might have only 10
"rateable polls"

(qualified voters); the other extreme

might be found in the State of Massachusetts, where in a
town of 250 males, there might be 150 qualified voters.
Congressional Districts and Malapportionment
What was true for the state legislative districts
was frequently untrue for the congressional districts.
Each state was guaranteed in Article I of the U.S.
Constitution one congressional representative regardless
of population.

In the less populous states, then,

congressmen were elected at-large; but, even in states
where the delegation included as many as four representatives (for example, in New Jersey and Georgia),
congressmen were frequently elected without use of
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districts.

It was not until 1842, and then only as the

result of a federal statute, that all the states elected
their congressmen by districts.

The states (Virginia,

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and New York)
that chose to assign districts followed the pattern used
for state legislative districting: thus the levels of
congressional malapportionment were, in these cases,
generally similar to those in the state legislature.
The Process of Reapportionment
and Redistricting
Despite the presence of significant malapportionrnent, only four states (New Jersey, New York, Virginia,
and Connecticut) constitutionally provided for legislative
adjustment of apportionment formulae or districts. 12

In

the remaining nine states, it was possible to alter the
apportionment formula only through the extraordinary means
of constitutional convention.
The Politics of Apportionment:
The Early Period
Whatever political consensus was reflected in these
early constitutional provisions was, at best, tenuous.

In

many states, significant controversy soon arose, even in
the same year the constitution was ratified.

Political,

geographic, or economic interests became disenchanted, and
then organized attempts to amend or to abandon the constitutional formulae.

The controversies often turned on
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population: either the formula did not accurately reflect
population or it gave it too much influence.

Again, con-

flict between urban and rural counties was generally at
the nub of the matter.
This fundamental conflict--traditionally referred to
as Piedmont (rural areas) versus Tidewater (coastal areasis visible in American politics from the earliest colonial
periods.

The classical example of the struggle is found

in Virginia and in the Carolinas; but most elements of the
struggle were also present in Maryland, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Georgia--indeed, to some degree, in nearly all
of the states.
Georgia, A Case History
One of the best examples of such struggles is the
apportionment battles of Georgia and the rivalries between
the Tidewater area along the coast, the pine barrens or
coastal plains just beyond, and the Piedmont extending into
the wilderness above the fall-line. 13

The conflict of

these areas furnished the basis for the sectional
struggles of Georgian politics from Colonial times to the
Civil War.

As soon as the settlers were allowed to intro-

duce slavery into the colony, and the low lands were laid
out into plantations, the yeoman found it to his advantage
to push further into the pine barrens where land was
cheaper, though often less fertile.

While the Piedmont

region was not ceded to Georgia by the Indians until 1773,
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the upper two regions of the State increased rapidly in
population during the course of the Revolutionary War and
the early nineteenth century.

As early as 1790, the

center of population in the State had changed from the
Tidewater to the up-country.
In the wake of this transformation of the State,
Georgia adopted four constitutions in the first twenty-two
years of independence.

But even these maneuvers did not

defuse the issue: the problem of apportionment remained a
central problem well into the 1840s.

The controversy

continued to rage around the central political problem of
apportioning representation among the three geographical
areas.
The first Constitution of Georgia in 1777 created
eight counties: five in the coast country, two in the
middle region between Savannah and Augusta, and one in
upper Georgia.

In this arrangement, the coast country

dominated in legislative representation, since apportionment was based on representation by county (see table 2 ) .
In this scheme, each county was apportioned ten representatives, with the exception of Liberty, the seat of
Savannah, which sent fourteen.

Realizing that this

formula ran in the face of the increasing population
growth of the upper and middle regions, the up-country
people quickly became dissatisfied with the unequal
position they held in the affairs of the State.

Unable

to change the apportionment formula, however, they at
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TABLE 2
GEORGIA REPRESENTATION IN 1g77

Tidewater

Middle
Country

Up-Country

Whole Population

21,536

25,336

37,946

White Population

9,025

17,584

29,145

Slave Population

12,511

7,952

8,801

Federal Numbers*

1,631

22,155

33,426

13

12

9

5

3

3

Representatives in
State Assembly
State Senators

* "Federal Numbers" is the basis of apportionment used in
apportioning representatives in Congress: total free population plus three-fifths slave population.

Source:

Lucien Roberts, Studies in Georgia History and
Government, p. 96.
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least succeeded in transferring the State capital from
Savannah (Tidewater) to Augusta (the middle region) in
1783-84.
Dissatisfaction with the first constitution finally
led to a call for a new constitution in 1789. Ostensibly,
the State wished to harmonize the State Constitution with
the new national Constitution; but, again, the real purpose was to adjust the original apportionment formula.
The Constitution of 1789 increased the number of counties
to eleven.

Of the three new counties added, two were in

the up-country and one in the middle country.

It also

provided that new counties could be added by simple vote
of the Legislature.

Despite this reformation of the

apportionment formula, it is quite clear that the
Tidewater retained its advantage.

A

study of table

shows that the middle and up-country counties combined
approximately five times as many white inhabitants and
one-and-one-quarter times as many slaves as the Tidewater,
but had only one-and-one-half times as many representatives in the lower branch of the Legislature.

In the

State Senate, the Tidewater had five members and the other
two sections combined had only six.
With these new provisions seven new counties were
created between 1790 and 1795.

Three of these were in the

up-country, two in the middle country, and two in the
Tidewater.

The new middle and upper counties were

created in newly settled territory; the old counties of

26

the Tidewater were beginning to carve themselves into
small units, not because of population increase or convenience in government, but for the purpose of maintaining
the section's influence in legislation.

Here, perhaps, is

the beginning of the clear use of districting for political
advantage.
In 1795 a new Constitutional Convention was convened
to address the issue of representation.

No less than four

proposals for representation to give the up-country
counties a fair apportionment were defeated before a workable compromise was reached.

A

proposal to abolish the

bicameral system of representation and to return to unicameralism was defeated by a vote of 44-11.

A

proposal

that representation in the Senate be based on population
was defeated by a margin of only ten votes.

It was then

proposed that representation be placed on the basis of a
census.

This method was voted down by a much narrower

margin, 28-27.

A struggle then began to separate the

State into two representative districts, the upper with
28 members and the lower with 24 members.
was defeated by a narrow margin.

This plan, als~

Finally, by a vote of

29-26 it was decided to apportion representation to the
counties without regard to population.

On this basis, the

lower counties received 25 representatives and the upper
counties received 26.

The Tidewater won a moral victory

in maintaining that representation should not be based on
population, and the up-country gained a material advantage
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of a one-vote margin in the House of Representatives.
The Convention of 1795 specified that a convention
for the consideration of further changes in the Constitution should meet in 1798.

Again the issue was representa-

tion, and again the up-country succeeded in altering the
formula to its advantage.

In this new formulation the

constitution provided that a Senate should be elected
annually and composed of one member from each county.
The House of Representatives was to contain members chosen
from the counties according to the principles of federal
districts.

Reapportionment, based on a state census, was

provided for every seven years.

According to this pro-

vision each county containing 3,000 population was
entitled to two representatives, each county containing
7,000, three representatives, and those containing 12,000,
four representatives.

Each county received at least one

representative and no county was allowed more than four.
The Federal Census of 1800 revealed that the five
low-country counties had a population of approximately
14,000, and the seven up-country counties had a population
of approximately 50,000.

Such figures clearly indicated

that, in the process of admitting new counties, the
Tidewater had managed to maintain the same system of
inequalities in evidence since 1790.

By the end of the

century, however, the tendency seemed to be toward a
gradual increase in up-country power.

The larger number

of new counties had been created there, and even the
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actual apportionment of the Convention of 1798 gave an
advantage to the newly created low-country counties.

The

provisions for the future apportionment made it possible
for the up-country gradually to increase in power by the
creation of new frontier counties.
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787
The Northwest Ordinance is popularly regarded as the
first "national" statement on the issue of apportionment
in state legislatures.

Passed by the Congress constituted

under the Articles of Confederation, the Ordinance is held
by many commentators to represent a decisive watershed, for
it mandated that apportionment be determined by population.14

The Warren Court has further enhanced this view,

for it centered much of its historical analysis on the
Ordinance. 15

Whether this version of the importance of the

.

Ordinance is justified is, however, more than a little
questionable.
If the standard of "apportionment by population" is
not too rigorously defined, the document certainly
deserves its reputation.

The Ordinance specified that the

"inhabitants of set Territories shall always be entitled
to the benefits . . . of a proportionate representation of
the people in the legislatures, . . . " and provided the
following mechanics of apportionment:
So soon as there shall be 5,000 free male inhabitants of full age, in the districts, upon giving
proof thereon to the governor, they shall receive
authority, with time and place, to elect representa-
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tives from their counties or townships to represent
them in general assembly:
Provided, That for every
5,000 free male inhabitants there shall be one
representative, and so on, progressively, with the
number of free male inhabitants, shall the right of
representation increase, until the number of representatives shall amount to 25; afterwards the
number and proportion of representatives shall be
regulated by the legislature-- . . . 16
This represents the first formal and official proclamation
that population should form the sole basis for apportioning
legislative representation.

When this document is coupled

with the rise of Jacksonianism--the extension of the
suffrage and the "direct democracy" movements of the
1830s--it does, indeed, seem to represent a decisive, even
momentous step toward a new system of apportionment.
In the wake of the reapportionment cases of the
1960s, this interpretation gained a considerable following.
It was argued that subsequent to the new formula of apportionment, the state legislatures were "almost completely
or predominantly" apportioned according to population;
whatever malapportionment later emerged in the states,
therefore, emerged in violation of an accepted basic
principle.

The analysis is supported by only part of the

available evidence (see table 3 ) .
The Institutions of Apportionment
and the Northwest Territories
The Ordinance's reliance on population as the one
significant element in determining apportionment was
partly a response to the controversies raging in the
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TABLE 3
APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
IN ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS

Apportionment
Formulae

Upper House

PerYear cent

PerLower House cent

Representation
of subdivisions.
No regard for
population

Connecticut
Delaware
Louisiana
Montana
New Jersey
N. Carolina
Rhode Island
Virginia

(1662) 16%
(1776)
(1812)
(1889)
(1776)
(1776)
( 16 6 3)
(1776)

Connecticut
Delaware
New Jersey
N. Carolina

8%

Representation
of subdivisions.
Some provisions
for population

Arizona
Hawaii
Maryland
S. Carolina

(1912)
(1959)
(1776)
(1790)

8%

Georgia
Maryland
Vermont
Virginia

8%

Representation
based on
population

Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Nevada
New Mexico
New York
Ohio
S. Dakota

(1818)
(1816)
(1848)
(1867)
(1912)
(1777)
(1805)
(1889)

16%

Illinois
30%
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Minnesota
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
S. Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Washington

Combination of
(1) Population
(2) Political
subdivision,
where subdivision predominates

Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Florida
Idaho
Iowa
Kentucky
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri

(1819)
(1836)
(1850)
(1876)

42%

Alabama
46%
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Massachusetts

(1845)

(1890)
(1846)
(1792)
(1820)

(1780)
(1837)
(1871)
(1821)
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TABLE 3 - Continued
Apportionment
Formulae

Upper House

PerYear cent

PerLower House cent

Combination of
(1) Population
(2) Political
subdivision,
where subdiviSlOn predominates

N. Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
w. Virginia
Wyoming

(1889) 42%
(1907)
(1859)
(1796)
(1845)
(1889)
(1863)
{1890)

Michigan
46%
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
N. Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island

Combination of
(1) Population
(2) Political
subdivision,
where population predominates

Alaska
Minnesota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Wisconsin

(1959) 12%
(1858)
{1867)
{1784)
(1889)
{1848)

Alaska
Nebraska
s. Carolina
w. Virginia
Wisconsin

I

10%
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original states.

Congress clearly hoped that the settle-

ments, and the states eventually to be carved out of this
territory, would avoid the conflict that had arisen elsewhere.

But this does not necessarily mean that population

was considered by the Ordinance the sole factor appropriate to apportioning representation.

It should not be

forgotten, for example, that the Northwest Ordinance
devised a plan of government for a sparsely settled territory largely devoid of political tradition, of established
local units, of deep-seated sectional loyalties, and of
the other multifarious elements that complicated apportionment in longer established societies.

In this era, the

only readily identifiable factor in the territory would
have been population; but the document is relatively clear
that this "population" was to "elect representatives from
their counties or townships," thus creating a system of
representation not unlike those of the original states.
A review of the actual practice of apportionment and
districting in these original territories and in the
states that emerged from them confirms this view.
The original constitutions of the five states carved
from the Northwest Territory--Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, and Wisconsin--shows that the principle of
"apportionment representation" was interpreted quite
loosely.

The constitutional provisions of all these

states stipulated that apportionment was to be based on
populations; but they simultaneously imposed the
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following restrictions:
1.

County lines could not be violated in drawing district
lines

2.

The provision of equal representation was approximated
by grouping less populous counties into one district

3.

Populous counties elected representatives in multimember districts .
The Issue of Malapportionment
and Districting
The constitutional provisions of these new states

rarely produced significant malapportionment.

Again, we

lack much of the necessary information; but we do know
that county lines were frequently redrawn to reflect
increases in population.

Most of the evidence suggests

that the most extreme population variance ratios in legislative districts did not exceed 2.5-1.

Compared with the

situation in the original states, the districts in the
Ordinance territories and states were indeed "as equal as
possible."
The Politics of Apportionment
Since the population and economies of the five
states were generally homogeneous, they rarely experienced
the complex political intrigues involved in the apportionment politics of the original thirteen states.

The new

states complied with their constitutional provisions and
reapportioned--or more precisely, redistricted--as each
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five-year or ten-year census demanded.

There seemed to be

little or no controversy surrounding such compliance.
In the absence of heated controversy, history rarely
provides details.

For this reason, we know very little

about these early periodic redistrictings.

By 1850,

however, some level of economic, political, or social
diversity had begun to appear in the states of the former
Northwest Territory.

Imitating the older and established

states, the new states now began to alter their formulae
of apportionment and districting--and did so with an eye
to political advantage.

Ohio, for example, and by 1870,

Illinois, 17 changed their constitutions to guarantee each
county at least one representative in the lower house,
regardless of population.

Employing the same arguments

used by the original states in the early period, the new
states changed their apportionment formulae to guarantee
certain interests within the state some "right to be
heard.''

Interestingly, however, these changes generated

little controversy.

Indeed, apportionment did not really

emerge as a controversial issue in these states until the
second decade of the twentieth century.
The Formulae of Apportionment Adopted
in Areas Not Directly Affected by the
Northwest Ordinance: 1812-1889
In many respects, this is the most difficult part of
our brief history.

The years spanned here constituted one

of the most turbulent periods in American history; and more
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states (20) were added to the Union than in any other era.
Our principal focus is on the states admitted to the Union
that were not directly influenced by the provisions of the
Northwest Ordinance.
Institutions of Apportionment
Although the Northwest Ordinance was originally
written to affect only the first states organized and
admitted into the Union, it became the model for all such
legislation.

It was used to organize the territories

that later became Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas; the
territories acquired from Spain (Florida); and the territory acquired through the Mexican-American War (three
states).
The legislation organizing the Territory of Alabama
is an example:
The government when formed shall be republican,
and not repugnant to the principles of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (Article II) which
provided for a "proportional representation of the
people in the legislature.18
The spirit, and frequently the letter, of the
Northwest Ordinance apportionment formulae were also
reproduced in these states' original constitutions.
Louisiana's Constitution of 1812 (the first territory
absorbed as a state) included the following provision
governing representation:
Representation shall be equal and uniform in
this state, and shall be forever regulated and
ascertained by the number of qualified electors
therein.19
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To implement the provision, Louisiana became the first
state to require a census every four years; for the first
time, reapportionment and redistricting of a state legislature were constitutionally tied to population.

There

was also some effort made to prevent the legislature from
failing to reapportion: the Louisiana Constitution of
1812, for example, intentionally restricted the size of
the lower house and limited the creation of new counties.
Similar or identical provisions were faithfully
employed by a number of states created in this era.
Whether the reapportionment formulae were accurately
translated into practice, however, and whether the
'districts could be described as "nearly equal as practicable," is unknown, for the census data is simply
unavailable.
Even though the states admitted into the Union
during this era were substantially affected by the proportionate representation standards of the Northwest
Ordinance, this era also saw experiments with a number of
other factors.

Some analysts have argued that "between

1790 and 1889 no state was admitted to the Union in which
the original constitution did not provide for representation principally based on population in both houses of the
legislatures;

•

•

•

1120 unfortunately, the record does not

substantiate the claim.
The states that were admitted prior to the 1840s,
and that used apportionment provisions based on population,
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had altered these formulae by the mid-nineteenth century.
Louisiana, for example, changed her original provisions to:
{1) guarantee that each parish should have at least one
representative; and (2) prohibit the creation of new
parishes or alterations in the boundaries of established
parishes.

The net effect of these changes was to protect

those regions of the state that were declining in population.
Even before mid-century, moreover, there was a
distinct tendency to move away from population as the sole
factor in apportionment.

The states of Alabama (1819),

Maine (1820), Missouri (1821), Arkansas (1836), Texas
{1845), Florida (1845), Iowa (1845), and California (1850)
all linked representation to their counties in some way,
in most cases with restrictions that each county would be
guaranteed at least one representative.

The obvious

intention of these provisions was to reduce the impact of
population growth: and, of course, malapportionment was the
result.

These later constitutions also coupled such pro-

visions with restrictions on districting (for example, no
rotation of county lines, or if a county was to be represented by more than one representative, no violation of
city boundaries) that tended to exacerbate the malapportionment.
The Politics of Apportionment
In many ways this era is best viewed as the "calm
before the storm."

In the next period of reapportionment,
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beginning in the late 1880s, the majority of states would
begin a great and decided move from population.

Prior to

the 1880s, the issues of immigration, the rise of the
great metropolitan centers, and the increasing effects of
the "Industrial Revolution" were still somewhat ambiguous.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the direct effect of the
standards of population was diminishing even before 1880;
even by mid-century there were harbingers of what was to
come.
The radical changes of the reapportionment provisions
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1812 are an example.
These changes were a direct result of the rural counties'
fear of New Orleans.

In the first quarter of the nine-

teenth century, as the settlements along the Mississippi
began to grow and prosper, New Orleans became one of the
great seaports of the United States.

The commercial

growth attracted population not only from within Louisiana
and the South; the city became a haven and workshop for a
dozen different nationalities newly arrived on the continent.

As it was expressed at the time, the City was

"filling up with all kinds of people"--the kind of people
who might subvert the interests of the rural counties to
meet their own, sometimes desperate, needs. 21

With repre-

sentation geared to population and reapportioned every four
years, New Orleans, with 20 percent of the State's population, was beginning to dominate both houses of the tegislature.
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The Convention was called by the upstate counties to
institute changes before they were overwhelmed.

After much

heated debate, the Convention focused its attention on two
proposals.

The first was a "federal plan"--very similar to

the form adopted by the states in the early decades of the
twentieth century--that would have represented counties
equally in the Senate and based apportionment according to
population in the House.

But this did not satisfy the

rural counties for it would have guaranteed, and perhaps
expanded, the influence of New Orleans. 22

The rural

counties would only accept the provision, eventually made
law, that each parish should be guaranteed representation.
As a consequence, New Orleans was granted only four senators and nine representatives--in a legislature of thirtytwo senators and from seventy to one hundred representatives.

This kind of political battle was not restricted

to Louisiana.

The same events were to occur in Illinois,

Tennessee, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.
A New Elernent--The Gerrymander
In 1812, we have the first clear evidence that the
politics of apportionment were not restricted simply to
manipulation of the formal mechanics of the formula, but
also included the criteria of districting.

The story

describing the origin of the term "gerrymander" is well
known.

It was supposedly coined by Gilbert Stuart, an

artist, who, looking at a map of the redistricting of a
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county in Massachusetts, noticed a strangely shaped
district; sketching in a head, wings, and claws, Stuart
constructed a dragon.

A friend,

who was enjoying the

scene, disagreed and thought it more resembled a salamander; whereupon Stuart is said to have re-named the
beast after the then governor of Massachusetts, Elbridge
Gerry, "Better call it a

'Gerrymander.'"

Since we only have a few of the electoral results,
population figures, or numbers of qualified voters
recorded by districts from any of these early periods, we
can only guess at the full story of the manipulation of
districting for political advantage.

Nor do we know how

prevalent it was, or the degree of abuse.

From as early

as 1800, however, state constitutions registered some
interest in the configurations of districts.

Yet, whether

this was a result of, or the beginning of, "gerrymandering"
is unclear.
The early constitutional criteria were relatively
consistent: they required (in Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire) that districts be, among
other things, "compact" and "of contiguous territory."
The general intent seems to have been that the districts,
like the county lines on which they were based, should
conform to "natural" communities of interest and involve
relatively homogeneous populations.
By the 1840s, these criteria seem to be blended with
political interest.

By that date, the practice of
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influencing the electoral results through districting is
quite clearly in evidence.
The "Little Federal Plan" Revolution
And Malapportionment: 1889-1962
The end of the nineteenth century is a critical
period in the history of apportionment.

The states

admitted into the Union after 1889 saw a culmination of the
movement away from population that had begun in the midnineteenth century; they initiated the formal modeling of
state legislative apportionment formulae after the federal
plan--an upper house apportioned by non-population factors
(counties) and a lower house based on proportionate representation (at least to some extent).

Imitating the new

states, a number of long established states (Connecticut,
Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Vermont) now changed their constitutional provisions.
Similar movements, but using somewhat different formulae
techniques, were found in the states of New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and California.

A third factor was

also added during this period: instead of formally amending
the apportionment formula, a number of states (the best
examples are Alabama, Delaware, Tennessee, Texas, and
Illinois) simply stopped reapportioning.
All of these events had similar causes.

In the

period from 1870 to 1910, the United States was radically
transformed by:

(1) immigration,

(2) rapid economic growth

as the result of the "industrial and commercial revolu-
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tions," and (3) the growth of the great cities and metropolitan centers.

In the decade of 1820-1830, the United

States admitted only 140,000 immigrants; this total grew
rapidly through the middle decades of the nineteenth
century, and, after the Civil War, the level of immigration
leaped geometrically.

In the decade of 1880-1890, the

United States admitted more than five million immigrants,
and by the decade of 1900-1910 the figure had reached nine
million. 23

After the first decade of the twentieth

century, of course, the federal immigration laws were
drastically reformed (bringing the immigration totals back
to pre-Civil War levels).

The first response of the states

was to make voting more difficult by increasing residency
requirements and instituting more stringent registration
requirements.

When this was not sufficient, however, the

focus changed to reapportionment. 24
The Institutions of Apportionment
In 1888, there were thirty-eight states in the Union
employing a great variety of apportionment formulae.

In

almost all the states, as we have seen, apportionment proportionate to population was combined with some representation of political subdivisions.

In 1889, four states were

admitted to the Union (Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
and Washington).

North Dakota, South Dakota, and

Washington adopted apportionment provisions that were
similar to those of the states admitted in mid-century:
the legislature was elected from districts that reflected
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population, but the less populous areas of the state were
given some degree of protection.

In Washington and South

Dakota, district lines were delineated in the constitutions
and the reapportionment process--a legislative responsibility requiring use of federal census data--was restricted
to increasing or decreasing the number of legislators
elected from multi-member (floterial) districts.

In North

Dakota, districts were drawn by the Legislature; but it was
required that districts should not unnecessarily violate
county lines.

In each of the states, the maintenance of

relatively equal population in legislative districts was
the primary focus--but this requirement was balanced by
various geographic factors.
The State of Montana, however, adopted a different
model, and its practices became the harbinger of the
future.

When, in 1889, Congress moved to initiate the

proceedings to admit the Territory of Montana as a state,
the enabling legislation, like so many statutes before it,
stipulated that the State's constitution be "republican
and not repugnant" to the principles of proportionate
population.

But when the State Constitutional Convention

convened, it agreed upon an entirely different principle-a principle that was, without substantial debate, accepted
by Congress.

The State was divided into sixteen counties

that were, in turn, guaranteed equal representation in
the Senate; the lower chamber was modeled after the House
of Representatives, with each county being guaranteed one
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representative (and additional representation apportioned
appropriate to population); there were further provisions
that the three largest counties should elect representatives from floterial districts and that city boundaries
should not be violated by legislative district lines. 25
This complex formula was adopted in the wake of
population growth that had followed the discovery of
copper: the new population had concentrated in the three
western counties (Butte, Anaconda, and Helena).

Composed

mainly of eastern and southern Europeans, this new population was viewed with a jaundiced eye by the older settlements: it should not be trusted, they decided, with full
legislative powers.
This arrangement came to the attention of a number
of states that faced the same situation.

Rural counties

were losing population, in both relative and actual terms,
throughout the country.

Indeed, the Federal Census of 1910

was the last to register a majority of citizens still
residing in rural areas.

The urban areas were filling up

with immigrants who might demand a change in state policy.
Montana's constitutional provisions found their way, with
only slight modifications, into provisions for the new
states of Wyoming and Idaho (1890), Utah (1896),
Oklahoma (1907), Arizona and New Mexico (1912)--and even
Hawaii (1959).
Equally significant, Montana's example was followed
by several existing states.

New York, in 1894, adopted one
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of the most complex formulae in U.S. history to accomplish
a similar desired effect. 26

Pennsylvania, which had

restricted its most populous city and county (Philadelphia)
to a maximum of four senators in 1838, and had guaranteed
each county a representative in the House in 1873, amended
again in 1901 to provide that no more than one-sixt~ of
the senators could come from any one city or county. 27
Ohio adopted a similar amendment in 1900, California in
1926, and Michigan in 1952.
California and Michigan present an interesting perspective on this period, for both States changed their
apportionment formulae through the initiative process and,
in each case, the voters were given a clear choice between
continuing a formula based more or less on population or,
alternatively, adopting a federal plan.

In both States,

the voters chose the new formula (California defeated the
proposal to continue a population base and to establish a
reapportionment commission by a margin of 3-2 and approved
the "federal plan" by a margin of 5-4).

Both states' new

provisions were tested in court (and in California tested
by initiative again in 1928, 1948, and 1960) and uphela. 28
The period between 1889 and 1962 comes to an abrupt
end with Baker v. Carr.

To see this decision in perspec-

tive, the range of apportionment formulae in use in the
states in 1961 should be reviewed ( see table. 4 ) •

TABLE 4
APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO BAKER V. CARR
Apportionment Formulae

Upper House

Representation of
subdivisions with
no regard to
population

Arizona*
Arkansas*
Delaware
Idaho*
Illinois*
Michigan*
Montana

Representation of
subdivisions with
some provisions
for population

Hawaii
Maryland
Mississippi*
Ohio*

Representation based
on population
(with disparity of
district not less
than 25%)

Colorado*
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky*
Massachusetts*
Minnesota*

Combination of
(1) Population
(2) Political
subdivision,
where subdivision
predominates

Alabama
California
Connecticut*
Florida
Georgia*
Iowa

Lower House
Delaware
Vermont*

Nevada*
26%
New Jersey
New Mexico*
N. Dakota*
Oklahoma*
S. Carolina*

None

8%

N. Carolina* 24%
Tennessee*
Virginia*
Washington*
W. Virginia*
Wisconsin*
26%

4%

22%

Colorado
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Michigan

Minnesota
Tennessee
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Connecticut*
Florida

Montana
64%
Nevada*
New Jersey*
New Mexico*
New York*
N. Carolina*

~
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TABLE 4 - Continued
Apportionment Formulae

Lower House

Upper House

Combination of
(1) Population
(2) Political
subdivision,
where subdivision
predominates

Louisiana*
Maine
Rhode Island*
Texas
Utah
Vermont*
Wyoming

26%

Combination of
(1) Population
(2) Political
subdivision,
where population
predominates

Alaska
Missouri*
New Hampshire
New York*

Oregon*
14%
Pennsylvania*
S. Dakota*

Georgia*
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Alaska
New Hampshire*
Oregon*
s. Dakota

N. Dakota
64%
Ohio*
Oklahoma
Tennessee*
Rhode Island
S. Carolina*
Texas*
Utah
W. Virginia*
Wyoming

8%

* Changed from original Constitution

~

....J
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The Politics of Malapportionment
An almost equal number of states either changed their
constitutional apportionment formulae or simply stopped
apportioning.

The effect was the same: malapportionment as

the result of both approaches became more pronounced than
in any period of American history.
The motives behind such approaches were clearly
political.

The "established" political interests sought to

disenfranchise the "new" political forces before they could
gain a foothold.

Without access to the legislatures, the

new constituencies could do little to effect change.
(These conditions, in turn, provided the basis for eventual
judicial involvement.)

Such political motivations, how-

ever, should not be over-simplified.

The radical changes

in the apportionment process were a result of equally
radical changes in the political environment.

A "higher"

motive justifying these changes was articulated in the New
York Constitutional Convention of 1894:

I insist, sir, upon the principle which has been
adopted in a large number of the States of this
Union, in almost every state which has had to deal
with the problem of a great city within its borders,
and the relation of that city to an agricultural
community, that the problem which we have had to
deal with shall be dealt with by us on the same
piinciples; that the small and widely scattered
communities, with their feeble power, because of
their division, shall, by the distribution of
representation, be put on an equal footing, so far
as may be, with the concentrated power of the cities.
Otherwise we can never have a truly representative
and truly republican government.29
The alterations in the apportionment process, of
course, did not go unnoticed.

As the states tried to
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stabilize their institutions in the wake of the social and
economic upheavals of the period, the details of decisions
and their consequent effects were scrutinized and recorded.
Perhaps this accounts for the overwhelming flow of information that was spontaneously generated, really for the first
time, on apportionment and districting.
The Malapportionment of Congress
After 1842, when all the congressional seats were
elected by district, congressional malapportionment became
increasingly apparent in many states.

It is not surprising

that this generated rising controversy, for the U.S.
Constitution stipulates that the House shall be apportioned,
once state minimums are fulfilled, by population within
the states.

Furthermore, in 1901, Congress stipulated in

the Reapportionment Act (which was passed to prescribe the
number of representatives assigned to each state) that
congressional districts were to be "compact, of contiguous
territory, and as nearly of equal population as practicable.1130

It remained uncommon, however, for congressional

districts in any state to range in size from smallest to
largest by a factor of greater than five to two.
were blatant exceptions, of course.

There

By 1946, for example,

the largest congressional district in Illinois included
914,053 voters, while the smallest held only 112,116.
Other states that declined to reapportion in the face of
growing population disparities were not so egregiously out
of line: Georgia (823,680 to 272,154), Ohio (698,650 to
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163,561), Maryland (534,568 to 195,427), Texas (528,961 to
230,010), Florida (439,895 to 186,831) . 31

When the Supreme

Court in Colegrove v. Green 32 refused to mandate reapportionment, most of the states contiruedtheir policy of
neglect.
Congressional districts throughout this period were
drawn by state legislatures, which were themselves ''malapportioned."

The criteria of districting were not uniform,

but most of the states drew congressional districts
enclosing several state senate districts--unless, of cours~
the urban/rural split meant drawing around the metropolitan
areas.
There were, nevertheless, several attempts to rectify
congressional malapportionment before the Court intervened
in Westbury v. Sanders in 1964. 33

In 1936, a bill was

introduced in Congress that called for at-large congressional elections if the population of the largest congressional district exceeded the smallest in a given state by
more than 50 percent.

Other bills, modeled after this

first bill, were introduced in the late 1940s and 50s and
called for reapportionment, sometimes with and sometimes
without specifying appropriate remedies or penalties.

In

every case, the bills failed to reach the floor of the
House.
The Malapportionment of the
State Legislatures
In the state legislatures, malapportionment varied
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widely from state to state.

None of the states employed

criteria of apportionment for districting that fulfilled
the requirement of the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote"
ruling in Reynolds v. Sims; but neither were all the states
equally malapportioned.

Only Delaware failed to recognize

some degree of population variance in either house and
only thirteen states failed to apportion at least one of
their houses by population.

In addition, only ten states

went without apportioning or reapportioning one of their
houses for more than forty years.

In 1962, then, there

were twenty-seven states that made some allowance for population.
The levels of malapportionment were, nevertheless,
pronounced.
perspective.

There are two studies that provide national
Research funded by the University of Virginia

revealed that, after the 1960 Census, counties of under
25,000 population had more than doubled the representative
strength in state legislatures of counties of more than
100,000 population. 34

Using somewhat different criteria,

the National Municipal League issued a report in 1962
showing that in only six states were both houses of the
legislature apportioned so that at least 40 percent of the
state's population was needed to elect a majority of
.
.
representatives
in
eac h . 35

Only twenty states had even

one house for which at least 40 percent of the electorate
was required to elect a legislative majority.

Finally, in

thirteen states, one-third of the population or less could
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elect a solid majority of both houses of the legislature.
The Politics of Reapportionment
and Districting: 1962-1970s
Only some of the more important issues of this era
may be touched on in this account.

The complex legal man-

euvering is analyzed in a succeeding chapter on "Reapportionment, Redistricting, and the Law."

Despite the over-

riding significance of these legal questions, however,
political maneuvering played an important part.

It is

best understood if separated into three periods:
1.

From Baker to Reynonds.

2.

The political response to Reynolds.

3.

The reapportionment after the 1970 censusr
From Baker to Reynolds
With our acquired historical perspective, Baker v.

Carr can be appreciated in its full importance--as a new,
sweeping restructuring of the apportionment process.

What

is equally remarkable, perhaps, is the unprecedented
rapidity and scope of the states' responses to Baker.

Once

the deadlock of the first sixty years of the twentieth
century was broken, the states quickly concentrated on
erecting a new system.

By late 1963, reapportionment was

on the agenda of all but three of the states (none of these
three had scheduled sessions), and twenty-six had approved
redistricting plans for at least one of their legislative
chambers.

Confusion, with equal measures of anger and
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enthusiasm, abounded; but, in one way and another, the
states complied with the Courts' mandates.
Baker itself was a relatively limited decision;
although reapportionment was declared a justiciable issue,
the Court had not articulated clear criteria for the creation of "equal population districts."

The reapportionment

revolution would unfold in several stages; and, from 1962
to 1964, the states were given latitude for experimentation
This early stage laid the basis for the modus operandi of
the Court's involvement: the states would try to experiment
within the horizon of each successive court pronouncement,
which would, in turn, give rise to new litigation and new
judicial criteria to guide the states' new effort.

A

short list of the issues first raised in this early period
will suffice:
1.

What was the appropriate base population for reapportionment?

Would it be constitutional to base it on

registered voters, and to exclude students, military
personnel, or aliens?

Was it necessary to use the

federal census data?
2.

What was the minimum allowable ratio of disparity?

3.

What was the status of political or traditional subdivisions?

4.

What was the status of party competition, current
districts, or party registration?
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Reynolds v. Sims and the Political Backlash
This era of relative freedom ended abruptly on July
15, 1964, with the Reynolds decision that declared all geographic and demographic dispersion formulae unconstitutional.

More significant to the political history, the

Court ruled using the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Such a ruling severely restricted

the options of political opposition.

Any limitation on

the Court's decision could be achieved only by constitutional amendment or by congressional revocation of judicial
jurisdiction in the reapportionment process.

Political

opposition, therefore, focused on both these alternatives.
Congressional Action
By mid-August, 1964, 130 resolutions and bills had
been introduced, supported by 99 members, to a divided
Congress. 36

The proposed legislation concentrated on three

strategies: congressional restrictions of jurisdiction,
delays in state compliance or stays in Court involvement,
and the more permanent solution of a constitutional amendment.
The efforts to restrict, either entirely or partially, the Court's jurisdiction in apportionment cases
were relatively short-lived.

Emmanuel Celler (Democrat,

New York), the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
and a veteran advocate of reapportionment reform, successfully bottled up the legislation.

The single exception

was a bill, submitted by Representative Tuck of Virginia,
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proposing to withdraw jurisdiction from all federal courts
"seeking to apportion or reapportion the legislature of
any State of the Union or branch thereof. 1137

Cleverly

bypassing Celler's committee, Tuck succeeded in gathering
sufficient support for the bill and it became the only
House-passed bill relevant to the controversy.

In a move

that effectively foredoomed this strategy, however, the
Senate dismissed the Tuck bill without serious debate.
The effort to stay further Court action was equally
short-lived.

One effort was led principally by Senator

Dirksen (Republican, Illinois)--but only to "buy time" for
his proposed constitutional amendment.

The Senator was

successful in moving the legislation through the Senate
Judiciary Committee, without hearings, and onto the floor.
Unable to secure sufficient floor support, however, he
was forced to propose it as a rider to the foreign aid
bill--a bill that was almost certain to pass.

I

But even in

this form, the bill was defeated.
Restrictions on the Court's jurisdiction were controversial (and it was feared that the Court might declare
such legislation unconstitutional), but appeared to many
the only viable means available to Congress.

The House

and the Senate were badly split over this issue.

To avoid

further filibustering in the Senate, and to clear the
calendars of both houses, the Senate Majority Leader, Mike
Mansfield, submitted a "sense-of-Congress" resolution,
passed 44-38, that required the Court to "allow" the state
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legislatures freedom from further litigation so that they
might reapportion themselves (and prescribed a six-month
moratorium); it also requested from the Courts a stay of
state compliance until after the 1964 elections.

For the

most part, however, these requests were not honored.

The

majority of the lower federal courts hurried through their
reapportionment plans in time for the 1964 elections, and
only a few jurists either delayed judgment or kept their
distance from the legislatures' deliberations.
By far the most important strategy for overturning
the Reynolds decision was the proposed constitutional
amendment.

Five months after the decision, the Board of

Managers of the Council of State Governments and the
Seventeenth Biennial General Assembly of the States both
called for an amendment to permit the use of apportionment
formulae other than population in at least one house.
These resolutions, coupled with the amendments submitted
to the House and Senate by Senator Frank Church of Idaho,
Senator Jacob Javits of New York, and Senator Dirksen, gave
increased legitimacy to the political opposition to the
"legal thicket."
Of all the proposed amendments considered, the
Dirksen amendment received the most attention

Although

itself amended many times in its two year life-span, it
included the following main features:
1.

Authorization for apportionment of one house of a
bicameral legislature "upon factors other than
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population."
2.

Unicameral legislatures should be permitted to give
"reasonable weight" to nonpopulation factors.

3.

The apportionment formulae adopted by the state legislatures were to be submitted to popular vote and
approved by a majority of those voting in an election
that would also pose the alternative choice of a
"Reynolds" apportionment formula based on population. 38
The Senate debated the proposed amendments during

the summer of the first anniversary of the Reynolds decision.
issue.

It was a heated debate that ranged over the entire
In the end, however, the Senate rejected the

amendment: Dirksen gained a plurality, but not the needed
two-thirds majority.

The amendment required a state call

for a constitutional convention; but this also failed to
attract the necessary support (32 states approved of the
needed 34).
The Senate debates, ironically perhaps, turned on
the "history" of apportionment in the United States.
Those opposing the amendment relied on the Court's historical analysis and on a number of scholarly reports that
claimed that state arrangements frustrating numerical
equality in legislative districts were not consistent with
that history.

Unable to rebut these claims, the argument

supporting the amendment appeared untraditional, unfounde~
and undemocratic.
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State Action
The initial state response was twofold: as it was
phrased in California, the state needed both "a battle and
a capitulation plan. 1139
1.

The Battle Plan:

Because the states' actions depended

la gely on effective congressional remedies, a number of
states led lobbying efforts for bills in Congress.

Groups,

both official and unofficial, in California, Michigan,
Idaho, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Florida, and other
states, formed "flying truth squads" to marshall arguments
and political support either for a congressionally-passed
amendment or for a call for a constitutional convention.
The intent was to "exhaust all possible remedies to allow
us to keep the bicameral legislative system as we have
known it. 1140

Although this activity would continue, at

various levels of intensity, through the summer of 1967,
it ultimately failed to accomplish its goals.
2.

The Capitulation Plan:

The states' "capitulation"

took the form of tests of the Court's criterion of "as
nearly equal as practicable."

Chief Justice Earl Warren

had justified some experimentation in one part of the
Reynolds decision:
A state may legitimately decide to maintain the
integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible . . . . Valid considerations may
underlie such aims. Indiscriminate districting,
without any regard for political subdivisions or
natural or historic boundary lines, may be little
more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering . . . . So long as the divergencies from
a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation

59

of a rational state policy, some deviations from the
equal population principle are constitutionally perrnissable.41
(Emphasis added).
Exploiting this loophole, a number of states-including Montana, New York, and Missouri--tried to discover the "minimum allowable deviations."

Other states

attempted to satisfy the Court's principle through use of
multi-member districts or experimentation with acceptable
population bases.

Court responses to these plans, already

delineated above, continued through the 1970 reapportionment process; but the great majority of all these state
efforts were judicially frustrated.
The Reapportionment After the 1970 Census
In the eight years following the first wave of
reapportionment, hundreds of cases were decided by federal
and state courts and a series of Supreme Court pronouncements were issued intended to clarify the constitutional
requirements.

By 1970, however, there were still no clear-

cut guidelines of precisely what was and what was not constitutional; and many substantial issues had not yet been
fully reviewed.

To add to the confusion, the Court, on

the eve of the 1970 Census, delineated the most precise
requirements for congressional districting (in Wells 42 and
Kirkpatrick 43 ), but relaxed some of the requirements for
precision in state and local legislative districts (in
Abate v. Mundt 44 ).
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Institutions of Apportionment
The redistricting after the 1970 census was not as
confused and misdirected, of course, as the convulsions of
the mid-sixties.

The "political battle plans" had failed

to affect materially the Court's dedication to its principle of "equality," and much of the "experimentation" or
"testing" of the first wave of state plans was absent.
Moreover, many of the states' reapportionment plans had
been in effect for only one or two elections and the process generally involved relatively minor up-dating.

A

total of 62 percent (31 of the 50 states) of the plans
enacted in the wake of the 1970 Census were challenged in
the courts; but, unlike the experience after Baker, few
were overturned as unconstitutional.
The uniform application of the principle of "one
man, one vote" had, by 1973, substantially transformed the
reapportionment process into a process of redistricting.
There was, however, one significant change in some of the
states' institutional arrangements.

Although forty-one

states continued to rely on legislative deliberation,
nine states removed the initial responsibility from their
legislatures.

Seven states--Arkansas, Hawaii, Michigan,

Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania--provided for
special boards or commissions to redistrict after the 1970
census.

Two states--Alaska and Maryland--required the

Governor to submit a plan.

One hope from such approaches

was that, by removing the process from the legislature,
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some better degree of equity might be assured; another
motive, perhaps more important, was to keep redistricting
plans from being drawn in court.
It may provide further perspective on the period to
notice that, in almost every instance, these goals of
commission redistricting were at least partially frustrated
The commissions or committees were either "bipartisan" or
"nonpartisan;" yet, the plans proposed were recognized
consistently to reflect the partisan interest of the majority party.

In five of the states, commission plans were

either redrawn by the legislature, or drawn as a result of
litigation, or redrawn by yet another commission appointed
as a substitute.

Three of the state reapportionment

commissions could not come to any agreement on how to
redistrict.

There was only marginal success in avoiding

the intervention of the Courts; these plans were challenged
only half as frequently as legislative plans.
The Politics of Apportionment;
Redistricting and
the Gerrymander
The Court justified its entrance into the "political
thicket" by way of the "Equal Protection Clause," presuming
that "equal election districts" were a prerequisite for
"equal representation."

The argument was, and is, reason-

ably persuasive--as far as it goes.

In the course of their

decisions, the Courts removed some of the explicit partisan
manipulation that had been near the heart of the apportion-

ment controversy from the very beginning.

All state legi-

slative and congressional districts now fulfill the criteria of equality of population.

The one area that

remained open to political stratagem, however, was the
partisan gerrymander; indeed, there is much evidence that
the Courts' involvement in reapportionment and redistricting was followed by an unprecedented wave of gerrymanders.
Although the Court, as early as 1964, seemed to
oppose the partisan gerrymander as fundamentally inconsistent with "equal protection," it has been reluctant to
assume jurisdiction.

The only major case where the Court

ever confronted the issue was Noun et al v. Turner
(Iowa) , 45 where litigation was grounded,at least in part,
on the presence of gerrymandering; yet, the Court chose to
rule on other grounds.

The states are, therefore, still

free to protect encumbents, to confine party competition
within limits favorable to the majority party, and in
other ways to introduce purely political considerations
into the design of districts.
The net result of this freedom is that much intelligence, energy, and technological resources are now
directed to realizing political goals in redistricti~g.
Unfortunately, the data is not yet available to assess the
full character of this new redistricting politics.

One

reasonably reliable way, however, to calculate the
presence of a possible gerrymander--the disparity between
votes cast for party candidates and the percentage of
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party representation in the legislature--indicates that
gerrymandering is present to some significant degree in at
least 35 of the 50 states.
The Effects of Reapportionment
and the Prospects
It is probably too soon to evaluate the long-term
effects of the reapportionment revolution.

A preliminary

conclusion might be that the effects have not been so substantial as predicted.

Party competition, although

adversely impacted by the wave of partisan gerrymandering,
has continued at reasonable levels in many states.

It is

far from clear that the policies adopted by the new
"reapportionment legislatures" have been much different
from those embraced by the old "malapportioned legislatures."

And it is unproved that minorities or suburbs or

other groups have been significantly benefited.
Conclusion
In the course of this history, we have traced the
principles, institutions, and politics that have played a
part in the controversy surrounding apportionment, reapportionment, and redistricting in the United States.

In

one sense, events since 1962 have made much of this
history irrelevant; in another sense, recent events can
only be understood against the backdrop of that history.
One lesson above all is suggested by our historical

.

review.

It is that, whatever success the Court has had,
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or may have in the future, in ensuring "equality of representation," the struggle over the structures and processes
of representation in this country will continue.
(See Appendix following for examples of recent legislative gerrymanders.)
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CHAPTER II
REDISTRICTING AND THE LAW
Overview
Beginning in 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court took jurisdiction over complaints against "rnalapportionment" and
quickly developed population standards for redistricting
state legislative, congressional, and other electoral
districts.

It was a dramatic turnabout; as recently as

1947, in Colegrove v. Green, 1 the Court had denied relief
in a case challenging an Illinois congressional districting plan that gave one district nine times as many people
as another.

In dismissing the challenge, the Court had

then held that malapportionment was not "justiciable"-not appropriate for resolution by a court.

"The courts,"

said Justice Felix Frankfurter in presenting the Colegrove
opinion, "ought not to enter this political thicket."
Key Decisions
The major decisions through which the Court entered
the reapportionment "thicket" are:
1.

Baker v. Carr (1962) . 2

A group of urban resi-

dents of Tennessee had challenged the make-up of the
rurally controlled State n egislature.

Al tho~gh the

Tennessee Constitution provided for a population-based
68
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apportionment and required decennial reapportionments, no
apportionment changes had been made since 1901--despite
great population growth and shifts.

By 1960, lower house

districts ranged from 3,454 to 79,301 in population--a
disparity of 23-1; Senate districts ranged from 39,727 to
237,905--a 6-1 disparity.

The Court held that the issue

was justiciable: that the federal courts had jurisdiction
over complaints against rnalapportioned legislatures.

The

Court refused, however, to specify what lesser population
disparity might be constitutional or to consider appropriate remedies; the case was remanded to the lower court.
Justice Felix Frankfurter's dissenting opinion
read, in part:
What, then, is this question of legislative apportionment? Appellants invoke the right to vote and
have their votes counted. But they are permitted
to vote and their votes are counted. They go to
the polls, they cast their ballots, they send their
representatives to the state councils. Their complaint is simply that the representatives are not
sufficiently numerous or powerful--in short, that
Tennessee has adopted a basis of representation with
which they are dissatisfied . . . What is actually
asked of the Court in this case is to choose among
competing bases of representation, really, among
competing theories of political philosophy.
Appeal for relief, Frankfurter insisted, should not be
made in the courts but rather "to an informed, civically
militant electorate."
2.

Gray v. Sanders ('1963) . 3

The case presented a

challenge to Georgia's county unit system of voting in
statewide and congressional primary elections, which gave
each county a certain number of votes, usually the number
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of its seats in the State Legislature.

The Court held

that use of the system deprived city residents of equal
protection of the laws and ruled that "within a given
constituency, there can be room for but a single constitutional rule--one voter, one vote."
The majority opinion, written by Justice William
0. Douglas, emphasized that the decision did not reach the
question of state or federal legislative districts of
unequal size.

But the ground was laid:

"The concept of

'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no
preferred class of voters, but equality among those who
meet the basic qualifications."

In dissent, Justice John

M. Harlan said that the decision "surely flies in the face

of history . . . "

The principle of "one person, one vote"

had "never been the universally accepted political philosophy of England, the A..1TLerican Colonies, or the United
States."

He said a state should have the authority to

grant more voice to rural areas, either in election of
state legislators or statewide officials, "in order to
assure against a predominantly 'city point of view' in the
administration of the state's affairs."
3.

Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) . 4

The Court struck

down Georgia's congressional districting plan, holding
that Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution required
that "as nearly as is practicable, one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as
another's."
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Commenting on this case in a later decision, Chief
Justice Warren stated, "Wesberry clearly established that
the fundamental principle of representative government in
this country is one of equal representation for equal
numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic
status, or place of residence within a state."
4.

Reynolds v. Sims (1964) . 5

The Court announced

decisions in six reapportionment cases on June 15, 1964,
which came to be known collectively by the name of the
first case, Reynolds v. Sims, from Alabama.

The rulings

held all six state reapportionments unconstitutional and
established several major points:
a) The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution "requires that the seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis."
b) Legislative districts must be substantially equal.
c)

Mathematical "exactness of precision" may be impossible,
but apportionment must be "based substantially on population."

d) Even if approved by a majority of the people in an
initiative or referendum, an apportionment that is not
based on substantial equality of population is unconstitutional:

"A citizen's constitutional rights can

hardly be infringed upon because a majority of the
people choose to do so."

e) Any other basis for representation, other than
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population, is discriminatory: "Legislators represent
people, not trees or acres."

They are "elected by

voters, not farms or cities or economic interests."
5.

Swann v. Adams (1967) . 6

In this case, the Court

began to elaborate its definition of equality of populatio~
Florida's state legislative reapportionment plan was overturned because it contained Senate districts ranging from
15.09 percent above the average district and 10.56 below,
and House districts ranging from 18.28 percent above to
15.27 percent below.
6.

Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969) . 7

The Court

ruled that "the 'as nearly equal as practicable' standard
requires that the state make good faith effort to achieve
precise mathematical equality.

Unless population vari-

ances among congressional districts are shown to have
resulted despite such effort, the state must justify each
variance, no matter how small."

The Court held that

Missouri had failed to justify the deviations in its 1967
redistricting plan, and overturned it.

The deviations

were very small; the most populous district was 3.13 percent above the average district and the least populous was
2.84 percent below.
7.

Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971) . 8

A challenge was

presented to a state legislative reapportionment in Indiana
on the basis that the use of multi-member districts
resulted in invidious discrimination against the black
voters of Indianapolis.

The Court held that the
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challengers had not proved that the multi-member districts
had operated unconstitutionally to dilute or cancel the
voting strength of racial or political elements in the
state.
In a 1960 case, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court
had outlawed racial gerrymandering, finding that the city
boundaries of Tuskagee, Alabama, had been drawn to exclude
Negro voters in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.

In

1964, in Wright v. Rockefeller, however, the Court
dismissed a challenge to New York's congressional districts
brought by voters who charged that Manhattan's seventeenth "silk stocking" district was gerrymandered to
exclude Negroes and Puerto Rican citizens.

Wright and

Whitcomb were widely cited as evidence that the Court was
unwilling to deal with the whole problem of gerrymandering,
whether racial or partisan gerrymanders.
8.

Mahan v. Howell (1973) . 9

Justified deviations

in population of state leaislative districts were set at
a significantly higher level than in the Kirkpatrick
ruling on congressional districts.

The Court upheld a

1971 Virginia state legislative reapportionment plan with
a population deviation from the largest to the smallest
district of 16.4 percent: the Court indicated, however,
that "this percentage may well approach tolerable limits."
The Court noted that the plan "may reasonably be said to
achieve the rational state policy of respecting the
boundaries of political subdivisions."
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In two other cases in 1973 the Court hinted at
further guidelines on the meaning of "equality."

In

Gaffney v. Cummings, Connecticut's 1971 state legislative
reapportionment plan was upheld, despite a deviation of
7.83 percent between the largest and smallest districts,
and despite rather clear evidence of the use of partisan
data in the drawing of district lines.

The Court ruled

that "minor deviations from mathematical equality among
state legislative districts are insufficient to make out
a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the
state."

In White v. Weiser, however, the Court overturned

a Texas congressional districting plan with maximum deviations of 2.43 percent above and 1.7 percent below the
average on grounds that the deviations "were not 'unavoidable,' and the districts were not as mathematically equal
as reasonably possible."
9.

Chapman v. Meier (1975) . 10

The Court rejected

a court-ordered state legislative redistricting plan in
North Dakota involving multi-member districts.

The ruling

was that "unless there are persuasive justifications," a
court-ordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature
must avoid use of multi-member districts.

The Court care-

fully noted that it was not ruling that multi-member districts were unconstitutional, but merely exercising its
supervisory powers over lower federal courts.
10.

United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (1977) . 11

Legislative modification of a New York redistricting plan
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(in order to bring it into compliance with the 1965 Voting
Rights Act) had divided a community of Hasidic Jews to
establish several substantially non-white districts in
Kings County.

The Court upheld the plan, ruling that such

a use of racial criteria did not violate either the
Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendments.
Response to Court Decisions
The Court's decision on Baker v. Carr in 1962 was
followed by a flurry of citizen suits challenging malapportionment in state legislatures.

By March 1964, 26

states had approved new apportionment plans.

Alabama,

Oklahoma, and Tennessee were redistricted under courtdrafted plans; several states redistricted under court
threats of postponement of elections or at-large elections.
In Delaware, a court order gave the Legislature 12 days
to reapportion; Wisconsin was given 19 days, and Michigan
33 days.

Faced with these examples of judicial severity,

most states now voluntarily undertook reapportionments.
At the time of the Reynolds decision in June 1964,
court action on reapportionment was underway in 39 states.
The 1964 decisions further accelerated the process.

Two

years later, legislatures in 46 of the 50 states had
brought their apportionments into some degree of compliance with judicial standards of population equality. 12
Indeed, by this point, several states were experiencing
their second reapportionment of the decade: legislatures
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that had been reapportioned after Baker now adopted their
own new plans.

In a few states, reapportionment had been

handed over to specially created commissions, established
by statute or by constitutional amendment.

In some states,

too, constitutional provisions requiring geographic or
other modifications to population-based apportionments
were abandoned or amended.

Elsewhere, states created

multi-member and floterial districts in order to preserve
the boundaries of traditional political subdivisions in
their districting systems.

A number of states actually

changed the size of their state legislatures in order to
accommodate to population-based apportionments.
Although in the period 1963 through 1965 there had
been movements in Congress (principally, the so-called
"Dirksen Amendment")

and in the states (backed by groups

such as the American Farm Bureau Federation) to limit the
effect of the Court decisions, these faltered and faded
from sight by the late 1960s.

By 1970, the state legi-

slatures were all effectively based on equal population;
thus there was no longer any impetus in the movement to
resist "one man, one vote."

The "Reapportionment

Revolution," a dramatic, judiCE.lly-imposed change in the
character of the representative system, was apparently
complete.
In the sections that follow, more detailed commentary is provided on Court actions in the period 1962-79~
There are three areas of focus: congressional redistrictin~

state legislative redistricting, and redistricting on the
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local level.
Congressional Redistricting
Of the three levels of reapportionment litigation,
congressional equal representation cases show the Court in
its most exacting and demanding posture.

"One man, one

vote" guides in this area have been extremely tight from
their beginning in 1964, and later cases have served
further to tighten some of the guides by fending off any
attempted linkages between state legislative and congressional reapportionments.

In this area, the Court has

remained unyielding in preserving "as nearly as is practicable1113 equality of population standards.

The Court

has not been willing to set a specific maximum allowable
deviation, but has required that any deviations may be
justified only after the test of a "good faith effort" has
been applied against the state. 14
The adamancy of the Court in these cases seems to
be explained best in light of certain key concepts:
(1) the federal government possesses "sovereignty" over
the constitution of the House of Representatives, which
is one of the arms of the federal government;

(2) the

right of the Court to review these cases is based on the
time-tested case of Marbury v. Madison; 15 (3) the foundation for the Court's intervention comes not from an amendment to the Constitution, but from the Constitution itself,
Article 1, Section 2. 16
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The line of cases to be analyzed here begins with
Wesberry v. Sanders in 1964. 17

The case concerned itself

with alleged malapportionment in Georgia's congressional
districts, involving a ratio between the largest and the
smallest districts of over 3-1.

It was in this case that

the Court interpreted Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution to mean that "as nearly as practicable, each man's
vote in a congressional election shall count just as much
as another's." 18

The Court went on to argue that the

debates at the Constitutional Convention clearly showed
that the framers intended apportionment to be based
squarely on equal numbers of people in each district.
Justice Black drove the point home when he wrote for the
Court in the Wesberry decision:
While it may not be possible to draw congressional
districts with mathematical precision, that is not
excuse for ignoring our Constitution's plain objective of making equal representation of the people
the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives.
That is the high standard of justice and common sense
which the Founders set for us.19

.

From the beginning, the Court made it known that, in congressional districting, anything less than exact equality
in population would not be allowed.
This hard line was strengthened and continued in two
cases decided on the same day in 1969, Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler 20 and Wells v. Rockefeller. 21

Kirkpatrick

concerned itself with an alleged malapportionment of the
Missouri congressional districts (involving a maximum
deviation of 5.97 percent), and Wells dealt with
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malapportionment in New York (a congressional plan involving a deviation of 13.086 percent).
served to:

The two cases

(1) eliminate speculation as to maximum allow-

able unjustified population variance;

(2) make clear the

parameters by which variances would be measured; and
(3) eliminate various arguments that were then being used
to justify deviations in both state legislative and congressional reapportionment schemes.

Essentially, the

cases involved an explication of the meaning of "as nearly
as practicable" as enunciated in Wesberry.
The Court rejected a de minimi.s population deviationa level below which population deviations will not be
questioned--at the outset of the Kirkpatrick opinion.
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court:
The whole thrust of the "as nearly as practicable"
approach is inconsistent with adoption of fixed
numerical standards which excuse population variance~ without re~~rd to the circumstances of each
particular case.
Brennan further argued that the setting of a de minimi.s
level would:

(1) be an arbitrary action; and (2) involve

setting a target range toward which legislators would
.
work, rather than true popu 1 ation
equa 1·t
1 y. 23

Instead of setting a specific de minimis level, the
Court indicated that all variances from population
equality had to be shown to be unavoidable "despite a good
faith effort to achieve absolute equality."

24

If a "good

faith effort'' could not be shown, then justification for
the variances was required.

Should the state be unable to
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justify variances absent a good faith effort, the Court
claimed its right to void the plan on the grounds of
violation of the Federal Constitution.
Missouri and New York were unable to show evidence
of a good faith effort in the drawing of their respective
reapportionment plans and, as a result, they had to attempt
to justify the deviations as the outgrowth of a policy or
other consideration that the Court would deem nonviolative
of the Constitution. 25

Kirkpatrick presented a number of

interests that Missouri thought would justify the population variances.

The criteria that Missouri employed were:

(1) preservation of political subdivision integrity,
(2) preservation of political balance, and (3) compactness
of the districts themselves. 26
all three of these claims.

The Court ruled against

As to the first two, the Court

was of the opinion that partisan politics should not enter
into the question:
Problems created by partisan politics cannot justify
an apportionment which does not otherwise pass
constitutional muster.27
. . . an argument that deviations from equality are
justified in order to inhibit legislators from
engaging in partisan gerrymandering is no more than
a variant of the argument, already rejected, that
considerations of practical politics can justify
population disparities. 28
The Court continued on to reject the third criterion by
citing Reynolds to show that contemporary communication
techniques have outdated the notion that distance prevents
constituents from maintaining close contact with their
representatives. 29

The Court then specifically addressed
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the Missouri plan, noting that "a state's preference for
pleasingly shaped districts can hardly justify population
variances." 30
The opinions in Kirkpatrick and Wells gave greater
clarity to the considerations that may permissibly be
taken into account in congressional districting.

The

rejection of political considerations and standards of
compactness served to reinforce the Court's unyielding
position that population exactness is the overriding consideration.

All variances must be shown to be unavoidable

or otherwise justified by reasons other than subdivision
integrity, political fairness, compactness, or anticipation
of expected population shifts.
The Kirkpatrick and Wells opinions have stood
basically unchallenged and intact since they were handed
down in 1969. 31

An interpretation of the "good faith

effort" requirement by a

ower court is found in the case

of Drum v. Scott, 32 decided in 1971.

The District Court

considered a "good faith effort" to have been made
because:
Unlike Missouri, the orth Carolina Legislature
considered and debated alternate plans and did not
reject without consideration a plan which would
have rnarkedl~ reduced population variances among
the states.3
This is a slight departure from the line pursued in
Kirkpatrick.

Although it was not appealed to the Supreme

Court, it may be significant in that:

(1) since the total

maximum deviation was only 3.79 percent, it may indicate
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a quasi de minirnis level below which less justification is
required; and (2) there appeared to be a slight shift in
the burden of proof toward those who seek to show that a
plan is not representative.
Two of the most recent Supreme Court cases concerning
a de rninimis level, White v. Weiser 34 and Chapman v. Meier,
however, have served to strengthen the refusal to adopt a
de minirnis position.

Justice White, in writing for the

Court in the Texas case of White v. Weiser, upheld a lower
court ruling that struck down a plan with 4.13 percent
population deviation and called for a plan with .149 percent total maximum deviation.

In a tight application of

Kirkpatrick and Wells to deviations, White noted:
. . . we agree with the District Court that under
the standards of those cases, they (deviations)
were not unavoidable, and the districts were not
as mathematically equal as reasonably possible.36
Speaking directly to those who desire a de rninirnis variance level to be set, White commented:
It is clear, however, that at some point or level
in size, population variances do import invidious
devaluation . . . and represent a failure to accord
him (the voter) fair and effective representation.37
It is significant to note, however, that the Court remanded
the case back to the District Court because the plan that
the Court had ordered to be implemented was counter to
established state policy.

Nevertheless, any hopes that the

Court would greatly soften its position on allowable population deviations were squelched in the last paragraph of
the opinion:
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The District Court should not, in the name of state
policy, refrain from providing remedies fully adequate to redressing constitutional violations which
have been adjudicated and must be rectifiea.38
One of the last cases to speak directly to congressional reapportionment was Chapman in 1975.

Justice

Blackmun made it clear that the Court would still pursue,
in the future,the highest standards as to equipopulous
representation in the House of Representatives.
We have acknowledged that some leeway in the equal
population requirement should be afforded states
in devising their legislative reapportionment plans;
as contrasted to congressional districting, where
population equality appears to be the pre-eminent,
if not the sole, criterion, on which to adjudge
constitutionality.39
Summary on Congressional Redistricting
From the beginning of the congressional reapportionment cases in Wesberry v. Sanders, to the most recent
opinion about them in Chapman v. Meier, the Court has
remained steadfast in its position that "one man, one vote"
is to mean exactly that.

The Court began in 1964 by

striking down plans with a 3-1 population variance and has
continued to the point where it now orders to be put into
effect plans with a total maximum deviation of · .149 percent.40

Moreover, no clear end is in sight to this tend-

ency, for the Court continues to refuse to indicate a de
minimis level below which population deviations would not
have to be justified:
Chapman.)

(Kirkpatrick, Wells, White, and

Indeed, any justifications for congressional

district deviations are hard to find in the opinions of
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the Court.

Unlike state legislative reapportionment

cases, the Court has refused to count the preservation of
political subdivision integrity as a viable policy by
which to determine congressional representation.

"One

man, one vote" has truly reached its zenith in congressional districting.

It remains, of course, to be seen

if equally populous congressional districts in each state
will greatly improve representation.
State Legislative Redistricting
State legislative reapportionment has been at the
forefront of the apportionment debate from the time that
the questions of redistricting were first deemed justiciable.

It was in Baker v. Carr 41 that the Court,

speaking through Justice Brennan, took the reapportionment question from its traditional political setting.
Although the Court did not move to redistrict the
Tennessee Legislature itself, by sending the case back to
the District Court for appropriate action, it took the
first and decisive step into the "political thicket."

In

the paragraphs that follow, we will investigate the path
that the Courts have followed in defining "equality" as a
voting standard in state legislative districting.
The first cases decided with respect to state
reapportionment were not aimed at establishing an exact
standard to define population equality, but were pointed
toward setting the "ground rules" by which future cases
would be decided.

The most prominent of the cases

decided in 1964 was Reynolds v. Sims. 43
case that the Court:
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It was in that

(1) significantly strengthened its

argument for dealing with problems of reapportionment and
barriers to representation; 44

(2) established distinctions

between congressional and state legislative apportionrnent;45 and (3) announced some tentative and preliminary
standards by which equality in population would be defined
and determined. 46

The third point is of chief importance

for our purposes.
Three statements of great import for the future
development of equality standards were made by Chief
Justice Warren in the Reynolds decision.

"Legislators

represent people," he declared, "not trees or acres. 1147
By this first statement, the Court appeared to be discounting all other factors except population when determining "equality."

Warren argued that the bedrock of the

American political system was the ability of the people to
elect representatives in an unobstructed manner--and that
this bedrock was protected by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The representation of

interests, in was implied, would act as an obstruction to
free elections. 48

(The argument was taken to the point

that bicameralism not totally based on population equality
was held to be forbidden by the Equal Protection Claus~) 49
Warren's second key statement was that mathematical
exactness was not a requirement in state apportionment
questions. 50

Here we have what appears in retrospect to
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be the first evidence that the Court would be less strict
in judging population equality in state plans than in
congressional plans.
Warren's third key statement somewhat softened the
tone of his first:
So long as the divergences from a strict population
standard are based on a rational state policy, some
deviations from the equal-population principle are
constitutionally permissible . . . 51
Here the Court seemed to leave itself open to a flexible
standard of allowable deviation that would be applied to
each state individually.
In rather general terms, one may say that Warren's
second and third points still stand today, indeed have
strengthened; but various decisions of the Court have
tended to dilute his first point on the absolute primacy
of population as a criterion.
Following Reynolds, the next major case in this line
was Swann v. Adams. 52

The case concerned itself with the

Florida State Legislature, which had maximum population
deviations in the Senate of 25.65 percent and 34.55 percent in the House.

Swann employed the "rational state

policy" test enunciated in Reynolds and found that Florida
had failed to justify the deviations.

The State's justi-

fication, an attempt ''to follow congressional district
lines, 11 53 was not convincing to the Court, for it found
that Florida could have remained close to the boundaries
of its congressional subdivisions without allowing such
large deviations. 54

Swann also followed Reynolds in its
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argument that accepted variation norms in one state have
little relevance to those in other states. 55

Yet, despite

the holding against the Florida plan, the Court made clear
its willingness to take particular circumstances and the
desires of a state legislature into account.

From this

point forward, the representation of "interests" begins to
gain somewhat greater acceptance in the Court, and the
strict interpretation of the Reynolds finding that "legislaters represent people

•

•

." begins to weaken.

While

Swann failed to set definitive barriers for maximum population deviation, it did further define the rules and
tests by which future state apportionment cases would be
measured.
The post-1970 state reapportionment cases have dealt
with a wide range of issues that, taken as a whole,
reflect not only a certain relaxation of the "one man, one
vote" standards of the 1960s, but that are in general a
reflection of a growing reluctance to interfere in the
affairs of the states.

Beginning with Mahan v. Howe11 56

.
19 73 and continuing
.
.
.
hS 7 in
·
in
up t h roug h Connor v. Fine

1977, the Court exhibited determination to settle on
"tolerable" limits of population deviation and to define
the tools with which to measure deviation.

Some of the

old measures going back to Reynolds have been enhanced,
and some new measures have been developed.
The most prominent of the post-1970 cases is Mahan
v. Howell.

The case arose from a claim of rnalapportion-

ment in the Virginia State Legislature, where the population deviation totaled 16.4 percent.
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The District Court

disallowed the plan, relying on Kirkpatrick v. Preisler 58
and Wells v. Rockefeller. 59

The Supreme Court took the

case and made the following points, while ruling in favor
of the status quo plan:

(1) standards for congressional

reapportionment are not applicable to those for the states;
(2) the desire to maintain the integrity of the boundaries
of political subdivisions is permissible, and may be considered part of a rational state policy.

Thus, the

Virginia plan,with its 16.4 percent deviatio~ was approved,
despite allegations made in the District Court that multimember districting diluted voting power and constituted
racial gerrymandering and that the plan racially isolated
Negroes. 60
The inapplicability of congressional standards to
state plans was not a novel concept--indeed, it had been
brought up as early as Reynolds and Davis--but Mahan
served to give permanence to the split in classifications.
The opinion stated:
It is the conclusion of this Court that the absolute
equality in population test of Kirkpatrick is not
applicable to bicameral state legislatures and the
"rational policy" test. . . . 61
Earlier in its opinion the Court had championed the peculiarities of state and local governments, noting that
application of absolute equality to state legislatures may
impair the functioning of state and local governments. 62
The Court, as to the second point, made it known that
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maintenance of the integrity of political subdivisions
would be considered a rational state policy. 63

It is here

that the Court begins to make clear the point that, while
legislators may not represent trees and acres, 64 state
legislatures do have to be concerned with local interests
and other factors; and that, therefore, population deviations beyond those permitted under the strictest interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause may be permitted.
Thus, the preservation of integrity of political subdivisions becomes embedded as a rational state policy and as a
justification for population deviations.
Some commentators have raised the question of tolerable limits--how much deviation from exact equality will
now be allowed, given that the Virginia pla~ with its
16.4 percent variatio~ glided so easily past the Court?
This is a question that cannot be fully answered, of
course, particularly if the dictum in Swann of nontransferability of standards between states is sustained.

A

partial answer seemed to be given, however, when the Court
vacated a District Court ruling on apportionment in Idaho
later in 1973.

The case, Summers v. Cenarussa, 65 concerned

itself with an apportionment scheme of the Idaho Legislature that permitted a 19.41 percent maximum total deviation.

The State, in framing its plan, claimed to have

adhered to a policy of maintaining the integrity of subdivisions and anticipating increases in population.

The

District Court had upheld the plan; but the Supreme Court
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vacated the decision of the lower court without cornrnent. 66
While this state policy is not exactly commensurable with
that in Mahan, some gross indication may have been given as
to the maximum range of allowable population deviation.
Shortly after the Mahan decision, the Court took the
opportunity further to define the parameters of what would
be considered equal representation as dictated by the Equal
Protection Clause.

The opportunity came in the form of

two cases, Gaffney v. Cummings 67 and White v. Regester. 68
Gaffney was concerned with the Connecticut tegislature,
where the maximum total deviation was 7.83 percent.

White

concerned itself with the Texas Legislature, where the
maximum total deviation was 9.9 percent.

The question

asked in both cases was--at what level does a plan lose
its prima facie validity and thus have to justify itself
with a rational state policy?

Alternatively, what is

required to build a prima facie case of invidious discrimination?

In the two cases, the Court very clearly

increased the burden of proof on those who seek to overturn state reapportionment plans.

In effect, the Court

ruled that the 7.83 percent deviation of Gaffney was not,
on its face, a violation of any "one man, one vote" guidelines, and that extensive documentation must be submitted
to show that the plan causes invidious discrimination.
With reference to Mahan, Justice White states in the
Gaffney opinion:
We did not hold that in state legislative cases any

9l
deviations from perfect population equality in the
districts, however small, make out prima facie
equal protection violations and require that the
contested reapportionments be struck down absent
state justification.69
He went on to say:
It is now time to recognize . . . that minor deviations from mathematical equality . . . are
insufficient to make out a prima facie case of
invidious discri,bnation under the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .
It can be seen, therefore, that the Court is loosening the
stringent requirements of "one man, one vote" that characterized some of its earlier decisions. 71
This approach, combined with what is said in Gaffney
and in Mahan on preservation of the integrity of political
subdivisions, suggests that equality in population is
moving out of its position as the sole determinant of
equal representation.

Instead, other factors, such as the

preservation of subdivision boundaries and the "political
fairness" doctrine of Gaffney, 72 are edging forward.

Our

view of this tendency is supported by various commentators
on reapportionment law.

Irwin Rubin, in ''Malapportionment:

Inequality and the Individual's Vote, 1173 states that:
Taken together, Mahan and Gaffney indicate a
retreat from the strict "one man, one vote" principle initiated almost a decade earlier.74
Another writer takes a similar view of the situation:
Mahan v. Howell . . . simply allows the Court more
flexibility in looking at factors other than population in determinin~ the constitutionality of an
apportionment plan.7
The various doctrines of Mahan and Gaffney have been
continued in lower court cases up to the present.

The
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case of Graves v. Barnes 76 further supports the prima
facie arguments of Gaffney.

It notes that, as opposed to

court-ordered plans, those that are originated by the
state will receive a certain amount of "indulgence from
the adjudicating court." 77

Graves does not, however,

leave the door wide open, but notes that avoidance of
voter confusion and encouragement of voter participation
are not to be considered overriding state interests.

This

caveat is included at the end of the case:
It will serve no one for us to ignore constitutional norms in the name of convenience and
administrative inertia.78
The political fairness principle of Gaffney is continued in the Illinois city council districting case of
Russo v. Vacin. 79

This case quotes Gaffney on the notion

that districting and apportionment of a political nature,
designed to "reflect the political balance" of the elements in the community, will be allowed. 80
The integrity of boundaries doctrine that extends
from Reynolds through Mahan, Gaffney, and White is noted
in the Tennessee case of Sullivan v. Crowell. 81

The Court

wrote:
. . . we are of the opinion that the elimination of
split precints would be a valid reason for increasing
population disparities among legislative districts
to the 12.51 percent level demonstrated here . . .
if no less severe method is possible. 82
The Court in this case ruled that deviations of 12.51 percent are permissible in the drive to retain a certain type
of territorial integrity.
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Before concluding these comments, it would be well
to discuss the status of "one man, one vote" in relation
to plans devised by the Courts.

Although Graves and

Sullivan comment on the subject briefly, the Supreme Court
case of Connor v. Finch 83 gives what seems to be the
currently definitive word on court-ordered plans.

The

Court quite clearly states that court-ordered reapportionment plans must be more fully justified (as to deviations
from a strict equal population application) than those
promulgated by a state legislature.

Two quotations follow:

With a Court plan, any deviation from approximate
population equality must be supported by enunciation of historically significant state policy or
unique features.8 4
. . . a state legislature is the institution that
is by far the best situated to identify and then
reconcile traditional state policies within the
constitutionally mandated framework of substantial
population equality. The federal courts by contrast possess no distinctive mandate to compromise
sometimes conflicting state apportionment policies
in the people's name. 85
It can be seen that, should the Courts deem it necessary
to reapportion a governmental unit themselves, the most
stringent "one man, one vote" standards will be applied.
Court attitudes toward state legislative apportionment have undergone some important changes since the
Reynolds decision was handed down in 1964.

From what was

once a strict interpretation of the population requirements
of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court's definition of
"equal representation" has begun to assume a modified,
softer form.

In addition to equal population, the states
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may now also consider such policies as the preservation of
political subdivision integrity, the preservation of political balance, and the rights of states qua states to
determine the specific policy considerations they will
integrate into their reapportionment efforts.

There has

also been a slight lessening of the burden of proof laid
upon the states to show that their plans do not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.

Gaffney and White permitted

deviations up to 9.9 percent without justification, other
than the fact that a state policy was present.

As to

court-devised and implemented plans, however, the Supreme
Court, in Connor, made it clear that should a reapportionment come to the point where a court-drawn plan must be
implemented, the most stringent interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause will be applied.
Thus, a contemporary summary definition of "one man,
one vote" in state legislative districting would involve
the requirement of adherence to equal population, but
supplemented by provisions for consideration of political
subdivision integrity and political fairness.
Redistricting at the Local Level
The debate on apportionment of voting rights in local
political divisions was a relative late-comer in the history of apportionment/reapportionment litigation.

The

first case to deal specifically with the area, and which
set many of the basic and continuing lines of the Court's
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approach to local representation, was Sailors v. Board of
Education. 86

From this case there followed a wide-ranging

set of arguments that concerned themselves with such
issues as:

(1) whether "one man, one vote" applies to

local districts,

(2) what constitutes the exercise of

governmental powers, and (3) what are the special requirements of local and special district governments as compared
with other types of governing bodies. 87
The first issue to confront the Court on the local
level was the basic one of whether the so called "one man,
one vote" rule did indeed apply.

In the Sailors decision,

Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, used both Gray v.
Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims to support his contention
that, regardless of the level of government, each voter
has the right to participate equally in the electoral
process. 88

The finding opened the door for judicial

activity in local reapportionment.

This application of

the "one man, one vote" principle was further reinforced
in Avery v. Midland County 89 and Hadley v. Junior College
District. 90

In these decisions, the Court drew on the

power of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
From the beginning, however, there seemed to be a
certain hesitancy to apply "one man, one vote" to local
units of government.

In the Sailors decision, for example,

Justice Douglas made a distinction between legislative and
administrative bodies. 91

Although, in the summation,

Douglas refused to classify the school board in question

96

as either legislative or administrative--he claimed they
were not actually elected--the distinction indicated a
certain willingness to let the states determine the quality
of voting strengths in state political subdivisions.

(This

distinction reappears later on in one of the most recent
local reapportionment cases.) 92

Douglas noted in Sailors:

Viable local governments may need many innovations,
numerous combinations of old and new devices,
great flexibility in municipal arrangements to
meet changing urban conditions. We see nothing in
the Constitution to prevent experimentation. 93
In other words, it appeared that the Court was willing to
allow deviations beyond those accepted for state and congressional apportionments and, further, that the states
would be allowed at least some say as to the degree of
deviation.
After deciding that "one man, one vote" does indeed
apply to local districts, the next issue to confront the
Court was the definition of governmental powers and what
constitutes a government.

For, so the reasoning went, if

a political subdivision was determined not to have governmental powers, then it could not be considered to be subject to "one man, one vote" strictures.

The question was

given a partial answer when the Supreme Court decided in
Avery v. Midland County 94 that local political subdivisions having "general governmental powers" were subject to
the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause.
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The

Court did not define, however, what it meant by "general
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governmental powers"--merely saying that these powers must
extend "over the entire geographic area served by such a
body."
Such a definition was hardly "operational" and, as a
consequence, a number of later cases shaped, modified, and
remodified a definition of governmental powers.

The first

Supreme Court case to follow Avery on this subject was
Hadley v. Junior College District. 97

The opinion noted

that the college district had the power to
. . . levy and collect taxes, issue bonds . . . ,
hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect
fees, supervise and discipline students, pass on
petitions to annex school districts, acquire
property by condemnation, and in geng a1 manage
the operation of the junior college. 8
After this listing, the Court stated:
. . . we think these powers are general enough
and have sufficient impact throughout the district
to justify the conclusion . . . that the district
board was actually a governmental body, and thus
subject to "one man, one vote."99
It can readily be seen that a rather broad definition of
governmental powers was used.
Hadley was the last case in which the Court took the
opportunity to define governmental powers with respect to
local reapportionrnent. 100

Various District Court and

Appeals Court opinions have both broadened and restricted
the Hadley definition. 101

In 1975, the Court had the

opportunity to rule on a rather restrictive definition of
governmental powers, but denied a writ of certiorari without comment. 102

· h igan
·
In 1978, the Appeals Court 103 f or Mic

affirmed a District Court opinion 104 which stated that the
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power to tax does not constitute an exercise of governmental power:
The committee here is not more "legislati ve 1! in
character than the County School Board in
Sailors which had the power to tax.105
Today, there is a clear opportunity for the Court to refine
its definition of "government" on the local levei. 106
Aside from questions of the applicability of "one
man, one vote" to local bodies and the various caveats
that arise with respect to the opinions and definitions
that are formulated, there is the question of the numbers
involved--how large a deviation in population in each
district is allowed in these representative bodies.
Unlike state and congressional apportionment cases, those
that deal with local apportionment have given little
attention to "exactitude."

Perhaps one may surmise that

the Courts feel that local bodies are more closely based
on interests and, therefore, that "one man, one vote"
rules need not be applied so vigorously. 107
The cases that have presented quantitative limits
are Abate v. Mundt, 1 0 8 Leopold v. Young, 109 and Burton v.
Wh 1.tt·1er. 110

Abate upheld a county legislative plan that

.
d ev1at1on.
.
.
111
a 1 lowed 11.9 percent popu 1 ation

(That the

Court gave no indication of an upper limit may have shown
a certain willingness to compensate for future population
changes and shifts.) 112

Leopold concerned itself with a

unified high school district comprised of small constituent towns: the largest district was underrepresented by
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43.0 percent and the smallest district was overrepresented
by 31.0 percent. 113

The district apportionment plan was

struck down in this case.

Burton concerned itself with a

school district in which one of the constituent towns held
41 percent of the population but had only 15 percent of the
representation. 114

This plan was upheld by the Court of

Appeals and has not yet been taken to the Supreme Court.
Both Leopold and Burton were based on different definitions of governmental power, and were decided by lower
courts.

For all practical purposes, therefore, standing

total maximum population deviation seems to be indicated
in Abate at 11.9 percent.
In the local apportionment debate, the Court has
devised several tests, each of which is in various stages
of development.

The administrative/legislative distinc-

tion, which surfaced in Sailors, continued in slightly
changed form two years later when the governmental functions
debate began in Hadley.

Sailors also began the elective/

appointive distinction: this doctrine still survives in
good shape in Burton v. Whittier.

A third test, general

function v. special function, surfaced most recently on
the Supreme Court level in 1973: 115 while it may lead to
some unwanted entanglements for the Court, it appears that
it may be more viable than the elective/appointive test.
As compared with state legislative and congressional
reapportionment, the Court has:

(1) shown less interest,

and (2) not applied "one man, one vote" guides with such
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precision (or fervor).

While Sailors did establish that

the Equal Protection Clause does extend to local governmental bodies, later cases have continued to raise questions that weaken the position of the Clause in relation
to local units.

The cases do not center around the appli-

cability of the Clause to local units, but rather around
definitions of local government and questions of the power
that states should have in deciding the duties of local
political subdivisions.

The debate as to what constitutes

a governing body has continued and grown since its inception in 1968.

After discarding several early definitions,

the Court has begun to settle on a definition of general
governmental powers that includes, most significantly, the
power to levy taxes and set budgets. 116

(Recent lower

court opinions, however, denied to some bodies the title
to governmental powers even though they have the power to
tax.)117
"One man, one vote," therefore, exists on the local
level, but in a much looser form.

Population equality is

a factor; but local interests and traditions have also
been allowed to play a part in the determination of the
representative nature of local governing bodies.
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CHAPTER III
MISSISSIPPI REDISTRICTING CASE HISTORY
1965 to 1979
In 1965 a group of civil rights advocates brought
suit against the State of Mississippi, contending that the
legislative districts of the State violated both the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution&

In July 1966, the District Court in Jackson invali-

dated the 1962 redistricting of the Mississippi State
Legislature on the grounds that it was in violation of the
Fourteenth Arnendment--namely the one person, one vote
rule. 1

This decision started the long process of litiga-

tion that still continues as of this writing.
All statewide constitutional officers, members of
the State Legislature, and county supervisors in the State
of Mississippi are elected to four-year terms.

All

offices come up for election at the same time in the year
preceding U.S. presidential elections.

Thus, the members

of the Legislature were up for election in the years 1967,
1971, 1975, and 1979. 2
When in 1966 the 1962 apportionment was held to be
unconstitutional, the next legislative elections were due
to take place in 1967.

In response to the 1966 ruling,
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the Legislature enacted a new plan that was also held to
be unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3

Thus,

in 1967 the District Court was forced to implement its own
plan for that year's elections.
Following the 1970 census, in the 1971 session, the
Legislature enacted a further redistricting plan.

This

plan was held unconstitutional on the same grounds--violation of the one person, one vote rule. 4

As was the case in

1967, the District Court formulated a plan for the 1971
elections.

The Court, in recognition of the fact that

large multi-member districts were discriminatory, stated
its desire to formulate sub-districts within the counties
of Harrison, Hinds, and Jackson.

The Court further stated

that it would implement the subdivision of these large
counties following the 1971 election. 5
It is clearly evident from the census data that up
to six black districts could be formed in Hinds County and
one in Harrison County.

Thus, the plaintiffs in the

Connor case appealed the 1971 decision on the grounds that
the District Court should formulate single-member districts in these two counties in time for the 1971 legislative elections.

The Supreme Court agreed and directed the

District Court, at a minimum, to devise and put into effect
single-member districts for Hinds County for the 1971
election. 6
The District Court in Jackson managed to find insurmountable difficulties to the creation of single-member
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districts in Hinds County, and the 1971 elections were held
with twelve members elected at large in that county. 7
Plaintiffs in the Connor case appealed again to the U.S.
Supreme Court following the elections.

The Supreme Court,

taking note that the District Court had retained jurisdiction, and intended to appoint a Master to attempt to subdivide the counties of Harrison, Hinds, and Jackson into
single-member districts, directed that Court to act with
haste to settle the case. 8
In 1973 the Legislature, which had been elected under
the 1971 temporary court plan, passed another redistricting
statute with the intent of avoiding another election held
under a court-ordered plan.

In the construction of the

1973 statute, however, the Legislature had declined to
create single-member districts in the counties of Hinds,
Harrison, and Jackson.

This was clearly in opposition to

the District and Supreme Courts' stated preference for
single-member districts in these larger counties.
The absence of these single-member districts drew
strong complaints from the Connor Plaintiffs.

Acting in

response to these objections, the Legislature passed a
new redistricting statute in 1975.

This plan was the same

as the 1973 statute with the exception that it created a
combination of at-large and two-member districts in Hinds,
Harrison, and Jackson Counties.

In that same year, the

District Court ruled that the Legislature's plan was constitutional and could be used for the 1975 elections. 9

lll

Connor Plaintiffs again appealed to the Supreme Court, and
that Court reversed the District Court's decision on the
grounds that the Legislature's plan required approval by
the U.S. Attorney General under Section 5 of the Civil
Rights Act before it could go into effect. 10
In accordance with the ruling of the Supreme Court,
the Legislature submitted its plan to the Attorney General
for his approval.

The next day the Attorney General

rejected the Legislature's plan on the grounds that it was
discriminatory both in purpose and effect.

The Attorney

General's disapproval left the State, once more, without a
set of districts in which to hold the 1975 elections.
Responsibility for the implementation of a plan was then
shifted back into the hands of the District Court in
Mississippi.
The District Court took the 1975 legislative plan
and substituted single-member districts in Hinds, Harrison,
and Jackson Counties.
effect as a court plan.

This plan was then ordered into
This plan, because it did not ori-

ginate from the Legislature, did not require Section 5
preclearance from the U.S. Attorney General.

This court-

ordered plan is the one under which the 1976-79 Legislature
was elected in 1975.
Following the 1975 elections, the District Court was
petitioned by plaintiffs to devise a final plan for the
State.

There were, however, several important redistric-

ting cases before the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of
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this petition.

The District Court stated that it intended

to delay action on a new and final plan for the State until
these other cases had been decided.

The Connor Plaintiffs

returned to the Supreme Court again, requesting a writ of
mandamus requiring the District Court to act forthwith.
This writ was granted, and the District Court ordered into
effect a plan produced by a Special Master in November,
1976.

11

The decision to implement this plan was appealed

to the Supreme Court on the basis of Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment violations and was held unconstitutional on the basis of malapportionment in May, 1977. 12
The District Court was directed to try again.
Mississippi held legislative elections in the years
1967, 1971, and 1975.
total of twelve years.

These three Legislatures sat for a
During this entire period of time,

legislative elections have been held using temporary
court plans which have been, at best, stop-gap solutions
to Mississippi's redistricting problems.

During this

entire period of time, the District Court in Jackson
avoided a redistricting of the State into constitutionally
acceptable, single-member districts.

The Court always

managed to delay action until just before each election
was imminent--thus precluding the formulation of singlemember districts due to time limitations.

It may, perhaps,

be assumed that the District Court preferred a solution to
be forthcoming from the Legislature; equally, however, one
may conclude that the Court displayed excessive patience
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with the Legislature at the expense of the Plaintiffs'
rights in the action.
Following the May, 1977 Supreme Court decision, the
District Court directed the parties to the Connor suit to
file proposed plans for redistricting of the Mississippi
Legislature.

The order, entered on August 2, 1977,

directed that plans should be filed no later than October
29, 1977.

Thus, all parties were given a period of ninety

days in which to formulate their plans.
The Legislature, acting on behalf of the Connor
Defendents, and having been called into special session by
the Governor on August 12, 1977, created a Special Joint
Legislative Committee on Reapportionment on August 13,
1977. 13

Representative Thomas H. Campbell III, represen-

ting Yazoo County, was elected Chairman of the Joint
Committee.

At this point, the Committee had no staff and

no data base.

Accordingly, the Committee chose to inter-

view prospective consultants, from outside the State, with
previous experience in redistricting.

They were particu-

larly interested in retaining individuals with data processing expertise.
On August 16, 1977, the Joint Committee authorized
the formation of a Sub-committee to handle the day-to-day
details of the redistricting process. 14

On August 19th and

20th, interviews were held with prospective consultants in
Washington, D.C., and in Chicago, Illinois on August
25th. 15

As a result of these interviews, the Committee

retained the services of four redistricting consultants.
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These consultants, referred to as "experts" throughout the
process, were:

(1) Richard L. Morrill, Ph.D., Chairman of

the Geography Department, University of Washington (Dr.
Morrill was the Special Master for the Federal District
Court in Seattle in 1971-72, and had drawn redistricting
plans for the legislative and congressional districts in
the State of Washington); 16 (2) Delmer D. Dunn, Ph.D.,
Professor of Political Science and Director of the
Institute of Government, University of Georgia (Dr. Dunn
had been active as a consultant to the Georgia General
Assembly in its 1971 redistricting effort) ; 17 (3) Mr.
Calvin A. Webb of Manlius, New York (Mr. Webb was former
Associate Director of the Joint Legislative Committee on
Reapportionment for the New York Legislature, and had
directed the 1971 redistricting of that state); 18 (4) the
author of this study; 19 and (5) Earl F.

(Rick) Fortenberry,

J.D., a graduate of the Law School of the University of
Mississippi (Mr. Fortenberry was Director of the Legislative Services Office for the Mississippi State Senate and
had served in a staff capacity in the Mississippi Legislature's redistricting efforts of 1973 and 1975 before his
appointment as Director of the Joint Committee Staff) . 20
These five individuals were responsible for all plan development by the staff of the Joint Committee.
On September 2, 1977, the staff began work on tentative plans for the Committee.

The first task was to
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develop a data base and a computerized redistricting
retrieval system to analyze proposed plans.
delegated to the author.

This task was

A data base was constructed for

all the census units in the State using the First and
Third Count Summary Tapes from the Bureau of the Census.
The First Count Tape continued tabulations by county, MCD,
and ED.

The Third Count Tape contained summaries by Block.

Only four data items were included in the data base for
each geographic unit.

These were the Total Population

(TPOP), Total Black Population (BLK) or (TBLK), All Persons
Over Eighteen (TADT) or (VAP), and All Black Persons Over
Eighteen (BADT) or (BVAP).

These numbers became the

common reporting statistics throughout all of the court
proceedings.

From these were developed the Black Percent-

age (%BLK) and the Black Adult Percentage {%BVAP).

The

data base and original retrieval programs were completed
by the third week of September.
The data base structure remained the same throughout
the entire Mississippi redistricting effort, with some
modifications to the retrieval and reporting programs
being made by Mr. Robert S. Walters, Senior Programer for
the Rose Institute of State and Local Government. 21

The

data base and reporting programs were designed in such a
way that no census unit could be assigned to more than one
district and so that unassigned units could be located by
deficiencies in total county populations.

This did not

prevent misassignrnent, but it did prevent double assign-
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ment, and also allowed for the accounting of all units.
No other plans submitted to the Courts were formulated
using a computerized system. 22
The Committee staff, meeting informally, decided
that the task of district drawing should be divided up
among the consultants.

This writer and Mr. Webb undertook

primary responsibility for the development of House plans,
while Mr. Fortenberry and Dr. Dunn took primary responsibility for the development of Senate plans.

Dr. Morrill,

working in Seattle, was directed to develop independent
alternatives for both houses.

Proposed plans were to be

readied for presentation to the Joint Committee on October

14, 1979.

This gave about five weeks in which to design

all the plans.
By the time the Joint Committee met on October 4,
1977, two plans had been developed for the House and four
for the Senate.

These plans were designated as House

Plans A and B, and Senate Plans A, B, C, and E (Senate
Plan D was abandoned by the staff as unworkable).

House

Plan A was primarily the product of this writer and Mr.
Webb.

House Plan B was deve 1 ope db y Dr. Morri·11 . 23

Senate Plan A was developed by Dr. Dunn.

24

Band C were developed by Mr. Fortenberry.
E was developed by Dr. Morrill in Seattle.

Senate Plans

25
26

Senate Plan
House Plan B

was dropped on October 4, leaving Plan A as the only House
plan. 27

On October 14, the Joint Committee chose Senate

Plan c for presentation to the Legislature and re-approved

House Plan A.
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28

While this process was moving forward, a former member of the House and a staff employee of the Administration
Committee, Mr. Bud Thigpen, roughed out a new plan on
behalf of some of the members of the House who were dissatisfied with the configuration of House Plan A in the
northern portion of the State.

This plan was submitted to

the staff and was developed into House Plan

c. 29

On

October 18, the Joint Committee shifted its support to Plan

c. 30

There was then a dispute between some members in the

southern portion of the State who preferred Plan A and
those in the north who preferred Plan C.

Fortunately, the

staff was able to merge the two plans together, taking the
northern and central portion of Plan C and attaching it to
the southern portion of Plan A.

The plan became known as

A/C and was the House plan finally adopted by the Legislature and submitted to the District Court. 31

Senate Plan C

was also passed and submitted to the Court.

These two

plans were subsequently referred to as the House and Senate
Court ED Plans.
Following the completion of the Court ED Plans there
were two significant events.

The first was a decision by

the Legislative leadership to develop statutory plans
independently of the District Court.

The second was the

total rejection of the ED plan approach by the District
Court.

These two events prolonged the redistricting pro-

cess for another five months.
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Up until the 1977 redistricting, the Legislature in
Mississippi had always been divided along county boundaries.
Using a combination of multi-member, single-member, and
floterial districts, counties had evaded sub-division in
any districting scheme prior to 1975.

Aside from racial

considerations, there was an almost fanatical dedication
to the preservation of county integrity in the formation
of legislative districts.

The Legislature, in its 1975

plan, had been able to bring itself to the point of subdividing the three major counties.

Furthermore, the

District Court had subdivided those same counties for the
1975 elections.

Up until 1977, however, no portion of any

county had been combined with another county to form a
legislative district.

There was what could only be

described as "profound shock" at the prospect of fracturing counties in order to divide the State into acceptab]e
single-member districts for both houses.
The District Court, in its order of August 2, 1977,
emphasized that county integrity should be maintained whenever possible.

It was also the expressed will of the

members of the Legislature that the integrity of the
counties should be maintained.

The House Court ED Plan

(A/C), although attaining a total deviation of only 4.5
percent from the smallest to the largest districts, had
fractured numerous counties in the State.

In order to

placate the members of the Legislature, the leadership had
promised to produce a statutory plan which, with greater
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allowable deviation, could maintain more of the counties
intact.

It was under this understanding that the Court ED

Plans had been passed.
The District Court angrily rejected the Legislature's
ED approach and ordered creation of a precinct plan.

The

presiding judge threatened to cut the size of the Senate to
45 members and the House to 90 members, and to draw coterminous districts if the Legislature did not act. 32

Such

a threat was well devised to secure the full attention of
the Legislature.

Plans were made in early November to

move the Court ED Plan boundaries to the "nearest" precinct
boundary and to resubmit them to the Court in early 1978.
At the same time, the decision was made to draft a
Statutory ED Plan for passage in December.
reasons for this action.

There were two

The first was to fulfill the

commitment to the members to devise a statutory plan that
divided fewer counties than the Court ED Plan.

This ED

Plan would be passed under the supposition that the boundaries could later, as was the intent with the Court Plans,
be moved to the "nearest" precinct line.

Thus, House and

Senate Statutory ED Plans would be passed in December, and
further House and Senate Statutory Precinct Plans would
supercede them--these latter being passed in the regular
legislative session in the spring of 1978.
The second reason for passage of the Statutory ED
Plans in December was to convince the District Court that
the Legislature was serious in its intent to redistrict
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the State on its own authority and to obtain approval of a

statute either from the Justice Department or the courts in
Washington, D.C.

If the statute were to be in existence

before the District Court completed its hearings on the
proposed court plans, that Court might be convinced to
withhold proclamation of a judicial plan until the statute
were either approved or rejected through Section 5 proceed-

.

ings.
At the same time all this redistricting activity was
in progress, the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Intervenor were
not idle.

The Plaintiffs' technician, Dr. Gordon

Henderson, Professor of Political Science, Tougaloo Colleg~
had completed a court precinct plan that was submitted on
October 31, 1977.

This has been subsequently referred to

as the Henderson Plan.

In addition, the Department of

Justice submitted both House and Senate plans based on ED's
and precincts.
each house.

In all, they submitted four plans--two for

These plans were drawn by Mr. John Tanner, a

second year law student, working as a paralegal for the
Department of Justice.

Of these two sets of plans, only

one set, the precinct based plans, have received any
attention.

These plans have subsequently been referred to

as the Tanner Plans.
Thus, as the year 1977 ended, the District Court had
before it for consideration five plans for each house of
the Legislature, with the prospect of two more to come for
each house.

The Henderson Plans and the Tanner Plans were
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further modified throughout early 1978 and did not come
before the Court in final form until March 23rd and
February 7th, respectively.

The Legislature's October 1977

ED Plans were corrected in mid January of 1978.
At the same time that the Legislature was involved in
regular session, the staff of the Joint Committee was
laboring to complete both the Statutory and Court Precinct
Plans.

The final Court Precinct Plans were completed and

submitted to the District Court on March 7, 1978, and the
Statutory Precince Plans were passed by both houses on
March 27, 1978, and signed by Governor Finch on April 21,
1978.

This completed all work on plans by Plaintiffs, the

Department of Justice, and the Legislature.
Simultaneously, the Special Master for the District
Court had been busy preparing his set of plans for the
House and Senate districts.

His original submission was

made to the District Court on May 3, 1978--with final
submission on May 18, 1978.

The Court then instructed the

parties to the Connor case to file any objections to the
Special Master's Plan within 15 days.

The Committee

Consultant, this writer, completed analysis of the Master's
Plan on May 31, 1977.

Massive errors and large deviations

were found and filed before the District Court on June 2,
1977. 33
One June 1, 1978, the Attorney General of the State
of Mississippi submitted the Statutory Precinct Plans to
the Attorney General of the United States for clearance

under Section 5 of the Civil Rights Act.
that clearance was denied.
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On July 31, 1977,

On August 1st, Mississippi

filed suit against the United States for declaratory relief
under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act.

This was the

beginning of the action Mississippi v. U.S., which at this
writing is still under appeal before the U.S. Supreme
Court. 34
At the same time that the State of Mississippi was
seeking approval of its Statutory Precinct Plans from the
Attorney General in Washington, the Connor Court, having
examined all the plans before it (now numbering sixteen),
decided to initiate a settlement among the various parties
in the Connor case.

That Court declared that the differ-

ences between the parties in Connor v. Firtch were not
insurmountable, and on June 14, 1978, it directed the
parties to meet in conference within fifteen days and
attempt to work out a settlement.

A compromise plan for

both houses was worked out, but a consent decree was not
signed due to a legal difference between the parties.

The

point of objection was that the State did not wish the
plan worked out in compromise to be submitted into evidence
at the Section 5 trial in Washington.

The Connor Court,

however, was informed that a compromise plan, agreeable to
all parties in the Connor case and to a majority of the
members of each house of the Mississippi Legislature, had
been devised.

This plan was subsequently referred to as

the Compromise Plan.

Due to the pending court action in
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the District Court in Washington, the Connor Court stayed
its hand, presumably awaiting action on the Section 5
.
35
1 awsu1t.

Mississippi v. United States went to trial on
September 18, 1978.

The trial ended on September 27th.

Briefs were submitted throughout the fall, and final arguments were heard on January 16, 1979.
Meanwhile, the Connor Plaintiffs, wishing speedy
action from the District Court in Jackson, petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court once more for a writ of mandamus,
directing the Connor Court to act in settlement of Connor
v. Finch.

This writ was granted on March 26, 1979.

Accordingly, the Connor Court adopted a slightly modified
version of the Compromise Plan as its redistricting plan
for Mississippi on April 13, 1979. 36

The District Court

ruled, however, that should the Washington Court rule in
favor of the State, the Statutory Precinct Plans would take
precedence over its plan of April 13th.
On June 1, 1979, the District Court in Washington
found in favor of Mississippi, declaring that the Statutory
Precinct Plans did qualify under Section 5 of the Civil
Rights Act.

With this decision, these plans became law,

and, for the first time since the start of these lawsuits,
Mississippi had a constitutionally acceptable redistricting
statute.
Following the decision of the District Court, the
Connor Plaintiffs requested a stay from the United States

Supreme Court and submitted an appeal of that decision.
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If

a stay were to have been granted, the plan adopted by the
District Court in Mississippi would have gone into effect
for the legislative elections in 1979.

This plan was

clearly more acceptable to the Justice Department and the
Connor Plaintiffs.

The Supreme Court, however, denied the

petition for a stay, and elections were held under the
Statutory Plans in November of 1979.
In the 1979 elections the number of black legislators in the Mississippi Legislature increased from four to
seventeen.

Black House membership increased from four to

fourteen, and the first three black State Senators were
elected since the Reconstruction days.
As of the date of writing this study, Mississippi v
United States is still on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
It is extremely doubtful that the Supreme Court will
invalidate the entire plan.

If the ruling of the District

Court in Washington is found to be in error, the Supreme
Court will probably direct the Court in Mississippi to
modify the Statutory Plans in only those areas which it is
found to be unconstitutional.

This would amount to about

five districts in the House and one or two in the Senate.
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Discussion of Section 5
of the Civil Rights Act
It would be impossible properly to analyze the 1978
Mississippi redistricting case without some exploration of
Section 5 of the Civil Rights Act and its relevance to this
particular case.

The provisions of this federal act place

burdens on Southern states in the conduct of all redistricting that are different from those that bear on most
Northern jurisdictions.
Section 5 specifies that any state or political
subdivision that is subject to Section 4 of the Act may not
change any"

•

•

. voting qualification or prerequisite to

voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect
to voting different from that in force or effect on
November 1, 1964" without meeting one of the two following
requirernents:37
(1) It must obtain a declaratory judgment from the
District Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed change

11

•••

does not have the purpose and will not

have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color." 38
(2) It must submit the change to the Attorney
General of the United States and he must not object to
that change within a sixty day period from the date of
submission.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 5, any
statute which has not been approved by the Attorney GeneraL
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or for which a declaratory judgment has not been obtained,

may not go into effect.

Thus, in jurisdictions covered

under this Act, any change in the law which affects voting
in any way (from changing a precinct boundary to changing
the structure of the government) must be approved in
Washington,

o.c. 39

The constitutionality of this statute

was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach~ 0 and its
applicability to redistricting was upheld in both Allen v.
State Board of Elections4 1 and Georgia v. United States. 42
While these cases defined the limits of jurisdiction of
the Act, it remained for the Supreme Court to address the
method of application in redistricting until its decision
in Beer v. United States in 1976.

43

Beer involved a redistricting of the City Council of
the City of New Orleans following the 1970 census.

In this

action, the Council was redistricting the five council
seats in which the members were elected from single-member
districts.

Two more members were elected at large, but

their districts, the entire City, were left undisturbed

by the new ordinance.

The D.C. District Court found that

the new plan would have the effect of abridging the voting
rights of the City's blacks.
two grounds.

This decision was made on

First, the District Court held that, by

virtue of the fact that blacks constituted 35 percent of
the voters of the City, they were entitled to districts in
which they could elect 2.42 of the City's seven council
members.

The plan in question only gave them an opportunify

to elect one mernber~ 4
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Even in this one district, their

majority was only 52.6 percent.

Second, the existence of

the two at-large seats abridged the right to vote on
account of race or color.

The key point was that the

District Court held that blacks should have their proper
portion of all seven seats.

The two at-large seats were

out of the reach of black voters due to majority vote and
anti-slingshot voting rules in force in New Orleans.

For

these two reasons, declaratory relief was not granted. 45
The Supreme Court held that the District Court was
in error in its interpretation of Section 5 criteria.

The

primary question posed was one of statutory construction,
not constitutional law.

The Court reasoned that the will

of Congress in enacting Section 5 was to prevent the erosion or destruction of gains made in minority political
participation through the enactment of new statutes.

The

Court further stated that
. . . the purpose of (section) 5 has always been
to insure that no voting-procedure changes would
be made that would lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to
46
their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.
Thus, a'' . . • legislative reapportionment that enhances
the position of racial minorities" does not have "the
effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on
account of race within the meaning of (section)

5.

1147

Application of this standard requires that the new
plan must be compared to the plan in effect to establish
if the position of minorities is enhanced or diminished by
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the new plan.

Thus, if no retrogression is present or

intended, then the new plan passes the first test.
The second test involves a determination if the

"•

•

. new legislative apportionment itself so discrimin-

ates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution. 1148

There is, however, a further problem

involved for those who wish to challenge the constitutionality of a plan under Section 5.

The Supreme Court

declared that this involved a violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment--not the Fourteenth.
that,

The Court went on to say

"There is no decision in this Court holding a legi-

slative apportionment or reapportionment violative of the
Fifteenth Amendment." 49

It is extremely difficult to

prove a Fifteenth Amendment violation and the Court further
declared that, in comparison with other Fourteenth Amendment cases, the alleged violations did" . . . not remotely
approach a violation of the constitutional standards
enunciated in those cases. 1150
The Supreme Court based this later determination on
the facts presented by the intervenors in the case who
produced evidence that the black percentage of voters had
increased to 38.2 percent in 1974.

Thus, the Court

reasoned that blacks would decide the election in one of
the districts and had a good chance in a second.

Thus,

based on the calculation that 38 percent of five seats is
1.9 seats, blacks had a reasonable influence in city
council races involving single-member districts.

The
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at-large seats, having been unaffected by the redistricting

statute, were not subject to Section 5 scrutiny.

This

definition of Section 5, however, does not preclude a
normal constitutional challenge to any districting scheme.
A

normal constitutional challenge could include an

indictment of the at-large districts and could assert that
the black voters should form a majority in 38 percent of
all seven seats.

This would entitle them to 2.66 seats.

Thus, the present plan for New Orleans would not measure
up to this requirement.

However, the Supreme Court has

also stated that no one group is entitled by the Constitution to elect representation from that group.
Nonetheless, assuming for purposes of argument that
only five seats would be subject to some proportional
division between black and white voters, the two at-large
seats could be ruled unconstitutional on the grounds that
black voters could never elect a candidate of their choice
to either of these two seats.

This is due to the voting

rules in the City of New Orleans and to the fact that
racial bloc voting is the overwhelming phenomenon in that
City's elections.
The problem raised by this decision is that it
leaves us with no standards by which the Fifteenth Amendment can be used to challenge an apportionment plan.

The

Court leaves the impression that the plan must be clearly
and significantly deficient to sustain a challenge on
Fifteenth Amendment grounds.

This is, however, a two-edged

l30
sword.

The decisions covering Section 5 have clearly

placed the burden of proof on the designer or enactor of a
plan to prove that it is not in violation of Section 5.
If it is difficult to sustain a challenge due to a lack of
precedents, it may be almost impossible to prove that a
plan does not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent to the Beer decisio~ speaks to this point.

He maintains that the retro-

gression test cripples the intent of the statute.

He main-

tains that the constitutional issue is the primary concern.

In dissenting from the majority opinion, he states the
following:
When does a redistricting plan have the effect of
"abridging" the right to vote on account of race
or color? The Court never answers this question.
Instead, it produces a convoluted construction of
the statute that transforms the single question
suggested by Section 5 into three questions, and
then provides precious little guidance in
answering any of them.51
Aside from his objection to the retrogression test, he
goes on to state that
. . . the Court dilutes the meaning of unconstitutionality in this context to the point that the
congressional purposes in Section 5 are no longer
served and the sacred guarantees of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments emerge badly batterea.52
Justice Marshall was, perhaps, prescient in regard
to the issues posed in Mississippi v. United States.
warns that
Today the Court finds it simple to conclude
that Plan II (New Orleans) is "ameliorative," but

He
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it will not always be so easy to determine whether
a new plan increases or decreases Negro voting
power relative to the prior plan. To the contrary,
I believe the Court's test will prove unduly
difficult of application and excessively demanding
of judicial energies.53
. . . when would an increase (in Negro voting
strength) become retrogressive? As soon as the
majority becomes "safe"? When the majority is
achieved by dividing pre-existing concentration of
Negro voters?
When the size of the majority increases in one
district, Negro voting strength necessarilv declines
elsewhere.
Is that decline retrogressive?54
Justice Marshall is concerned that these questions should
be answered in the constitutional context, not in terms of
a retrogression test.

He is further concerned that the

procedural advantage of the United States has been eliminated by the first statutory test.
While Justice Marshall is concerned with expansion
of the power of Section 5, he forgets that the local
jurisdiction, faced with the problem of constructing a
plan within a legislative environment, is also entitled to
some guidance.

If all that is required on the part of the

United States is the assertion that the plan is in violation of the Fifteenth (or Fourteenth) Amendment, how can
this charge possibly be countered?

If, as was the case in

Mississippi v. United States, the plan is to be compared
with the proposed plans of the advocates of the black
position, how is the local government or state ~o determine
where it can balance their demands against other legitimate
redistricting criteria?
perhaps even impossible.

This is, indeed, a heavy burden--
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The other problem is that the distribution of the
black vote geographically will not always be as concentrated as it has been in all the other Section 5 cases
which have come before the courts.

In most municipal

areas the blacks are concentrated in district neighborhoods.

Where this is the case, a proportional comparison

is both logical and possible.
Mississippi.
whites.

This was not the case in

Large numbers of blacks are interspersed with

How does one then determine what proportion of the

black population shall be used to determine what should be
the proper number of "black" districts?
a black district?

What constitutes

Is the proportion reduced if 64 percent

black adult districts are required instead of 54 percent
districts?

Is there a point at which dilution occurs on

one side and maximization occurs on the other?
grey area which involves "political" decisions?

Is there a

.

It is one

thing for Justice Marshall to pose questions; it is
another to suggest answers.
Perhaps the majority, in deciding Beer, felt that at
least a majority of redistricting cases could be resolved
by the retrogression test and could, thereby, be pulled

from the morass of statistics involved in determining when
dilution has taken place and to what degree it has taken
place.

The testimony in Mississippi v. United States

proved one thing if it proved nothing else.

Trying to

balance the impact of past discrimination against present
voting habits, against demographic data, against political
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sophistication of black candidates, represents an enigma
within an enigma within an enigma.

There are no solid

standards to which anyone involved in such a restricting
situation can turn.

It is fortunate that the Compromise

Plan was so very close in nature to the State's Plan in the
case at hand.

The only benefit which can be gained by

hearing Mississippi v. United States at the Supreme Court
level will evolve from a resolution of these complex issues
by that Court.

It seems impossible that this could be

accornplished--especially with the lack of statistical
expertise demonstrated by the witnesses, many of whom propounded half-developed theories in the trial transcript.
If even one side's experts were confounding each other and
contradicting each other's testimony, how can federal
judges, untrained in complicated statistical analysis,
hope to extricate themselves from this numerical thicket?
While Justice Marshall's motives are beyond reproach, his
approach to Section S's application in redistricting may
create a morass that will make the Court's fumbling over
"one man, one vote" look like "childs' play."
A review of the proposed conclusions of law presented

to the D.C. District Court in Mississippi v. United States
is instructive in light of the previous discussion.

Inter-

venors, carrying the major load for the United States,
attempted to persuade the District Court to repeat the same
legal position overturned by the Supreme Court in Beer-while presenting a position to that Court with two major
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differences.

First, they admitted the necessity of a

search for a plan against which the State's Plan must be
compared.

They merely confounded the issue by offering

numerous alternatives for which they have varying degrees
of preference.

Second, they offered a demographic evalu-

ation of proposed districts in which the nature of those
districts is neither black or white, but often grey.

It

is to the District Court's credit that they were able to
cut through this thicket in which the Department of
Justice and defendent intervenors attempted to entwine them
Certain conclusions of law in the Mississippi case
were evident from the very beginning.

First was the fact

that the State was subject to the provisions of Section 5
and that the D.C. Court had jurisdiction.

Second was that

redistricting plans fell under Section 5.

Other conten-

tions were not self evident.
While correctly paraphrasing both City of Richmond v.
United States 55 and City of Petersburg v. United States, 56
in that Mississippi carried the "heavy burden" of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that its plan
would have neither the purpose nor effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,
intervenors failed to note that in both these cases the
issue was significantly clearer than in Mississippi.
Both these cases involved annexations of overwhelmingly white areas to black majority cities.

In both cases,

the original method of election of the city council was
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at-large election for all members.

In the case of

Petersburg, the Court agreed that election of the council
at-large in the newly expanded City, where the blacks were
in a clear minority, did abridge the black vote.

They

agreed that the suggestion of the Attorney General,that the
City change to single-member city council districts,would
correct this defect.

In the case of Richmond, the Court

found a situation in which the City had changed to singlemember districts, but the blacks had control of only a
minority of districts.

Previous to the annexation, the

City was 52 percent black.
was 42 percent black.

Following annexation, the City

In the newly apportioned city

council districts, the blacks held clear majorities in fou½
the whites held clear majorities in another four, and the
ninth seat contained a 41-59 percent split in favor of
the whites.

In this case the Court held that the annexa-

tion was permissible because the new districting scheme
recognized the blacks proper political potential.

Thus,

if the city has sound, nondiscriminatory economic and
administrative reasons for annexation, it may annex large
numbers of whites--even if a black majority is reduced to
a minority.

It must be noted, however, that in these two

.

cases the issue is clear and the demographic evidence is
The cases do not involve measurement of fine
degrees of minority representation.
Intervenors contended that in Mississippi, as in
Petersburg, the objection of the Attorney General under

136

Section 5 is entitled to deference.

Actually, in Peters-

burg the Court stated that, " . . . his objection to this
section of the statute, as applied to the facts of this
case, is entitled to deference." 57

It is, perhaps, up to

the Court to determine the degree of deference to which
the opinion of the Attorney General is entitled--particularly when the proceeding in the D.C. Court is supposed
to be a trial de novo.
Intervenors then misquoted a passage from Fortson v.
Dorsey, 58 citing also Burns v. Richardson 59 -- in which the
Court cited its ruling in Fortson.

The quote from Fortson

is given below with the portion left out by intervenors
underlined:
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a
multi-member constituency apportionment scheme,
under circumstances of a particular case, would
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial elements of the voting population. When this is demonstrated it will be time
enough to consider whether the system still passes
constitutional muster.60
First of all, these cases dealt with multi-member districts,
not single-member districts (as is the case in Mississippi).
Second, the Court did not state that the Fortson rule
applied beyond the consideration of the constitutionality
of multi-member districts.
The next conclusion of law proposed by intervenors
is quoted below:
In single-member districting plans,
voting strength is constitutionally and
sibly diluted, minimized, and cancelled
(1) when heavy black concentrations are

black
impermisout
unnecessarily
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fragmented and dispersed, and (2) when black population concentrations are unnecessarily combined
with white population concentrations to deny black
voters the opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice. 61
The amazing thing about this proposed conclusion of law is
that this quotation does not appear in any of the six
cases cited.

Intervenors also did not offer any guidance

in regard to the words underlined in the quote--such as
"heavy," "concentrations," and "unnecessarily."

Even in

the cases cited regarding Hinds County and Leflore County's
supervisorial redistricting plans, the conclusions in the
cases did not support the contentions of dilution asserted
in those very same counties by both the intervenors and
the United States.
The complaints against the configuration of the
State's House districts in both Leflore and Hinds Counties
are major issues in this case.

In Moore v. Leflore County

Board of Election Commissioners, intervenors complained
about the very same alleged fragmentation of the blacks in
Greenwood that they objected to in the State's Plan.

They

contended that black adult populations of 55 percent, 62
percent, and 59 percent are not good enough.

The District

Court, although recognizing that black adult percentages,
at the levels cited above, only produced voter registration
majorities of 51 percent, 58 percent, and 50 percent, made
the following statement:
Hopefully, blacks will now and in the future register
in numbers approaching their full potential. If
they do, the Holland Plan allows them full access to
the reigns of government.62
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Thus, in a previous instance, a district court has found
the 60 percent urban, 66 percent rural requirement enunciated by Dr. Loewen to be more than is constitutionally
required.

Blacks are simply not entitled to a "sure

thing."
In Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County,
Mississippi, 63 the issue was not the division of the rural
area of the County, as was the issue in Mississippi, but
rather the fragmentation of the black concentrations in
the City of Jackson.

In Mississippi, these blacks in the

City of Jackson had districts created for them which satisfied all parties.

It has never been clear that the blacks,

who are spread all over the rural area of Hinds County,
represent a heavy concentration--particularly in terms of
the cases cited.
In citing Connor v. Finch, 64 intervenors simply
quoted the Supreme Court's recitation of their own complaints against the plan proposed by the Connor Court.
The Supreme Court refused to pass on these complaints and
limited itself to an admonition to the District Court to
avoid practices which might lead to a suspicion of racial
dilution.
Intervenors' next proposed conclusion of law was
even more bizarre.

This is especially true when each con-

tention is examined separately.

First, intervenors con

tended that, "A legislative reapportionment plan is
enacted for a racially discriminatory purpose when.

•

•
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the essential inevitable effect is to fragment and dilute
black voting strength. 1165

First, this contention is not

supported by either Connor v. Finch,6 6 Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 67 or Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Authority 68 --the cases cited.
Second, a judgment of the presence and amount of fragmentation and dilution in the Mississippi context is extremely
difficult to ascertain.

Finally, it is illogical to assume

that effect proves purpose.

These two factors have always

been divided in Section 5 cases.

There are many instances

in which the Court has held effect but not cause.
The second contention is as follows:
A legislative reapportionment plan is enacted for
a racially discriminatory purpose when . . . the
plan fragments and minimizes black voting strength
in the face of alternative alignments which would
avoid such dilution and still meet the proper
criteria . . . 11 69

In the Connor decision the Supreme Court, when speaking of
alternative plans, was speaking in reference to plans with
less deviation from ideal population. "One man, one vote"
was the basis of this decision.

In adapting this principle

to alternative racial arrangements, intervenors are quoting
their own law as summarized by the Court.

The Supreme

Court merely advised the Connor Court in this way:
Such unexplained departures from the results that
might have been expected to flow from the District
Court's own neutral guidelines can lead, as they
did here, to a charge that the departures are
explicable only in terms of a purpose to minimize
the voting strength of a minority group. The District
Court could have avoided this charge by more carefully abiding by its stated intent of adopting
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reasonably contiguous and compact districts, and
by fully explaining any departures from that goai. 70
Nowhere did the Court state that the non-acceptance of
alternatives constituted either dilution or proved intent.
In addition, intervenors did not define "proper established
criteria."

Cases cited simply do not support the argument.

The third contention is that, "A legislative plan is
enacted for a racially discriminatory purpose when

•

•

•

the impact of the plan is to bear more heavily upon one
race than another. 1171

This is a paraphrase from Arlington

in which the Court cited Washington v. Davis. 72

Arlington

is a rezoning controversy and Washington is a police
recruitment controversy.

In Arlington, the Court stated

that there must be a "clear pattern, unexplainable on
grounds other than race. 1173
to apply.

This is extremely difficult

The Court went on to say that "absent a pattern

as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is
not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.1174

In Washington, the Court states that:

Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral
on its face and serving ends otherwise within the
power of government to pursue, is invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect
a greater proportion of one race than of another.
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is
not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.75
Even if this rule did apply to both Section 5 and redistricting, it is subject to a requirement that the degree to
which it bears more heavily must be substantial.
The fourth contention is that, "A legislative reappor-
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tionment plan is enacted for a racially discriminatory
purpose when . . . the plan is enacted against an historical background of a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes .
on its face.

•

•

11

76

This statement is ridiculous

Intervenors wish us to believe that the

Court maintains that if one has been ajudged guilty of
discriminatory purpose in the past, that one is thereafter
preconvicted of guilt in the future.
Court said in Arlington.
ground of"

•

•

This is not what the

It said, rather, that a back-

. a series of official actions taken for

invidious purposes

•

•

. may shed some light on the

decisionrnaker's purpose. 1177

He is not, however, auto-

matically convicted without trial.

This is a strange

attitude for a civil rights advocate to take.
The fifth and last contention is that, "A legislative reapportionment plan is enacted for a racially
discriminatory purpose when . . . there are departures
from the normal procedural sequence." 78

It is again suffi-

cient to quote what the Court actually said:

"Departures

from the normal procedural sequence also might afford
evidence that improper purposes are playing a role." 79
It is possible that intervenors, having searched
through the case law on discrimination, were just trying
to throw as many accusations into the case as possible,
hoping that something may have stuck.

However, to take

five weakly linked statements, reword them, reinterpret
them, and then try to gloss over that fact by combining
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them into one fine-sounding conclusion of law is bad
scholarship at best, and certainly bad law.
Discussion of Redistricting Criteria
In any redistricting performed in the United States,
two constitutional criteria must be satisfied.

The first

is the one person, one vote rule established by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

This rule of law simply states

that legislative districts should be as equal in population
as possible.

The other criterion is proper minority repre-

sentation guaranteed by both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.

It is, perhaps, ironic that all rulings in

the Connor case in Mississippi were based on lack of population equality, when the real issue was black representation.
All other redistricting criteria lack constitutional
standing, but can serve as standards against which adherence to the constitutional criteria may be measured.

It is

widely accepted that in singling out the one person, one
vote rule, the Supreme Court made possible gerrymanders
never before thought to be possible.

A gerrymander, how-

ever, when defined as the creation of odd-shaped districts
for political advantage, can "cut" both ways.

This is

particularly true in a state such as Mississippi, where
black representation is so very irnportant--and has been so
long denied.

Just as it is theoretically possible to deny

blacks any representation in the Mississippi Legislature,
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it is also possible, theoretically, to give them a majority
of the seats.

If the black population of that State were

to be perfectly integrated, it would be impossible to
create any black seats.

If, on the other hand, absolute

segregation were the case, and if those 100 percent black
areas were adjacent to white areas of equal population,
there would be a theoretical potential to create seats
capable of electing a 60 percent black legislature. 80

One

must make the distinction among those conditions limiting
the election of black legislators that are not due to
redistricting or political policy, those that are due to
political policy alone, and those that are due to redistricting policy.
For example, to the extent that blacks have been
integrated with the whites in Mississippi, they have lost
their ability to elect representatives of their choice
alone.

This is not due to the State's political policy.

Nor is it due to redistricting policy.

In fact, integra-

tion is the stated goal of all civil rights legislation in
this nation.

This is, in effect, a neutral condition which

affects the outcomes of elections in any district.
Another condition in Mississippi is the ratio of
adults to children in the population as a whole as compared with the black population.

This, again, is not a

political factor, but a demographic factor.

While one

could make a case that, in some circumstances, adult blacks
leave the State due to lack of economic opportunity, and
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that this lack of opportunity is due to discrimination,
which in turn is due to lack of political power, it is not
election law that causes this situation to exist in
Mississippi today.

Furthermore, this phenomenon arises in

part from the fact that blacks have more children.

While

this factor should be taken into account, it is nevertheless a demographic factor, not a political factor in the
strict sense of that term.

.
The fact that blacks do not register (as adults) ln
equal percentages to whites is, of course, partially a
political factor.

The fact that black registered voters

do not come to the polls in equal percentage to whites may
also be a political factor.

If, because of election law

and redistricting policy, blacks have been deprived of the
ability to register, or to vote, or if their votes have
been rendered ineffective, then those conditions are political--and may also be due to redistricting policy.

How-

ever, to the extent to which such conditions are caused by
ignorance or apathy, they are not political--or, at least,
are not readily subject to political remedies.
Ideally, the proper number of seats to be created as
"black" seats should be determined by what is "fair."

Yet

such a determination is difficult or impossible to ascertain.

The civil rights activists may maintain that the

State has an obligation to redress past injustices and to
remedy past discrimination by positive action.

They might

also maintain that redistricting plans are a proper medium

in which such redress should take place;

.
in
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a sense,

redistricting is an opportunity for affirmative action to
create black positions in the State Legislature.
indeed, be "fair" in the abstract.

This may,

It is questionable,

however, that it is "fair" in terms of the law or that it
was the intent of Congress in enacting Section 5 of the
Civil Rights Act.

'

If it were possible to derive some

mathematical formula to determine how many seats any
minority should have, then the problem might be easier.
Indeed, this is why non-constitutional criteria are so useful in judging racial fairness: they add some measurable
boundaries to a discussion of any redistricting controvers~
There was no doubt that more seats with higher percentages of black voting age population could have been
drawn into the State's Plan.

The question became one of

determining what other criteria must suffer if those seats
were created.

Another question raised was whether or not

the creation of those districts would make any difference
in the racial composition of the Legislature.

A

third

difficult question concerned the method of determining what
made a seat "black" as opposed to "white."

Who should set

the standard, and who should determine when the standard
should not apply?

Perhaps the whole question ultimately

comes down to what is "reasonable," and that is what the
courts must decide.

It seems doubtful that any reasonable

man would maintain that an apportionment plan which elected
only four blacks out of 122 members to the State House of
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Representatives, and no blacks out of fifty-two members of
the State Senate, was really reasonable.

On the other

hand, a reasonable person should not argue that because
blacks constitute 30 percent of the adult population of
Mississippi, a redistricting plan must give them exactly
proportional representation of thirty-seven black seats in
the House and sixteen black seats in the Senate.

Surely,

a plan can be fair and reasonable while allowing some
margin for error.
The State, in the creation of its statutory plans
for the House and Senate, did not create every "black"
seat that was possible.

To do so would have required a

massive gerrymandering of the entire State.

The State did,

however, adhere to rational, constitutionally neutral
criteria, while making a conscious, positive effort to
create strong black seats.

The Department of Justice, on

the other hand, contended that the State had deliberately
avoided the creation of some black seats, and that the
State's failure to locate black seats in areas where the
Department of Justice 1 s plan had located them was proof
that the State had consciously pursued a policy detrimental to the interests of blacks.

It simply did not

matter to the Department of Justice that the State was
unwilling to gerrymander, and that there was reasonable
latitude for the intrusion of other rational criteria.
To maintain that the State's plan was not a significant
improvement over any other plan proposed by the Legisla-
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ture--or by the District Court, for that matter--was absur~
Furthermore, to contend that there were significant and
unreasonable differences between the Compromise Plan and
the State Plan was not a defensible position.

For these

reasons, the U.S. lost the case.
The District Court, grappling with this problem,
listed, in its order of August 23, 1977, seven criteria
under which plans submitted to it must be developed.
(They are not discussed here in the same order as enunciated by the Court.)
1) There shall be no "minimization or cancellation
of black voting strength."

Such dilution would only be

justified by the necessities of population equality, compactness, or contiguity.
2) Population variances should be as near de minimis
as possible.
3) Reasonable variances in population could be
present in order to follow precinct, beat, and county line~
4) Only the 1970 Census population figures were to
be used.

No estimates developed during the subsequent

decade should be used.
5) Any county with enough population for one complete
district should have one full district created within its
boundaries.
6) Unless a county contained enough population for
more than two districts, it should not be split into more
than two segments.
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7) Criteria 5 and 6 could be infringed upon in order

to maintain "reasonable contiguity, an acceptable degree
of compactness, or a tolerable equality of population. 1181
It could be concluded that the three judges had never
drawn a redistricting plan and that they were also being
deliberately vague.

At the least, there were serious

deficiencies in the Court's criteria for guiding the formulation of plans to be submitted.
First, the Court did not address the question of
what constituted minimization or cancellation of black
voting strength.

The judges did not even give any

examples.
Second, the Court did not provide any limits as to
the amount of population deviation they would allow.

If

the Court were willing to accept the Gaffney standard, why
did they not say so in the beginning? 82
Third, the Court never addressed the very difficult
problem of determining precinct--and, therefore, district-populations.

The split ED issue was never addressed.

Fourth, the Court never discussed the problem of
county representation--a subject that will be discussed in
some detail below.
If the Court had intended to expedite the redistricting process, the judges might have been well advised
to require all the parties involved to develop a common
methodology and data base.

They also might have made

their prejudice against the use of Ed's more obvious.
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As it was, the Court wasted much time and many dollars by
failing to provide proper guidance.

This should be a

lesson to other courts that find themselves in similar
situations.
The criteria of maintaining county boundaries was
developed so that voters, as citizens of counties, could
have members in the Legislature who would be responsive to
the interests of their counties.

The voters in Mississippi

are reputed to identify very strongly with their counties,
and county governments are certainly very powerful in the
State.

The question that remains unanswered is the extent

to which the average voter feels that his representative
in the State Legislature should be responsive to his needs
as a resident of a specific county, as opposed to his needs
as a member of some other interest group, such as his race,
economic level, or profession.

This question has never

been systematically addressed.

The fact remains, however,

that there is a long-standing tradition in Mississippi that
representation in the Legislature is by county.

To the

extent that this tradition, embodied in the State Constitution, does not clash with the Federal Constitution, it
should be honored and kept as part of a rational state
policy.

The problem is that this tradition does tend to

clash with the one person, one vote rule.

Furthermore,

representation by county does limit the extent to which
concentrations of blacks forming a portion of one county
can be connected with other concentrations of blacks

forming portions of adjoining counties.

While there are
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certain recognized and quantifiable limits to population
deviation, the fragmenting of counties to form "black"
districts is a practice of debatable propriety.

The

Connor Plaintiffs would maintain that it is required; the
State would maintain that it is not.

The courts will

probably seek to avoid the issue.
The fact remains that anyone who has constructed a
redistricting plan for the State of Mississippi has found
that all counties cannot be left intact.

The dynamics of

forming 122 House seats representing 18,171 persons each-even given an allowable variation of 5 percent from ideal
district size--require the fragmentation of some counties,
and the splitting of almost all the counties.

There must

be some better method for evaluating compliance with this
criterion than merely a count of the number of counties
that are left intact.

This was the problem facing the

technical staff of the Joint Committee, and that forced
them to develop an alternative approach.
Given that the rationale for maintenance of county
lines is county representation--as opposed to racial
discrimination or simple convenience--then the following
rules may apply:

(1) the best policy is to leave the

county intact or to subdivide it internally,

(2) the next

best policy is to form as many districts as possible within
a county, leaving only one fragment,

(3) third best is to

form as many districts as possible within a county,
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leaving as few fragments as possible,

(4) if a county's

population is greater than the population of one district,
and therefore must be split, then the population from that
county which is placed in distri~ts with other county population portions should form a majority of the population
in the number of whole districts to which the first county
is entitled,

(5) counties smaller than the size of one

district should be left whole or should form the majority
of the population in the district in which they are
located.

These guidelines form the basis of a rule of

"maximized representation."

Simply stated, this rule holds

that a county is at maximum representational status if it
is left whole or has only one fragment forming part of a
district.

This was the goal in the formation of the

Statutory Precinct Plans.
By making a list of all the counties in the State,
one can evaluate the representational status of each county
using the following symbols:
undivided in the plan;

(W) means that the county is

(M+) means that the county is

divided, but has within it all the complete districts to
which it is entitled by population (i.e., it has only one
fragment);

(M++) or (M+++) means that the county still has

within it the full number of complete districts to which
it is entitled, but that the remaining portion of the
county is divided into two or more fragments;

(S 0

)

means

that the county is split and, if larger than the size of
one district, does not have its full entitlement of
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complete districts within its boundaries; the county does,
however, control the maximum number of districts that it
should according to its population;

(S) means that the

county is badly fragmented and has poor representation in
the Legislature.

If these symbols are ranked according to

the degree of representation that each circumstance affords
to a county, they appear as follows:
and 1st;

(M++) is 2nd;

(M+++) is 3rd;

is 5th; and (S) is 6th.

(W) or (M+) are equal
(M++++) is 4th;

(s 0

)

Using this scheme, one can eval-

uate a plan's compliance with the criterion of county integrity in a meaningful way.
In comparing one plan with another, each county will
be placed in one of three categories: one is better in the
first plan, two is better in the second plan, and three is
the same in both plans.

Table 5

shows an evaluation of

four of the State's House plans according to this system.
The following comparisons between plans have been made:
House Plan A to House Plan B, House Plan A to House Plan C,
House Plan C to House Plan A/C, and House Plan A/C to the
House Statutory Precinct Plan.

These plans are evaluated

in this order because it was the order in which they were
considered by the Joint Committee.
Plan A was selected over Plan Bon October 4, 1977.
Plan A was superior in 30 counties, equal in 37, and
inferior in 15.

This was an easy choice.

Plan C was

selected over Plan A on October 18, 1977.

Plan A was

superior in 25 counties, equal in 36, and inferior in 21.
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TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF THE HOUSE ED PLANS
PROPOSED TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE

COUNTY

A

Adams
Alcorn
Amite
Attala
Benton
Bolivar
Calhoun
Carroll
Chickasaw
Choctaw
Claiborne
Clarke
Clay
Coahoma
Copiah
Covington
DeSoto
Forrest
Franklin
George
Greene
Grenada
Hancock
Harrison
Hinds
Holmes
Humphreys
Issaquena
Itawamba
Jackson
Jasper
Jefferson
Jefferson Davis
Jones
Kemper
Lafayette
Lamar
Lauderdale
Lawrence
Leake
Lee
SOURCE:

B

C

~t ~t ~t

AC

COUNTY

M+

Leflore
Lincoln
Lowndes
Madison
Marion
Marshall
Monroe
Montgomery
Neshoba
Newton
Noxubee
Oktibbeha
Panola
Pearl River
Perry
Pike
Pontotoc
Prentiss
Quitman
Rankin
Scott
Sharkey
Simpson
Smith
Stone
Sunflower
Tallahatchie
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This was a more difficult choice--with some political considerations outweighing the slight advantage of Plan A
under this single criterion.
Plan Con October 22, 1977.

Plan A/C was selected over
Plan A/C was superior in 5

counties, equal in 69, and inferior in 8.

This was a still

more difficult choice than that of A over C, and was again
attributable to political considerations.

The most inter-

esting comparison comes when Plan A/C is compared with the
Statutory Precinct Plan (SPP).

SPP is superior in 26

counties, equal in 54, and worse in only 2.

It is evident

that allowing the district deviations to move from+ 2.00
percent to+ 5.05 percent brought about a very large
increase in the number of counties that could have their
representational status improved.
When the Statutory Precinct Plan is compared to the
Department of Justice Precinct Plan submitted to the
Connor Court, the comparison is also very interesting
(see

table 6).

The State's Plan is superior in 30 coun-

ties, equal in 41, and inferior in 11.

The reasons for

these differences will be examined in a later chapter; one
should note, however, that adherence to this neutral criterion was almost three times better in the State's Plan.
The other two neutral criteria ordered by the Court
were those of compactness and contiguity.

Contiguity is

easily determined--either a district is contiguous or it
is not.

Of course, none of the plan drawers intended to

create non-contiguous districts; yet, as a result of error,
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TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF THE PLANS OF THE
STATE, HENDERSON AND TANNER

COUNTY

Adams
Alcorn
Amite
Attala
Benton
Bolivar
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Chickasaw
Choctaw
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this did happen from time to time.

Compactness, for its

part, is a quantitative criterion.

All of the plans con-

tained some districts that were not compact.

Nevertheless,

judged against districts created by other legislative
redistrictings in the United States during the 1970s, all
the Mississippi plans allowed for reasonable compactness.
There was, however, room for argument that some of the noncompact districts could have been racially motivated-either for or against blacks. 83

This question also will be

discussed in more detail in a later chapter.
Since we are dealing with redistricting criteria,
the State's policy on race and population should also be
discussed.

The legal counsel and technical consultants

for the Joint Committee held lengthy discussions on both
issues.

The consensus was that the Court ED Plans would

aim for a 2 percent plus-or-minus deviation.

It was felt

that this was the lowest deviation possible without the
excessive splitting of ED's.

As it turned out, the Court

ED Plan did contain the lowest population deviations of
any plan presented to the Court.

The Statutory Plans,

being legislative and not court plans, fell under a
different rule of law.

In this case+ 4.0 percent was

originally desired, until it was found that so much could
be gained by going up to+ 5.0 percent that is was worthwhile to stretch the Gaffney standard to its limits.
The issue of racial dilution was met by an instruction to the consultants drawing up the State's plans that
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they were to go out of their way to construct districts
that would include a dominant number of blacks.

Further-

more, significant concentrations of blacks were not to be
broken up.

The consultants clearly understood that the

ooal was not to maximize the number of black districts,
but to see to it that black districts were constructed
whenever their creation did not conflict with de minimis
requirements or with reasonable adherence to the other
neutral criteria.

To set a percentage of blacks who must

be residents in a district in order for it to constitute a
"black" district was only to become embroiled in controversy with the Cour, the Plaintiffs, and the Department
of Justice.

As a matter of record, the attorney for the

Department of Justice refused, at the beginning of the
district-building process, to provide any guidance on this

.

issue.

(Such guidelines, perhaps, would have limited the

Department of Justice's ability to launch subjective criticisms when the State's districts were challenged in court.)
The Connor Plaintiffs would not talk with the State at all.
It is proper, at this point, to raise the subject of
incumbency.

From a purely technical viewpoint, one great

disadvantage that a legislative plan has over a plan
developed by some other group (such as the Department of
Justice or the Connor Plaintiffs) is that it must be passed
by a majority vote.

Some members of the Mississippi State

Legislature would not have voted for a single-member district plan if it had been drawn by Jefferson Davis himself!

l58

There were others whose counties were fractured and who
could not vote for the plan and return home to face their
constituents.

Still others had been placed in a district

with another legislator and would certainly vote "no."
And finally, there were some who found themselves in districts with large numbers of blacks, and who, perceiving
that they would fail to be reelected, would also vote "no."
Thus, within the bounds allowed by the guiding criteria,
the wishes of incumbents had to be considered.

A bill or

resolution, after all, had to be passed.
One other consideration ought to be discussed.
Mississippi is a one-party state.

The Speaker of the

House is, in the opinion of many, the most powerful
official in the State.

In order to maintain his position,

he must receive strong support from all the members of the
House majority party.

The redistricting plan, however,

placed the seats of over a third of the House members in
jeopardy--at least that was as they perceived the situation.

To set one-third of the incumbent legislators in

such a position would be an unpleasant duty in any legislative body.

Many of the members did not--and never will--

understand the constitutional implications of the redistricting process.

All they understood was that the Federal

Court was forcing them into an unpleasant situation in
which they were expected to vote against their own personal
interest.
friends.

Even worse, they had to vote against their

It is a credit to the leadership of the House
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that the redistricting plans were passed.

It is also a

credit to the Chairman of the Joint Committee that he was
not afraid to allow the staff to draw, in almost all cases,
those configurations that they felt to be the most constitutionally acceptable and the most logical.

Certainly

many legislatures have acted with much less responsibility.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GEOGRAPHY OF REDISTRICTING
There are three sets of geographic units involved in
the redistricting process.

These units are those created

by the United States Census Bureau, those created for
voter registration and election polls, and the boundaries
of local units of government.

A large majority of the

data problems involved in the redistricting process are
caused by the fact that the boundaries of these units do
not coincide.

In many states, this fact alone makes it

difficult, if not almost impossible, to determine exact
political and demographic characteristics for any proposed
legislative district.

This chapter reviews the nature of

these three sets of units and discusses the problems
involved in their use.
All the demographic data commonly used in redistricting come from the United States Census Bureau. 1

The

Bureau is charged with the responsibility of determining
the population and housing characteristics of all states,
counties, county legislative districts, and incorporated
cities and townships.

In order to accomplish this task,

the Bureau has created its own set of geographic units.
These units are tracts, Minor Civic Divisions (MCDs).
165
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County Census Divisions (CCDs), Enumerations Districts
(EDs), Block Groups (BGs), and blocks.

In urbanized areas,

the key units are Tracts and Blocks, while in rural areas
the - key unit is the ED.
In the urbanized areas tracts are subdivided into
block groups or EDs, which are, in turn, subdivided into
blocks.

A block may correspond to a regular city block,

but it may also be a portion of a block or a number of
city blocks.

In any case, data are available for very

small geographic units inside urbanized areas.
In the rural areas the smallest geographic census
unit is the ED.

The ED is an artificially created unit

used only by the Census Bureau.

In theory this unit is

supposed to encompass that area which may be enumerated
by a census enumerator within a one-day period--Census
Day.

These units, however, are also used to tabulate data

for cities and unincorporated "places."

Because of this

requirement, EDs do not normally cross city boundaries,
or include both rural territory and unincorporated residential areas.
EDs are also used to determine the population of
areas annexed to cities since the previous census.

Thus,

for example, an ED would not include territory which was
annexed or inside the city limit before the 1970 Census
along with territory annexed following the 1970 Census.
This means that, in some cases, EDs will not be contiguous
or, in the cases of a small city which has expanded its
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boundaries on all sides, might surround one or more EDs
which make up the former territory of that city (see figure
1 ).

. which an ED might
This is an example of a case in
I

have to be split in order to combine a portion of the old
city with nearby rural areas.

The surrounding ED would

have to be split to create a corridor into the former city
(see figure

2).

Another difficulty encountered when using EDs in
redistricting is that some rural EDs completely surround
a residential town.

If one does not wish to split the

surrounding rural ED, one is forced to include both EDs in
the same district.
These are problems facing the reapportioner when he
is just using EDs as the geographic base of his plan and
when he is just interested in the demographic characteristics of the districts he is building.

They are diffi-

culties which are bothersome, but certainly not impossible
with which to deal.

Another problem of great difficulty

arises when the districts being created must have small
populations and the allowable deviations are also very
small--as was the case in Mississippi.

For example, the

average population of an ED in the State of Mississippi
in 1970 was 858.
18,171.

The average district population was

The average ED, therefore, represented 4.7 per-

cent of the ideal district population.

This fact alone

made it difficult to construct districts with less than a
5 percent deviation from ideal district size.

The
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FIGURE 1

EXAMPLE OF ENUMERATION DISTRICTS CAUSED BY ANNEXATION

SOURCE:

Joint Committee Files and U.S. Census Bureau Maps
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FIGURE 2
EXAMPLE OF HOW AN ENUMERATION DISTRICT CAUSED
BY ANNEXATION HAD TO BE SPLIT IN THE STATE'S PLAN

E.D.58

DIST. 3
E.D.6
E.0.5A.

E.0.7

E.D.8

DIST. 18

BOONESV1LLE

SOURCE:

Joint Committee Files
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placement of EDs of proper size in relationship to each
other would become more important in determining the combinations of EDs into districts than the desirable configuration of the district in terms of compactness or community
of interest.

For example, if one were required to cross

over into an adjacent county to pull a few more people into
a district, one would choose the ED being taken from the
adjoining county on the basis of its population rather than
its geographic location.

The larger the average unit size

and the smaller the districts being created, the less the
shape and configuration of the districts is determined by
"good government" criteria and the more it is determined
by the actual populations of the individual units.

It was

very difficult in Mississippi to construct a plan with
maximum district population deviations of less than+ 2
percent.
In the urbanized areas, where block-by-block data
are available, the problems outlined above are not present.
One can simply work with individual block units.

It is

always relatively easy to find some block on the perimeter
of a district with the appropriate population to "fine
tune" the final district population.

In states with large

proportions of their populations located in urbanized
areas, the availability of block data gives considerable
latitude to those constructing redistricting plans using
only census units and data.

However, Mississippi is a

state in which only 16.4 percent of the legislative
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districts may be constructed in areas with block-by-block
data.

All other districts are subject to the problems

discussed in the paragraphs above because they are being
built in so-called "rural" counties.

Even though large

cities are located in those counties, the cities are not
large enough to have block data compiled by the Census
Bureau. 2
Unfortunately, census data and census geographic
units are not the only data and units used for redistricting.

It is rare, indeed, when some political infor-

mation is not required in the redistricting decisionmaking process.

It is also common for many state

redistricting projects to attempt to minimize the fragmentation of precincts (or election districts) when building
new districts.

Because of one or the other (or both) of

these requirements it is often necessary to interpolate
data from voting precincts "into" census units or census
data into election units--or both.
Considering the problems that were involved in the
interpolation of census data into precincts in the 1977
Mississippi redistricting process, it is fortunate that
there was no requirement to provide political data by
census units.

If that were the case, the redistricting

might never have been completed.
Even in the best of circumstances there is little
correspondence between tract and ED boundaries on one side
and precinct or election district boundaries on the other
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side.

In Mississippi this problem uniquely increased by

several factors.

The first is the maintenance of separate

precinct structures for city and state elections.

The

second is Mississippi's unusual supervisorial redistricting
criterion.

The third is the interference by the Civil

Rights Act with normal precinct revision process due to
population and registered voter growth; local agencies in
charge of adjusting precinct boundaries must first submit
the changes to the Attorney General, a difficult process
which discourages these changes and often ends in disapprovals.
The State of Mississippi has two different precinct
structures.

One is used for county and statewide elec-

tions every four years, and is established by the county
election officials.

The second set of precincts is for

cities and is used in municipal elections only.

In order

to vote in a city election, a voter must first register
with the county officials and then with the city officials.
Thus, two different voter rolls are maintained in some
areas.

Unlike the situation in many states, precinct

boundary lines for county precincts do not terminate at
corporate boundaries.

Many precincts combine numbers of

city voters with rural voters--extending far beyond the
corporate boundaries to encompass large rural areas.

To

further complicate the issue, the policy for redistricting
county supervisor districts, called "beats" in Mississippi,
is subject to an unusual statistical constraint.
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One of the primary duties of the supervisors is the
maintenance of the county road system.

Each supervisor is

charged with the maintenance of the roads within his own
district.

Thus, the ability to repave or regravel any given

road represents political power to all supervisors.

For

many years, it has been common policy for each of the
supervisors to divide up the county into districts so that
each has an equal amount of road mileage.

This practice

dates from the time when all supervisors were elected at
large, but governed within districts.

The enforcement of

the one person, one vote rule has played havoc with this
basic tradition for county redistricting--the "one road,
one vote" rule.

Faced with numerous suits demanding

redistricting according to both equality of population and
proper racial representation, and still wishing to honor
the "one road, one vote" policy, county boards have drawn
bizarrely shaped districts in many counties.
Most Mississippi counties are oriented around the
county seat that contains a large portion of that county's
population.

If that city is centrally located in the

county, it is possible to draw the beats so that they
divide up the county like a pie.

But, if the large city

in the county is not centrally located, or if the rural
racial distribution is awkward, or if any other political
consideration comes into play, then some extremely irregular district shapes may result.
below:

An example is presented
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Pearl River County contains a population of 27,802
(see figure

3).

Each beat, therefore, should contain a

population of 5,560.

This county has two major cities--

Picayune,with a population of 10,467, and Poplarville, with
a population of 2,312.
figure 3.

The 1960 beats are also shown in

In that plan, the city of Picayune is located

almost entirely within Beat 4--with a small portion in
Beat 5 (probably due to annexation since the redistrictin~.
The city of Poplarville is located entirely within Beat 1.
The districts are reasonably regular in shape and roughly
equal in area.
The present plan carves up the county in what can
only be described as a bizarre manner.

All three of the

northern beats descend south into the city of Picayune
through corridors one mile wide, which open up within the
city.

One of the corridors is 23 miles long; the others,

10 and 13 miles long.
between districts.

The city of Poplarville is split

Precincts run up and down these corri-

dors or are formed entirely within them.

There is no way

that these districts could be anything but confusing to
the voters of the county.

It is illogical that precincts

shaped by road policy should be used to form state legislative districts!
Other counties' supervisor districts, such as those
in Alcorn, Franklin, Greene, Lee, Prentiss, and Winston
Counties, also serve as good examples of this practice.
All these beat configurations would be of little
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FIGURE 3
THE 1960 AND 1970 SUPERVISOR BEATS IN PEARL RIVER COUNTY
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importance to the legislative redistricting problem in the
State except for the fact that such contorted precinct
shapes make the determination of the populations of the
precincts very difficult.

.

The precinct of Tupelo 3 in

Lee County is a striking example of this problem.

This

precinct was designed to allow Beat 3 a pathway through the
city of Tupelo so that the beat could open up in rural
areas on both the east and west sides of that City (see
figure

4).

This precinct contains portions of no less

than 17 EDs, and not one of those EDs is entirely contained
within the precinct.

It happens that the average beat pop-

ulation in Lee County is about half that of the average
House district.

This, therefore, was one case in which

beat lines could be followed.

The determination of the

correct estimated 1970 population of these beats, however,
was a major problem involving the splitting of many EDs.
This was the case in many areas of the State.
As previously mentioned, the Civil Rights Act of
1965 has also distorted the precinct structure in the State
of Mississippi.

In many of the counties of that State,

the primary concern of the civil rights forces over the
last decade has been the registration of black voters and
increasing their turnout at the polls.

Before the enforce-

ment of the Civil Rights Act, many blacks had been denied
the right to register and had been discouraged from voting.
Thus, Section 5 of the Civil Rights Act, among its many
goals, was designed to discourage the alteration of precinct
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FIGURE 4
LEE COUNTY SUPERVISOR BEATS AND THE CITY OF TUPELO SHOWING PRECINCT 3 (SHADED) WHICHCARRIES BEAT 3 THROUGH THE CITY

.

II

JI

TIJPELO

l ■4

5.D.

lu S.D.

lrd S.D .

4t

s.o.

Sch

S .O.

LEE COUNTY

SOURCE:

Joint Committee Files

178
boundaries or changing of polling places--a device used to
confuse black voters.

Every change in precinct lines,

therefore, 1s subject to the veto of the Department of
Justice.
The administration of elections is, at best, rather
informal in some Mississippi counties.
boundaries are not defined at all.

Many precinct

Voters _simply register

where it is most convenient to vote or where the local
election official thinks they should vote.

It is not

always clear exactly where all the voters actually reside.
Under the best of circumstances, local election officials
are not eager to change any precinct boundaries because it
is difficult for them to ascertain which voters would fall
on either side of the new lines.

In some cases, it is

asserted that all voters in precincts where boundaries are
shifted would have to re-register in order that their
current residence could be determined.

All these factors,

combined with the complex and drawn-out process involved
in obtaining permission from the Justice Department to
change voting precinct lines, has kept Mississippi precinct
boundaries stable over the last decade

What changes that

have come about have usually been the result of court
actions--which are not subject to the Justice Department's
veto or in which the Justice Department has been a party to
the settlement.
Following the 1970 Census there was a long string of
court challenges to the composition of supervisorial dist-
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ricts in Mississippi's counties.

Plaintiffs were seeking

both enforcement of the one man, one vote rule and appropriate representation for black voters.

The result of

these actions has been discussed above--namely, the
unusually shaped districts in many counties.

The need for

determination of demographic characteristics for these new
supervisorial districts has spawned a variety of methodologies for splitting EDs.

In some cases the United States

Census Bureau was asked to aplit the EDs.
special censuses were taken.

In other cases,

Sometimes current (at the

time of each case) housing counts were made and the population was divided in accordance with the number of
housing units.

Sometimes this same method was followed

using outdated housing maps.

Sometimes the parties to the

action simply agreed that certain populations were correct.
Sometimes people simply guessed at the population.
At any rate, the population estimates originated
from a variety of methodologies and used population bases
anywhere from the 1970 Census to estimated 1977 figures.
The important factor to note is that the primary motivation in almost all these cases was racial.

Interest was

focused on black representation, not exact equality in
population.

As long as they were obtaining proper black

representation, the civil rights forces and the Department
of Justice were not prepared to argue over differences in
population estimates.

In many cases settlements were made

out of court--with Justice's agreement to approve the
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results when submitted.

In other cases, the courts

involved were not qualified to determine if the population
estimates were accurate.

One fact is certain--there was no

uniformity in the demographic work done for supervisorial
redistricting on a statewide scale.
The preceding

discussion on supervisorial redistric-

ting serves to emphasize the difficulties involved in the
determination of accurate estimates of populations for
precinct-based districts.

Even in a non-adversary pro-

ceeding it would be difficult to develop satisfactory
demographic summaries for many districts.

In the context

of the Connor v. Finch decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the 1976 District Court Plan was unacceptable
due to excessive population deviations.

In this plan, the

House districts had ranged from -9.9 percent to +9.4 percent in relation to ideal district population.

The Senate

districts ranged from -8.3 percent to +8.2 percent.

These

maximum deviations of 16.5 percent for the Senate and
19.3 percent for the House, held the Court, "simply cannot
be tolerated in a court-ordered plan, in the absence of
some compelling justification. 113

The Supreme Court itself

recognized the problem facing those attempting to construct
redistricting plans in a footnote to this decision.
As is not unusual in cases such as this, there is
considerable controversy among the parties as to
what the proper population figures are. The census
is itself at best an approximate estimate of a
State's population at a frozen moment in time.
Because it is taken by census tract rather than along
supervisory district or voting precinct lines,
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relevant population figures for these political
districts have to be extrapolated. That process
is complicated by the recognition that major shifts
in population and in voting precinct lines have
occurred since the 1970 census, and by the fact
that proportionally more Negroes than whites are
ineligible to vote because of age.
We need not 'enter this imbroglio of mathematical
manipulation,' but instead 'confine our consideration to the figures actually found by the
(district) court.'
(Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S.
315, 319 n. 6. See also Burns v. Richardson,
supra, at 91-93.)
On remand, however, to avoid
the substantial confusion that characterizes the
record now before us, the District Court should
explain the genesis of the population figures on
which it relies.4
It is interesting to note that while the primary issue in
the Connor litigation was black representation, all rulings
prior to the D.C. District Court ruling of June, 1979, were
decided on the issue of population equality.

It was felt

by both the Counsel and Technical Consultants to the Joint

Reapportionment Committee that the Supreme Court had placed
considerable emphasis on both population equality and
adequate documentation of demographic data compiled for
districting plans.

The Supreme Court, in a further foot-

note, took the District Court to task for claiming that the
small size of the districts being created was justification
for high population deviations.

Turning to another case,

they stated that "The 1 percent population norm in the
sparsely populated State of North Dakota was 121, but the
Court did not consider that a

'legitimate basis for depar-

ture from the goal of equality' in Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S., at 24." 5

It was inferred from this language and

similar language throughout this decision that strict
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application of the de rninimis rule was required and that
sound methodology in determination of populations of district was also required.
Because the U.S. Supreme Court had mentioned the 1
percent deviation in North Dakota and had also instructed
the District Court to present better documentation of its
data in its next attempt to redistrict the State, both the
Committee's counsel, and most of the experts retained by
the Cornrnitte~ felt that the plan to be presented to the
District Court for its adoption should be drawn along ED
boundaries.

This would allow the construction of a plan

with the smallest possible deviations and the highest
accurace of demographic data.

Thus, the Legislature's

Court ED Plans and the first version of the Statutory Plans
were created with EDs as the building blocks.
Although the District Court, in its somewhat vague
instructions to the parties submitting plans for its consideration, had expressed some preference for the use of
precinct boundaries, the Committee decided that the plan
which it was presenting should follow ED lines.

It con-

sidered the need for the lowest possible deviations and
accuracy of data to be more important than the District
Court's preference for keeping precincts intact.
In doing so, the Committee had underestimated the
District Court's absolute preference for precincts.

After

the Legislature's ED Plans had been submitted to the
District Court, the Court expressed extreme dissatisfaction
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at the Committee's use of EDs.
The Court felt that the use of ED boundaries would
result in the splitting of a large number of precincts in
the State.

This, in turn, would result in the necessity

of re-registration of all the voters in those precincts-perhaps throughout the entire State.

This re-registration

process would result in a greater drop in the numbers of
blacks registered than whites.

It would also cause con-

siderable expense to the various county election officials.
The Court, on this issue, was trading off about 4 to 6
percentage points of district equality for the avoidance
of disruption of the voter rolls and polling places.

The

District Court in Jackson has long been under fire from
the civil rights forces in the State for what they perceive
to be its unenthusiastic enforcement of federal civil
rights legislation.

There might have been some fear of

further criticism of that Court's redistricting record.
Whatever the reason, the Court directed the Legislature to
submit new plans which did not break precinct boundaries.
In accordance with the desires of the District Court,
the Joint Reapportionment Committee instructed the
Committee staff to "adjust" the boundaries of the Court ED
Plans and the Statutory ED Plans to the "nearest" precinct
lines.

This was to be accomplished without increasing the

maximum district deviations beyond+ 4 percent for the
Court Plan, and+ 5 percent for the Statutory Plans.
change in policy, of course, threw the Committee's

This
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technical staff into the same statistical thicket as the
other parties submitting plans.

All were now faced with

determining the best possible populations for the split
EDs which were on the boundaries of the new districts
where the precinct lines did not coincide with the ED lines.
What follows is a discussion of the various approaches taken to this problem by plan designers.

This will

serve as a final example of the difficulties of dealing
with the various sets of geographic units involved in the
redistricting process and the problems of interpolation
of data for split units.
The District Court Master, in the construction of
his 1976 Plan, used the turnout in the Democratic Primary
of 1976 for estimation of precinct populations.
produced highly questionable figures.

This

To begin with, the

Democratic Primary does not represent all voters.

Second,

one cannot assume that voter registration is consistent
as a percentage of total population throughout an entire
geographic area.

Third, even assuming a homogeneous ratio

of voters to total population, this method does not account
for members of the other parties.

Fourth, there is a

built-in bias against blacks, who do not register in equal
percentages to whites.
registration, not 1976.

Fifth, he should have used 1970
In fact there are so many statis-

tical errors in this method that it might, in the eyes of
some critics, bring into question the competence of the
Court that ordered the plan into effect.

It is no wonder
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that the Supreme Court questioned the population figures
of the 1976 Plan.

Unless one were to make a blindfold

guess, one could hardly imagine a worse method for estimating population.
None of the experts or plan-drawers involved in the
Connor case after 1977 used registration as a means of
population estimation.
other methods employed.

There were, however, a variety of
These were the "enumerator map

count" method, the "office separation" method, the "cultural" method, the "area" method, and "house-count" method,
and, for lack of a better term, the "former settlement"
method.
The "emunerator map count" method involves the actual
maps carried around by U.S. Census enumerators on Census
Day.

On these maps, enumerators are instructed to mark

the locations of all the housing units which they encounter
and the number of inhabitants in each unit.

Using this

map, assuming that the enumerator was both conscientious
and accurate, one would be able to make a very precise
determination of the number of persons on each side of a
line running through the middle of an enumeration district.
This method, however, can only be used by the Bureau of
the Census, which keeps the maps in storage in
Jeffersonville.

Furthermore, only a limited number of

personnel are available who can read these maps.

This

method, therefore, is both time consuming and expensive,
but it is also the most accurate method available of
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splitting EDs.
If one is to take advantage of the expertise of the
Bureau, one may also pay the Bureau to use the "office
separation" method.

In this method, trained personnel

from the Bureau make an educated determination of the
number of persons on each side of the line drawn through
an ED.

This method is less accurate than the "enumerator

map count" method, but it has one desirable feature: it
cannot be biased by the prejudice of the plan drawer.

The

Bureau's expert does not have any stake in the outcome of
the estimate.

He is not likely to tamper with the data in

order to make it fit the plan.

This method was used by the

Joint Committee in the formulation of both its Court and
Statutory Precinct Plans.
An alternative method of splitting EDs is that of
straight areas proportions (discussed above).

Mr. Tanner

undoubtedly used this method when splitting EDs that did
not contain lakes, swamps, or forests {as defined by
National Forest boundaries).

This method can be shown to

be totally invalid by common logic.
The "cultural" method was employed by the plan drawer
from the Department of Justice, Mr. John Tanner, who drew
the Court Precinct Plan submitted to the Connor Court.

Mr.

Tanner stated in the Washington D.C. trial that the "cultural" method involved the use of "actual geographic area,
less lakes, swamps, or forests"

(trial page 1190).

His

view was that, after allowances for these factors, the
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population should be split on a basis proportional to geographic area.

There are two main problems with this

method, which is essentially a modified "area" method.
First, one can never assume that population distributes
itself proportionally to geographic area.

This is not even

true in the metropolitan area--a fact that can be verified
by reference to block data.

Second, the maps that were

used by Mr. Tanner did not even show forest area, and
Mississippi has a considerable amount of forested territory.

Much of the forest area is not contained in National

Forests; it is privately owned.

None of this privately

owned forested land is shown on the census maps.

Thus,

there is at least a double error in Mr. Tanner's splitting
methodology.
The "house-count" method is, perhaps, the most valid
method, other than the "enumerator map count" method.

Its

validity is, of course, limited by the accuracy of the maps
from which the houses are counted.

In Mississippi, the

Highway Department published both county and metropolitan
maps throughout the 1970s on which are shown locations and
types of housing.

They also show apartments--of which

there are few outside the major cities.
to be of acceptable accuracy.

They are reputed

In any event, the distribu-

tion of houses on these maps gives a generally good idea
of where the people live within each ED.
subdivisions are shown on these maps.

Villages and

(Ideally, it might,

of course, be desirable to have aerial photographs of the
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State, flown on the day of the census.
not available.)

These, however, are

Lacking actual photographs, and not having

access to the Bureau's enumerator maps, the State Highway
Department maps provide the best source of information
which is available on a uniform basis throughout the entire
State.

This method was used in part by the Connor Plain-

tiffs and by the staff of the Committee in the examination
of the Tanner and Henderson Plans.

It was also used to

examine the Master's 1978 Plan.
The "former settlement" method involves the use of
all the documents and data used to split EDs in the redistricting of the supervisor districts throughout the State
in the period from 1970 to 1977.

Some ED splits involved

house-counts, some actual special censuses, other EDs were
split by the Bureau, many splits were just agreed to by
the parties involved.

The problem with reliance upon

these documents is that they are not consistent--nor were
they developed with the goal of statewide legislative
redistricting in mind.

They are, however, probably more

accurate than either the "cultural" method or the "area"
method.

This approach was used by Dr. Henderson in the

formulation of his plans, together with the house-count
method.
Perhaps the notes here have given the reader a sense
of the problems involved in determining accurate population
counts for Mississippi's legislative districts.
be added that these were only total populations.

It should
The data
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on adult population, both total and black, and total black
population could only be assigned in direct proportion to
the total population.

It was admitted by all parties to

this process that this could involve significant error in
the estimation of black percentages.

This is why asser-

tions by the Justice Department that there is a significant
difference between a district in Jackson with 59.7 percent
black adults and one in a rural area with 60.0 percent
black adults (a difference of 0.3 percent) is evidently
absurd.

A skeptical person might draw the assumption that

the Department of Justice was, in this instance, attempting
to mold both the criteria and the data to cast their plan
in the best possible light in relation to the plan of the
State.
case.

This is probably the primary reason they lost the
Indeed, it appeared from the very beginning that

the Department of Justice was manipulating the statistics,
with no consistency in their methodology.
were simple and they were consistent.

The State's data

The State may not

have created as many black districts as the Department of
Justice; but the Court could be sure of the State's data
and be sure, also, that no "games were being played" with
the statistics.
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On the Technical Aspects of Drawing
A Redistricting Plan

A consultant, faced with the problem of redistricting
a state legislature, confronts difficulties that span four
disciplines: politics, data processing, cartographies, and
law.

For purposes of this study, cartographies and data

processing have been labeled the "technical" aspects of
the redistricting process.

Maps and data are the essential

tools of redistricting; redistricting, by definition, is a
method of allocating representation based upon the number
of people residing in a geographic area.

In the case of

Mississippi, however, the nature of the people living in
an area is often more important than their numbers.
In terms of the type of data required, the process of
redistricting Mississippi was relatively simple.

There

were only four data items required for each geographic
unit.

These were: total persons, total black persons,

total persons over eighteen years of age, and total black
persons over eighteen years of age.

These pieces of

information represent only a fraction of the data required
for redistricting a large urban state.

In states such as

Illinois and New York, much more information is required
to obtain a suitable demographic description of the population.

Among these are age, race, ethnic group, income,

occupation, housing data, and education.

In addition to

these demographic factors, data are required on a myriad
of political factors, usually limited only by the amount
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of room available for the data base on the computer system
being used in any particular state.

Such information is

especially important in a large, two-party state, in which
the staff performing the redistricting is faced with a
multitude of competing interests--including both ethnic
and racial groups and the major political parties.

All of

these interests must be kept in balance within the limits
allowed by the one person, one vote doctrine.
The problems in Mississippi were those of size and
time.

Size was a problem because, while the number of

counties and the number of seats in the Legislature are
large, the population

is small.

For example, in

Mississippi the average House member represents 18,171
persons.

In California, each Assembly member represents

249,600 persons.

The seats in California's lower house

are, therefore, 13.75 times "larger" (in terms of population) than those in Mississippi.

Also, in California, the

population of the census units is smaller.

This is because

the State is more urbanized, and statistics are more widely
available on a block-by-block basis.

The point is that in

Mississippi it is much more difficult to put together
districts that are both equal in population and demographically and geographically acceptable.

In the lower house

in Mississippi, it was virtually impossible to create
districts with deviations lower than+ 2.00 percent.

Such

problems made the whole process extremely difficult, and
required the splitting of many voting precincts.
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The problem of maintaining acceptable district deviations was exacerbated by the necessity of building districts out of precincts, rather than census units.

In

California, it is a common and accepted practice to split
voter precincts in a redistricting.

In fact, in the large

counties, precincts are redrawn on a routine basis.

In

Mississippi, however, permission must be obtained from the
Justice Department in Washington before a precinct can be
split or a polling place moved.

And, since this permission

is routinely withheld (and because growth patterns are
often uneven), precincts vary in size tremendously, in
terms of both area and population.

In Washington County,

for example, 70,681 persons are distributed among just
twenty voter precincts.
3,534 per precinct.

This is an average population of

By contrast, in Kings County,

California--like Washington County, a rural county with a
large central city--66,717 persons are divided among 60
precincts, with an average precinct population of just
1,112.

In fact, in the State of California, there is a

statutory limit on the number of voters who may live in
any one precinct.
The large size of the precincts in Mississippi is
generally due to the low percentage of voter registration.
The size of the precincts, in itself, is not being criticized.

Mississippi has a right to organize its election

system in any constitutional way it pleases (or that
pleases the Department of Justice).

However, when the
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average population of a precinct, as in Washington County,
represents 19.45 percent of the population of a district,
it severely limits the number of combinations which can
result in districts with a deviation smaller than+ 5.00
percent.
In addition to the large variances in precinct size,
many Mississippi precincts are highly irregular in shape.
This irregularity is due to the State's redistricting
policy for county supervisor districts.

The irregular

shapes of precincts make it much more difficult to ascertain the populations of many Mississippi districts, since
precinct lines, even under the best of circumstances, do
not correspond to the boundaries of census enumeration
districts (EDs).
The time problem was also a limiting factor in the
Mississippi redistricting.

When the technical staff

arrived in Jackson on September 1, 1977, they were faced
with the prospect of producing a tentative plan by no
later than September 30th--with a final plan to be ready
by October 29th.

This time limit made it mandatory that

a data base and tabulation program be in existence no later
than September 15th.

Thus, the scope of the data proces-

sing effort had to be limited.

Two weeks is a very short

time in which to write any program--let alone a redistricting retrieval system and a full set of programs to create
a data base.
To create Mississippi's data base, the data from the
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U.S. Census Bureau's first and third count summary tapes
were extracted for counties, supervisor districts, census
tracts, enumeration districts, and blocks.

After a short

period of time, the block data were dropped from the data
because the disk space required to maintain them was not
justified by the marginal use to which the block data were
being put.

The data were organized hierarchically by ED

within either tract or supervisor district within each
county.

It should be noted that the supervisor districts,

the basis on which the data were organized within counties)
were the districts as of April 1970--many of which had
been drastically redrawn during the preceding seven
years.
The data base consisted of one indexed sequential
file, with one logical record per geographic unit.
Having the file in indexed sequential mode allowed the
access of any single record without having to read the
file from the beginning--as would be the case with a
magnetic computer tape.

Any record could be accessed by

one disk read at any time.

Each record contained a geo-

graphic identifier section, followed by the four data
elements, followed by a 15-elernent array into which
assignments for that unit could be made.

This allowed for

the storage of up to fifteen plans simultaneously.

The

file was protected so that the users could not erase any
of the data, but could change district assignments or
blank out entire plans.

The data base was backed up on
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magnetic tape each evening.
the use of passwords.

Security was maintained by

Entry to the system was by remote

terminal over telephone lines.

The terminal was located

in the Joint Committee Offices in the State Capitol
building in Jackson, and the computer was the DEC-10 system
located at the University of Mississippi in Oxford.
There were two modes programmed for the assignment
of census units.

The first was the random access mode.

Using this mode, the user would indicate the county, SD,
and ED he wished to assign.

The computer would then dis-

play the data for that unit and the district to which it
was presently assigned.

Each unit assigned using this

mode had to be entered by giving the county, SD, and ED
(tract was substituted for SD when available).
The second assignment mode was the sequential mode.
In this mode, the starting county, plus the SD or tract
was designated.

The computer would then display each unit

sequentially in turn, and the user would enter the district
assignment.

If a county were assigned as a whole unit,

then all other units would be passed over for that county.
The same was true in the case of an SD or tract.

The

assignment of a tract or SD would cause the computer to
skip over all the EDs within that unit.

This program

allowed for rapid entry of a whole plan or a portion of a
plan.
One disadvantage of the data base as it was organized
was that in order to split a county, SD, or tract that had

196
been previously assigned as a whole unit, the larger area
had to be reassigned to district O (i.e., unassigned).
This was not difficult to do, but sometimes users forgot
this procedure.

Their forgetfulness generated complaints

that the program was not functioning properly.

The alter-

native, however, was to have the program force disassignment of a unit when one of its sub-units was assigned.

But

with random access available, this would allow for units to
remain unassigned either by themselves or as sub-units.
This was considered a greater disadvantage of the software
than the problem which the change would have solved.
Another program was written to display the districts
for any given plan.
modes.

This program also could be run in two

Mode one was for the entire plan, while mode two

was for selected districts.

At the beginning of the run,

the user was required to indicate the plan number he
wished to access, and whether the plan was for the House
or the Senate.

The program would then proceed to read the

data base file sequentially, reading each record and
checking the appropriate array position to see if that
record's unit had been assigned to any district.

If so,

the program wrote out the record in an output file; if not,
it would proceed to read the next record.

If a county

were assigned, the program would advance immediately to the
next county record.

If an SD or tract were assigned, the

program would advance to the next SD or tract.
The resulting output file would then be sorted first
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by district then by county, then SD or tract, then by ED.

A second program would then produce individual district
reports and summaries, a summary report by district for
the entire State, and a rectification of assigned population to actual population by county.

An optional report

of district population by county, or county population by
district, could also be produced.

A copy of the programs

is found in the Appendix.
When the decision was made to produce precinct plans
instead of ED plans, some modifications in the software
were required in order to accommodate large numbers of
split EDs.

An additional ISAM file was created into which

split portions could be written.

When an ED was to be

recorded as split, the user would assign the ED to district
555.

The program would then ask into how many sections

the ED was to be divided, record the population of each
section, record the district to which it was being assigne~
check the total against the total population, proportion
out the three remaining data elements to each section, and
write out a record into the split file for each section.
The program which read through the file for district
assignments would then be triggered into reading the split
file when a unit appeared in the main file which was
assigned to district 555.

Instead of writing out the unit

assigned to district 555, it would read each of that unit's
section records in the split file {which carried the actual
district assignments)and write out those records instead
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of the originals.

These records would be indicated as

split on the printout.
This program was extremely simple, containing none
of the geographic retrieval features available in programs
built for the larger states.

The Mississippi program,

however, was a good example of the application of computer
technology to small state redistricting.

The one arduous

task which could not be performed by the available software was the checking of the plan for contiguity.

Geo-

graphic display, even of the most primitive nature, would
have been extremely helpful in this project.

The ability

to plot ED assignments by centroid location also would
have been most helpful.

In the 1981 redistricting, the

breakdown of the 1980 Census by block for the entire State
of Mississippi should allow the fairly accurate calculation of precinct demographics.

This, in turn, should end

the continuous battles over district data which have
occurred throughout the 1977-78 project.

The 1981 data

base, if aggregated into precincts, will streamline some
of the software.

In addition, a touchlist and plotting

program could be used with data aggregated by voter
precinct.
By way of comparison, and to give an example of a
sophisticated redistricting system, a short discussion of
REDIS, a system being developed in part by this writer
for large state redistricting is included in the Appendix.
Another of the technical problems encountered in
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Mississippi was the lack of adequate maps.

In mid-August,

1977, the Joint Committee initiated the central collection
of precinct maps for the State's 82 counties.

Several of

the counties did not have precinct maps--some because maps
had never been drawn, others because there were no precinct
lines in existence.

(These counties without precinct

lines had merely designated polling places; voters chose
the polling place which was most convenient and registered
in that precinct's book.)

In many cases when maps were

sent to the Committee, they were vague or primitive.

The

poor quality of the maps was not a problem as long as the
Committee was generating only ED plans.

However, when the

Committee decided in November, 1977, to switch to precinctbased plans, it became important to know which sections of
which EDs were located in any given precinct.

At this

point the Committee consultants, led primarily by Calvin
Webb, recommended most strongly that the Committee produce
a set of maps adequate for the task.

For each county, two

maps were produced on the same base maps set; one of these
contained the precinct boundaries and the other the ED
boundaries.

In addition, an acetate overlay with ED boun-

daries was produced.

As it turned out, these maps,

although produced at great expense, were one of the best
investments which the Committee made.

They allowed not

only the production of accurate statistics for the
Legislature's plans, but also allowed accurate analysis of
the plans produced by other parties in the litigation.
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Accurate maps are a "must" for any effective redistricting
project.
Throughout the entire redistricting process, the
staff was pushed by the shortage of time.

The original ED

plans were produced in just four weeks, and given the final
form in two more weeks.

The Statutory ED plan was produced

in another three-week period, and put in final form two
weeks later.

Both of the precinct-based plans, the one for

the Connor Court and the one that was to appear as a
statute, were adjusted to precinct lines from their original ED base within a period of nine weeks.

During this

nine-week period, not one of the technical consultants was
able to devote full time to the project, since each was
employed elsewhere in a different capacity.
Thus, it is apparent that for the legislators and
lawyers involved in any redistricting effort, it is important to have an understanding both of the intricate procedures involved and of the difficult decisions that will
have to be made.

A basic understanding of these realities

is just as important as the technical knowledge that the
staff must have in order to operate in the complex political and legal environment that surrounds today's
redistricting process.
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Footnotes to Chapter IV
1

Not to be confused with data on voting and registration, which is referred to as "political" data.
2

That population was 50,000 in 1970 and will be only
10,000 in 1980.
3

4
5

Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 417 (1977).
rbid., at 416 n. 13.
rbid., at 418 n. 18.

CHAPTER V
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOUSE PLANS
The Court ED Plans
The first task in the development of any redistricting plan is to obtain a general overview of the state.
The State of Mississippi had a 1970 population of
2,216,912.
black.

Of this total population, 37 percent were

The total number of persons who were of voting age

in 1970 was 1,368,321, of which 31.5 percent were black.
There are eighty-two counties in the State, ranging in size
from Issaquena County with 2,737 persons to Hinds County
with 214,973 persons.

The Legislature is comprised of a

Senate, with fifty-two members, and a House of Representatives, with 122 members.

This set the ideal population of

a Senate district at 42,633, and of a House district at
18,171.
Of the eighty-two counties, thirty-nine were smaller
than the ideal population for one House seat, twenty-seven
had populations between one and two House seats, nine
between two and three House seats, four between three and
four House seats, one between four and five House seats,
and two greater than five House seats.

Hinds County,

which contains the capital city of Jackson, had enough
202
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population for twelve House seats, and Harrison County,
containing the cities of Biloxi, Pass Christian, and
Gulfport, had enough population for just over seven seats.
Other large counties included Jackson, Forrest, Jones,
Lauderdale, and Washington.

With the exception of Rankin

County, which contains suburbs of Jackson City, and De Soto
County, which contains suburbs of Memphis, Tennessee, the
counties listed above are the only ones containing any
cities approaching "metropolitan" size.

All of the

remainder of the State is essentially rural in nature.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the black population by county for the entire State.

With the exception

of two counties bordering on Alabama--Noxubee and Kemper-all of the counties with heavy black populations were
located on the west side of the State near the Mississippi
River.

Those counties in the northwestern portion of the

State comprise the "Delta" area.

The "Delta" area con-

tained the largest concentrations of rural black residents
in the State.

Outside of the counties with high percenta9=s

of blacks, the only other large concentrations of blacks
were in the cities of Jackson, Hattiesburg, Laurel,
Gulfport, and Meridian.
The Joint Committee Staff, having been charged with
the duty to avoid dilution of black voters, adopted a
policy of attempting to draw districts so that they did not
cross over county lines from counties with high concentrations of blacks to counties with low percentages of blacks.
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FIGURE 5
THE DISTRIBUTION OF BLACK ADULT POPULATION BY
COUNTY IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI IN 1970
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It was reasoned that if special care were taken in drawing
districts on the western side of the State, in Noxubee and
Kemper Counties, and in the five cities mentioned in the
paragraph above, then the other districts in the State
could be drawn in accordance with the other criteria without fear of creating districts which diluted the black vote.
In the case of the counties of Noxubee and Kemper,
Noxubee County, containing a black Voting Age Population
(VAP) over 55 percent, was combined with a portion of
Kemper, another heavily black county.

In the southwest

portion of the State, the counties of Claiborne and
Jefferson were combined to make a heavily black district.
The heavily black County of Wilkinson in the southwest
corner of the State was combined with a portion of Amite
County to make another black district.
Aside from the Delta area and the large cities, these
combinations handled the remaining major black areas in the
State.

Specific district construction was begun at the

southern end of the State.

Staff members noted the combin-

ation of the counties of Harrison, Jackson, and George as
just slightly shy of thirteen full districts.

Therefore,

they added a portion of Greene County to this area, and set
aside the resulting population for the creation of thirteen
districts at a later time.
The planners then noted that the County of Hancock
was just slightly short of the exact district population.
A portion of Pearl River County was combined with Hancock
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to form a district.

Another full district was formed

within Pearl River County.

The remaining portion of Pearl

River County was combined with all of Stone County and
found to be just short of a full district.

Accordingly, a

portion of the southern end of Forrest County was added to
that area to form another district.
The remaining area of Greene County was added to all
of Perry County and found to be short of a full district.
Another portion of Forrest County was added to this group
to form a district.

A three-district area was formed within

Forrest County and left for later subdivision

The

remainder of Forrest County was added to Lamar County to
form one district.
At this point the staff determined that Jones and
Wayne Counties together could form four districts.

Thus,

a small portion of Jones County was added to Wayne to form
one district, and the remaining portion of Jones County was
left for the construction of three districts.
Covington, Jefferson Davis, and Lawrence Counties
were found to have a population just in excess of two
districts.

Jefferson Davis County was split, with a por-

tion being added to Covington to form one district, and
the other portion being added to Lawrence to form a second
district.

A small portion of Lawrence was subtracted to

bring the second district down to the desired population.
At this point, the planners determined that if a
line were drawn across the tops of the counties of Wayne,
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Jones, Covington, Jefferson Davis, Lawrence, Lincoln,
Jefferson, and Claiborne, the resulting area would be just
600 persons in excess of thirty-six districts.

Thus, a

small area of Lincoln County was reserved for combination
with Copiah County.

A

portion of Jefferson County and all

of Claiborne County were combined to form a heavily black
district.
A two-district area in Adams County was set aside
for later subdivision.

A second two-district area, consis-

ting of the remainder of Adams County, the remainder of
Jefferson County, and all of Wilkinson and Franklin Counties
was formed.

As previously planned, all of Wilkinson was

then combined with a portion of Amite to form a black district.

The remaining portion of the two-district area--

consisting of part of Adams, part of Jefferson, all of
Franklin, and the remaining part of Arnite--was found to be
just short of one-district size.

Thus, a portion of Pike

County was added to make another district.
Turning back to the other side of the State, Lamar,
Marion, W~fuall, and the remaining portions of Forrest and
Lawrence Counties were combined into a three-district area.
This area was just short of the required population, so a
portion of Pike County was added.

The planners then sub-

divided the resulting area, creating a full district in
Marion County and dividing that county in half to form two
other districts (a Pike-Walthall-Lawrence-Marion district
and a Marion-Lamar district).
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Another full district was formed within Pike County,
and yet another within Lincoln County.

The remaining por-

tions of Pike and Lincoln Counties now comprised the last
district in the southern portion of the State.

Thirty-

seven districts were now specifically located (see figure
6 for map of original Plan A districts in Mississippi).
The staffers then focussed their attention on the
northern end of the State.
into two full districts.
full district.

Do Soto County was subdivided
Tate County was designated as a

In the northeast corner of the State, a

district was constructed within Prentiss

County, leaving

the remainder of that county to be divided and combined
with Itawamba to form one full district, and with
Tishomingo County to form a portion of another.

The

Tishomingo District received a part of Alcorn County to
bring it up to full population.
The planners then noted that the remaining portion
of Alcorn County, along with Tippah, Benton, Marshall, and
Union Counties, could be formed into five districts.

After

forming a full district each within Alcorn, Union, and
Marshall Counties, the planners drew the remaining two di~ricts by dividing Tippah County.

Two districts were formed

in Lee County and left for later subdivision; meanwhile, a
Lee-Pon -otocdistrict was formed.

Single districts were

formed within Lafayette County and Panola County.
Yalobusha-Panola district was formed.

A

This left portions

of Panola, Lafayette, and Pontotoc to form another full
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FIGURE 6
HOUSE PLAN A AS APPROVED BY JOINT COMMITTEE
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district.
The staffers then decided to move over to Oktibbeha
County and form a full district within that County.

A very

small portion of Clay County was set aside, and the
remainder was formed into a district.

An Oktibbeha-Lowndes

district was formed, which also included the small portion
of Clay County.

A two-district area was formed in Lowndes

and all of Monroe, Chickasaw, and Calhoun Counties in this
part of the State.

Since the area in question was just

short of four districts, a small portion of Grenada County
was added.

A Lowndes-Monroe district was constructed, and

a full district was set aside within Monroe County.
Chickasaw County was then divided to form the other two
districts.

Elsewhere in this area, Webster and Choctaw

Counties were combined to form a full district.

Another

full district was formed within Grenada County, and Winston
County became a self-contained district.

This completed

location of another thirty districts in the State.
Turning to the east-central portion of Mississippi,
the planners determined that the counties of Noxubee,
Kemper, Lauderdale, Clarke, Jasper, Newton, Neshoba, Scott,
and Leake had a combined population that was just 700
persons in excess of eleven full districts.

Hence it was

decided to form eleven districts in this nine-county area.
At the same time, the five-county area of Smith, Simpson,
Copiah, Hinds, and Rankin (along with 600 persons in
Lincoln county) would form seventeen and one-half districts.

211
The planners decided to take the excess population out of
the nine-county area by removing the northwest corner of
Leake County.

They further decided to take the excess over

seventeen districts from the five-county area by removing
part of Rankin County and combining it with Madison County-the same approach used in the 1975 Plan.

These decisions

having been made, districts could then be formed in both
areas.
Hinds County was just short of twelve districts in
population.

Thus, a small portion of Copiah County was

combined with Hinds County to form a twelve-district area,
which was set aside for later subdivision.

A

district was

then formed by combining part of Copiah County with a
small fragment of Lincoln County.

The remaining portion

of Copiah County was combined with a portion of Simpson
County to form another district.

All of Smith County was

combined with a second portion of Simpson County to form a
district.

The remaining part of Simpson County was added

to Rankin County to form a two-district area for later
division; and what remained of Rankin County was set aside
to be added to a Madison County district.
In the nine-county area mentioned above, the staffers
found Scott, Newton, and Jasper Counties to be about 1,400
persons in excess of three districts.

Thus, a district

was formed within Scott, a second district was formed by
adding all of Jasper to a portion of Newton, and 1,400
persons were taken out of Newton to form a Scott-Newton
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district.

A portion of Lauderdale was combined with Clarke,

forming another district.

The predetermined Noxubee-Kemper

district was formed, leaving a portion of Kemper County
free.

Moving over to Leake County, the remaining portion

of Leake (700 persons having been removed from the northwest corner) was combined with a portion of Neshoba County
to form a district.

One full district was formed within

Neshoba County, and the remainder of Neshoba County was
combined with the remainders of Newton County and Kemper
County,

and the northern portion of Lauderdale County to

form a complete district.

This left a three-district area

in the east-central part of the State to be subdivided
later.

At this point in the process, the locations of

ninety-five out of one hundred twenty-two districts had
been completed, leaving just the twenty-seven Delta area
districts to be constructed.
Accordingly, district construction now moved to the
Delta, where significant concentrations of blacks were
located in all counties.

Warren, Issaquena, Sharkey, and

Washington Counties comprise a seven-district set.

When a

portion of Sharkey was added to Washington County, that
left a four-district area for later subdivision.

The

remainder of Sharkey, all of Issaquena, and the northern
portion of warren were then formed into a single district,
leaving a two-district area in Warren County--also for
later subdivision.
The planners then made a decision to form districts
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down the counties bordering the Mississippi River, and to
move eastward from there into the counties located away
from the river.

Beginning with Tunica County, a Tunica-

Coahoma district was formed.

A district was also formed

within the City of Clarksdale in Coahoma County, and the
remainder of that county was combined with the northern
end of Bolivar County to form yet another district.

Two

complete districts were formed within Bolivar County, and
the remaining portion of that county was set aside.
Quitman County was combined with part of Tallahatchie
County to form a district, and the remaining portion of
Tallahatchie County was combined with parts of Grenada and
Leflore Counties to make another district.

This left just

thirteen more districts to be located.
Many of the remaining district locations were now
determined by what was geographically possible.
constructions were logical.
drawn.

Certain

A Madison-Rankin district was

Another Madison district was also drawn.

The

southern part of Sunflower County became a district, and
Humphreys County was combined with a portion of Holmes
County to form another district.

A district was formed

within Holmes County, and the remaining portion of Holmes
County was combined with northern Yazoo County to form one
more district.

This left seven districts to be drawn.

A two-district area was formed from the remaining
parts of Bolivar and Sunflower Counties plus a portion of
Leflore County.

Formation of a Greenwood City district
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was planned in Leflore County, with the remainder of
Leflore County to be combined with a portion of Carroll
County to form another district.

This left three districts

to be formed out of the remainders of Carroll, Leake,
Yazoo, and Madison Counties, plus the whole of Montgomery
and Attala Counties.

To create these districts, both

Montgomery and Attala Counties had to be split.

Finally,

a split was made in the above-mentioned Bolivar-SunflowerLeflore district, and the outline of Plan A was finished.
At this point in the development of Plan A, twelve
multi-district areas had been created and set aside to be
subdivided into single districts.

These included the large

municipal areas in which racial factors needed to be considered in more detail.

In addition, the criterion gover-

ning the treatment of counties was not in effect in these
areas.

This gave the plan drawers a greater degree of

latitude in creating proposed districts.

In some cases,

individual legislators or groups of law makers had expreffied
an interest in participating in the drawing of these lines.
In other cases, the Committee Staff wished to have some
local input.

This does not mean that individual members

who participated in the devising of Plan A could dictate
lines; it meant merely that they could contribute to the
process.
Certain members of the staff were of the opinion
that, in counties with large central cities, attempts
should be made to place one or more districts entirely
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within those cities.
two reasons.

This was not done in many cases--for

First, since these cities had been in multi-

member districts in previous plans, the incumbents would all
reside in close proximity to one another in these cities.
Second, there was in the Legislature a strong rural bias,
most legislators preferring city-county combinations to the
possible polarization of city and rural areas.

When these

preferences did not affect the racial aspects of the Plan,
they were allowed to influence policy decisions.

(Of

course, such social and political preferences are apparent
in any redistricting plan that is developed in a legislative setting.

There is also ample evidence that such pref-

erences influence redistrictings that are done by commissions.)

At any rate, while the drawing of the rural dist-

ricts took place with very little legislative input, the
city districts were drawn only after a great deal of
research and consultation with local residents.
At this point, the staff began work on these fifty
remaining districts in the twelve multi-member areas.

De

Soto County's two districts were drawn with a north-south
line, and presented little difficulty.

The City of

Vicksburg in warren County was split, creating two city/
rural districts.

This same policy was followed in the City

of Natchez in Adams County.

Over some strong staff objec-

tions, the City of Laurel in Jones County was split three
ways, giving each incumbent in Jones County his own district.

In Lauderdale county, two districts were created
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within the City of Meridian, and the remaining portion of
the City was connected to the adjacent rural area.

The

City of Meridian had one black district drawn within its
boundaries.

The two Rankin County districts, dividing the

suburbs of Jackson, were drawn without controversy.
It was in the counties of Hinds, Harrison, Jackson,
Washington, Leflore, and Lowndes that serious problems
developed.

The situation in these areas was exacerbated

by the fact that time was running out, and not all redistricting possibilities could be investigated.
In Hinds County, there was confusion as to how many
black seats should be created.
anywhere from three to six.

On paper there could be

In Washington County, one

black seat, and possibly two, were to be drawn; there was
much debate as to where this should be done.

In Forrest

County, one black seat could be created; but there was some
opposition to such a move.

In Harrison County, one black

seat was possible (although it would be an extremely weak
seat), but one incumbent would have to displaced.

And

finally, in Jackson County, there was a difficult incurnl:ency
problem.

Each of these situations will be covered in some

detail below.
The first version of Plan A, when publicly presented,
did not even contain individual districts for Jones,
Forrest, Washington, and Leflore Counties.

In the case of

Hinds, Washington, Forrest, Jackson, and Harrison Counties,
the districts went through considerable modification
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between the time they were first made public and the time
they were presented to the District Court.

A detailed

discussion of the development of House Plans in Hinds
County and the other metropolitan areas appears later in
this chapter.
Plans A and B were presented to the Joint Committee
on October 4.
plete.

At this time, both plans were still incom-

There were different reasons, however, for the

incompleteness of each.

Plan A had balanced populations.

Where there were areas remaining in which subdivision into
single districts was required, those areas had the correct
composite populations.

In the case of Plan B, however, not

only was the County of Hinds undistricted, but the Plan was
out of balance in terms of district populations, the
Leflore Districts (32, 35, and 36) required adjustments,
and the whole southeastern portion of the State was badly
out of balance. 1

At this point, the Committee examined

the general configurations of the two Plans and chose to
continue the development of Plan A while setting aside Plan
B.

Plan A was scheduled for public hearings on October 11

and 12, and was in its final form by October 14, 1977.

At

this point, Plan c had just been brought to the attention
of the Joint Committee.
Plan C was developed by a former member of the Legislature from the "Delta" area.

This former member was on

the staff of the House, but not of the Joint Committee.
His aim in sketching out this new plan was to correct some
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of the problems pointed out by powerful members in the
House.

The primary motivation behind the Plan was to vary

the treatment of districts in the counties of Coahoma,
Sunflower, Tallahatchie, Leflore, Carroll, Montgomery, and
Kemper.

While Plan C was not substantially different from

Plan A in its treatment of blacks (nor did it contain population deviations significantly different from those in
Plan A), it caused considerable disruption in some counties
outside of the area with which it was chiefly concerned.
The choice between these two plans became one that grew
out of political considerations rather than objective
judgment.

With considerable dissension about Plan Con

the part of Committee members, the Committee directed the
staff to complete and "fine tune" Plan C, and then move to
adopt it over Plan A (see figure 7, Plan C).
As it turned out, however, there were powerful members of the Joint Committee from the southern part of the
State who preferred the way Plan A dealt with their area.
Fortunately, there was enough compatibility between the
southern portion of Plan A and the northern and central
portions of Plan C for the two plans to be merged together.
This was the genesis of Plan A/C, which was the Plan
presented to the District Court on October 29 (see figure
8 ) •

The basic problem with the Court ED Plan (A/C) was
that the plus or minus 2 percent allowable deviation simply
did not permit enough latitude to avoid county fracturing.
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FIGURE 7
PROPOSED HOUSE PLAN C

SOURCE:

Joint Committee Files

220

FIGURE 8

HOUSE PLAN A/C

AS PASSED BY THE LEGISLATURE

THE COURT ED PLAN

SOURCE:

Joint Committee Files

OCT. 29, 1977
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There were two ways in which this problem could be
corrected.
tion.

The first was an increase the allowable devia-

The second was to draw the districts in a way that

seemed desirable, and then "stretch" the statistics.
State took the first approach,

The

(while the other parties in

the Connor litigation appeared to have taken the second).
Nevertheless, there were areas in the State where counties
were badly fractured in the Court Plan.
northeast and east-central areas.

These were the

The idea behind the

creation of the Statutory ED Plan was to increase the populations of some districts and to diminish the populations
in others so that more counties could be left intact and
there would be fewer county fragments.

A later section of

this chapter will deal with the Statutory ED Plan.
House Plans in Hinds County
Hinds County, containing a population of 214,964, is
the largest county in Mississippi.

In it is located the

State Capital, the City of Jackson, with a 1970 population
of 153,968.

This City has undergone a considerable popu-

lation growth since 1970, mostly through annexation of the
surrounding suburbs.

As Jackson has annexed the surrounding

territories, its boundaries have come up against the City
of Clinton, which with a 1970 population of 7.246, is the
only other large town in the County.

The County's popula-

tion fell 4,084 persons short of the required number for
twelve full House districts.

All past redistricting plans
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based on 1970 Census figures have placed twelve full seats
completely within the County--even though, technically,
one--or perhaps two--of the County's districts should
cross over the County boundary to pick up the required
4,084 persons.
The black population of the County was 84,064 persons.
They eomprised 39.10 percent of the total population, which
represented 4.79 House seats.

It is technically possible

to create five black seats if district

lines are drawn so

as to take in certain parts of the County with 60 percent
or greater black voting age population (VAP).

Given the

expansion of the black population into certain suburban
areas, it may even be possible to create six 60 percentor-better black VAP seats.

This latter proposition, how-

ever, is highly speculative.

The drawing of such districts

would entail leaving areas which in 1970 had high populations, but which are now low in population, within the
black districts; it would also require that areas with
almost no population in 1970, but which have since filled
up with blacks, be added to the black districts.

While

this sounds like a correct "trade-off," it complelely
ignores the fact that there has been considerable growth in
the white areas of the City and County, and that this policy
could result in deliberate malapportionment.

The number

of black seats to be created in Hinds County was a matter
of great controversy throughout the entire 1977-78 redistricting process in the State.
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No history of this process could ignore consideration
of the areas of Hinds County located to the west of the
1970 city boundaries.

This part of the County contained

enough population for approximately three House seats.

The

districts in question were commonly referred to as the
"rural Hinds County Districts."

Current demographic exam-

ination, however, would reveal that this is a misnomer.
Actually, there was only enough "rural" population for one
rural district in Hinds County.

The rest of the area

lying outside the 1970 city limits of Jackson is now suburban in nature.

According to 1970 population figures,

this three-district area was about 38 percent black.
However, the 1980 Census will probably reveal that those
areas which are still rural--and predominantly black--will
have lost population, while the suburban areas will have
picked up large numbers of whites.

It could, therefore, be

contended that to create a district in the far western
portion of the County would be to deliberately underrepresent the predominantly white suburban areas.
This problem is pointed out because there was much
discussion on the part of both the Plaintiffs in the Connor
case and the Department of Justice about taking black migration patterns into account when drawing districts.

There

was never any talk of taking total migration patterns--and,
more specifically, white migration patterns--into account.
It should be noted that the one person, one vote rule does
not apply to blacks only.

In principle, this rule is
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totally color-blind.

Any plan based on the 1970 Census

should have been put into effect in 1971; if the plan was
constitutional then, it would also be constitutional today.
If Connor Plaintiffs wished to place more blacks in dist-

ricts created in 1978 due to migration, they should have
also allowed some districts to be underloaded with blacks
due to in-migration of blacks.

One must play the popula-

tion game both ways.
Philosophy aside, however, the combination of census
tracts 105, 106, 107, and 113--the four westernmost tracts
in Hinds County--would have created a district containing
18,213 persons.

This district would have been 66.96 per-

cent black and 57.80 percent black VAP.

Reanjustment of

the district along precinct lines would raise the black VAP
to 59.02 percent.

This would be considered a marginal black

district, according to the Justice Department's standards
(as enunciated in the Mississippi v. United States
hearings).
The configuration of the "rural Hinds County
Districts" was, as previously stated, a matter of great
controversy.

Of all the complaints brought against the

Statutory Precinct House Plan in Mississippi v. United
States, this issue, and that of the Warren County District~
provided the strongest arguments for ~he Connor Plaintiffs
and the Department of Justice against the State's House
Plan.
The decision to draw the "rural Hinds County
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Districts" with east-west lines evolved out of a general
policy decision for Hinds County as a whole.

The Federal

Court had subdivided Hinds County into twelve single-member
districts for the 1975 legislative elections.

The white

members of the Hinds County House delegation had expressed
a desire, from the very beginning of the process, to keep
the County's districts as close as possible to the 1975
configuration.

The three black members of the Hinds dele-

gation were contacted by the staff many times throughout
the district-building process in this County.

They never

expressed any dissatisfaction with the final boundaries in
either the Court or the Statutory ED Plans--until after
both plans had been voted on by the House of Representative&
The lines in the City of Jackson underwent a more
complex evolution.

The first plan for that City had pro-

vided for five black districts.
shown on figure

These five districts are

9, with the relevant statistics listed

below:
HINDS COUNTY FIVE BLACK SEATS IN JACKSON
District

Population

61

17,871

62

~
0

Deviation

-

% Black

%

Black VAP

1.65

67.39

61.04

18,069

.56

64.90

54.75

63

18,118

.29

62.46

54.06

64

18,215

+

.23

68.53

60.23

65

18,306

+

.73

67.59

62.68

The data for these districts show an average black
population percentage of 66.17 and an average black VAP
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FIGURE 9
A FIVE "BLACK'' SEATS PLAN FOR JACKSON CITY
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percentage of 58.55.

With some minor adjustments, these

districts might all have been brought above 59 percent
black VAP.

This five-district plan was shown to the black

member of the Joint Committee from Hinds County and was
objected to because that member believed the five districts
would be too weak to insure the election of black members.
In accordance with the opinions expressed by the
black member, the staff drew up a new plan for Hinds
County, which provided for three black districts.

This

Plan, shown in figure 10, created districts with the
following statistics:
HINDS COUNTY THREE BLACK SEATS IN JACKSON
District

Population

67

18,163

68

18,157

69

18,156

70

18,167

% Black

% Black VAP

.04

97.80

96.71

.08

83.97

80.22

.08

81.55

78.28

.02

47.58

38.84

% Deviation

-

These three districts (District 70 is shown because
most of the remaining black population in the City was
placed in that District) had an average black population
percentage of 87.77 and an average black VAP percentage of
85.07.

The black delegation from Hinds County objected to

these districts also, however, as being "packed."

In

effect, the blacks thought these three districts were too
strong in black population--they wasted black votes.

2

The staff concluded from all this that if five black
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FIGURE 10
A

THREE "BLACK" SEAT PLAN FOR THE CITY OF JACKSON
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districts in the City were too weak, and three were too
strong, then four ought to be acceptable.

Thus, the staff

set to work to draw a plan with four black districts in the
City.

This four-black-district plan was presented to the

Joint Committee for approval on October 4, 1977.

This same

configuration was carried on into all subsequent House
Plans.

The statistics for the four black districts in this

plan were as follows:
HINDS COUNTY FOUR BLACK SEATS IN JACKSON

District

Population

% Deviation

% Black

% Black VAP

67

18,271

76.70

70.09

68

18,028

72.98

66.05

69

18,212

+ .54
- .79
+ .22

80.92

76.28

70

18,120

-

74.61

67.21

.28

The average black population percentage in these
districts was 76.30, with an average black VAP percentage
of 69.91 (see figure 11) . 3
These four districts, which had been negotiated and
re-negotiated, were moved into a precinct plan in December
of 1977.

Seen below are the data for these same districts

.

as they appeared in all plans presented to the Court in
1978 or enacted into law by the Legislature in 1978:
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FIGURE 11
SEAT PL11~N FOR THE CITY OF JACKSON
THESE ARE THE DISTRICTS INCLUDED IN PLAN A/C
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HINDS COUNTY FINAL STATUTORY PLAN
District

Population

67

18,182

+

68

17,270

-

69
70

% Deviation

% Black

% Black VAP

.06

76.35

70.25

4.95

80.89

74.53

17,997

.95

74.36

69.70

18,761

+ 3.24

75.30

68.73

The average black population percentage in these
final districts was 76.72, and the average black VAP percentage was 70.80.

On the whole, then, these districts

were the strongest to appear in any plan--without being so
strong as to bring on a charge of "packing"
12) .

(see figure

4
The final problem in the redistricting of Hinds

County was caused by the shift from an ED-based plan to a
precinct-based plan.

In order to maintain the basic con-

figuration from Plans A and A/C, it was necessary to break
up some of the County's precincts.

Two of these precincts

were located in heavily black neighborhoods in Jackson.
These precincts, numbers 28 and 52, were both split in the
plan along the line of a single street.

The members of

the Committee believed that the Circuit Clerk's office
could notify these voters of the change by mail, and set
up separate polling places in the two parts of the precincts.
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FIGURE 12
THE STATUTORY PRECINCT PLAN FOR JACKSON
CITY WTTH FOUR "BLACK" SEATS
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Redistricting the Remaining
Metropolitan Counties
This section will discuss the problems encountered
in the counties of Forrest, Harrison, Jackson, Jones,
Lauderdale, Leflore, Lowndes, Warren, and Washington.

In

its redistricting plans for many of these counties, the
State of Mississippi was accused of discrimination by the
Connor Plaintiffs and the Department of Justice.

This

section will not, however, attempt to answer the legal
arguments involved; rather it will describe the process by
which the districts in question came into being.
Warren County
The staff of the Joint Legislative Committee expected
that the redistricting of Warren County would involve an
incumbency problem.

This was because it was clear that

four districts--one of them black--should be placed within
the County of Washington; this meant that Warren, Issaquera,
and Sharkey Counties should be combined to make a threedistrict area.

The problem was that there were four

incumbents living in the area, and one was the Speaker of
the House.
Fortunately, one of these four members was appointed
to a post in the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
incumbency problem was thus solved.

The planners then

decided to combine the northern areas of Warren, Issaquena,
and Sharkey Counties to form a district for the Speaker.
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The remaining portion of Warren County, including all of
the City of Vicksburg, was left to be divided into two
districts.
There were two ways in which this two-district area
could be divided.

One involved the creation of one full

district within Vicksburg, and the combining of the
remaining area of the City with the rural area of the
County.

The second method was to split both the City and

the rural areas in half, and to make two city/rural districts.

At this point in the redistricting effort, there

was no consistent policy on such issues; in effect, there
was something like a "local option" given to the House
members who represented this area to decide what action
should be taken.

Although there was the possibility of

creating a black district in the area, such a district
would be too weak to elect a black and the staff believed
that it would not be accepted by legislators who desired
to avoid the polarization of their constituencies along
city/county lines.

Thus, when the two districts were

created, one had a black population percentage of 44.77,
and the other a black population percentage of 30.71.
The Connor Plaintiffs made a major issue of this
decision.

They had created a district by combining the

black precincts in the City with heavily black precincts
in the northern rural areas of the County.

A statistically

correct version of this district was later included in the
Compromise Plan.

The district had a black population of
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60.99 percent, and a black VAP percentage of 56.22.

In

retrospect, this alternative probably should have been
examined in more detail and included in the State's plans,
even though the district thereby created would not have
been a strong black district, but a weak one.

Its creaticn,

however, might have prevented a great many court battles.
Washington County
Washington County was another county in which there
was considerable input from the local legislators.

In the

first pass through Plan A, the entire County had been combined with a small section of Sharkey County to form a
four-district area.

The suggestion was made by the staff

to divide up the County four ways by forming one district
across the northern end, creating a second district within
the Greenville area, and then splitting the remaining area
with a north-south line to form the final two districts.
This suggestion worked out well, and Plan A .was presented
for public hearings with these districts (see figure 13).
These Washington County Districts had the following statistics:
WASHINGTON COUNTY PLAN A
District

Population

% Deviation

% Black

% Black VAP

44

18,347

+ .96

54.31

50.41

45

18,054

-

.64

45.83

40.07

46

18,131

.22

52.99

48.87

47

18,003

-

.93

66.74

59.81
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FIGURE 13

PLAN A IN GREENVILLE CITY IN WASHINGTON COUNTY
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At the public hearings, however, this districting
plan met with strong objections.

The opponents contended

that a strong black district could be formed in the City
of Greenville.

While it was certainly commendable to have

a rural black district in the County, opponents to the
proposed House Plan contended that a very strong black
district in the City of Greenville would give blacks from
Washington County a better chance to send a black legislator to the House.

After much consultation, and subse-

quent modifications, the configuration in figure 14 was
incorporated into Plan A/C before the Plan was sent to the
House floor:
WASHINGTON COUNTY PLAN A/C
District

Population

51

17,940

- 1.27

90.51

87.85

52

18,286

+

.63

53.35

48.72

53

18,225

+

.29

43.67

36.57

54

18,084

.47

32.71

26.36

%

Deviation

%

Black

%

Black VAP

These were the districts which were included in both
Plan A/C and the Statutory ED Plan passed in December.

By

the time the Statutory Precinct Plan was being completed,
however, there were some complaints that the black district
was a little "too black."

Thus, as shown in figure 15,

the following districts were adopted for the final
Statutory Precinct Plan:
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FIGURE 14
PLAN A/C IN GREENVILLE IN WASHINGTON COUNTY
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FIGURE 15
STATUTORY PLAN IN GREENVILLE IN WASHINGTON COUNTY
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WASHINGTON COUNTY STATUTORY PLAN
District

Population

51

17,617

52

17,810

-

53
54

% Deviation

% Black

% Black VAP

3.04

73.36

68.35

1.98

37.55

33.38

19,055

+ 4.86

62.20

55.63

17,901

-

46.89

40.14

1.48

The large deviations in these districts are due to
the fact that many of the precincts in Washington County
have very large populations.

It was very difficult to fit

them together to form districts that came anywhere near the
original Statutory ED Plan configuration, and still had
permissible deviations.
Leflore County
Leflore County contained a large enough population
for about two and one-third districts.

When the planners

divided this County into individual districts, therefore,
they felt that they should locate two complete districts
inside the County.

They further believed that one dist-

rict should be located entirely within the City of
Greenwood.

Accordingly, a portion of the east side of

Greenwood was broken off and combined with the rural areas.
Figure 16 shows the districts which are listed below:
LEFLORE COUNTY PLAN A/C
District

Population

34

18,400

35

18,028

% Black

% Black VAP

+ 1.26

60.93

55.31

.78

52.66

47.26

% Deviation
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FIGURE 16
PLAN A/C IN LEFLORE COUNTY
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Leflore was another county in which objections were
raised after passage of the Court ED Plan.

The Connor

Plaintiffs wanted a stronger black district in the County.
In the Statutory Precinct Plan, the configuration shown on
figure 17 resulted in the following statistics:
LEFLORE COUNTY STATUTORY PLAN
District

Population

% Deviation

% Black

% Black VAP

34

18,378

+ 1.13

69.17

64.26

35

18,322

+

42.89

37.72

.83

These modifications in the Statutory Plan, therefore,
brought up the black percentages of the City-rural District
by about 9 percent, for both total population and VAP.
Forrest County
This County consisted almost entirely of the City of
Hattiesburg and its suburbs.

The City itself had enough

people for more than two districts.

The County had 3,436

people in excess of the population required for three
districts.

In every plan completed by the State, this

County contained three districts entirely within its boundaries.

However, in both Plans A and A/C, the remaining

portion of the County was divided three ways to complete
adjoining districts.
There were three incumbents in this County, all of
whom lived in the City of Hattiesburg.

Thus, in the first

version of Plan A, and continuing until the final adjust-
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FIGURE 17
STATUTORY PLAN IN LEFLORE COUTY
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ments in Plan A/C, the districts in this County were as
shown in figure 18:
THE THREE FORREST DISTRICTS - PLAN A
District

Population

% Deviation

103

18,203

+ .17

104

18,179

105

18,034

-

% Black

% Black VAP

3.80

3.37

.03

32.06

28.40

.75

40.98

35.95

One of the functions of the staff consultants was the
continuous review of all Plans, in an attempt to improve
them in terms of both constitutional criteria and neutral
criteria.

Staff review of the plan for Forrest County led

to the conclusion that a black district was possible.
Working with the members of the Joint Committee from this
area, the staff devised a new plan for Forrest County and
it was included in the final version of A/C.

The data for

the new districts are shown below, and the map is on figure
19·.
FORREST COUNTY IN PLAN A/C
% Deviation

% Black

% Black VAP

District

Population

103

18,070

-

.55

2.99

2.59

104

18,234

64.62

59.26

105

18,255

+ .34
+ .46

8.69

7.78

Unfortunately, the switch from ED's to precincts
brought about a decrease in the black strength of District
104.

If the Committee had been able to split two or three
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FIGURE 18
HATTIESBURG IN PLAN A
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FIGURE 19
HATTIESBURG IN PLAN A/C
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precincts in the County, the black strength in this District might have been maintained.

However, they could not.

The Statutory Plan Districts, as shown on figure 20, contained the following populations:
FORREST COUNTY STATUTORY PLAN
District

Population

103

18,853

+ 3.75

1.54

1.48

104

18,623

+ 2.58

58.53

52.28

105

18,134

.20

15.66

14.07

%

Deviation

%

Black

%

Black VAP

Jones County
Jones County was almost exactly the same in population as neighboring Forrest County.

Its central city,

Laurel, was about 60 percent the size of Hattiesburg, with
a population of 24,145.

The first proposal for this County

was to create one district within Laurel.

The remaining

portion of that City would then be included in the second
of the three districts that were to be created in the
County.

To test the viability of a black district in

Laurel, the staff drew a city district which had within it
all but thirty-four of the City's 8,731 blacks.

The County

was divided as shown in figure 2l, with the following
results:
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FIGURE 20
HATTIESBURG IN STATUTORY PLAN
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FIGURE 21
AN ALTERNATE PLAN IN JONES COUNTY
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JONES COUNTY ALTERNATE PLAN
District

Population

82

18,348

+

.96

14.62

11.61

88

18,430

+ 1.41

47.18

41.35

90

18,368

+ 1.07

12.79

11.76

%

Deviation

% Black

%

Black VAP

A black district with just 41.35 percent VAP, however,
was not considered to be a viable black district.

This

configuration also caused an incumbency problem, since all
of the incumbents from this County lived within the City
of Laurel.

Because the black district was not considered

viable, the City was split three ways, with each district
extending out into the rural areas of the County.

The

resultant districts are shown on figure 22, with the
following data applying to them:
JONES COUNTY PLAN A/C
Deviation

Black

Black VAP

District

Population

82

18,329

+

.86

34.97

31.20

88

18,358

29.75

25.67

90

18,459

+ 1.02
+ 1.58

10.07

9.05

%

%

%

Finally, the switch to precincts resulted in the
districts shown on figure 23, with the relevant data shown
below:
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FIGURE 22
PLAN A/C IN JONES COUNTY
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FIGURE 23
THE STATUTORY PLAN IN JONES COUNTY
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JONES COUNTY STATUTORY PLAN
District

Population

82

18,005

.91

33.53

29.47

88

18,433

+ 1.44

29.85

25.69

90

18,039

.72

10.19

9.34

%

Deviation

%

Black

%

Black VAP

Lauderdale County
This County, with a population of 67,087, was the
fourth largest in the State.

It also contained the State's

third largest city, Meridian, with a population of 45,083.
In the development of Plan A, the northern end of
Lauderdale County was split off to complete the KemperNeshoba-Newton District (53).

At the same time, the far

southern end of the County was broken off to form a ClarkeLauderdale District.

This left for later division a three-

district area in Lauderdale County, including all of
Meridian.
The division of this three-district area was greatly
influenced by local input, with the result that two districts were created within the City and one district took
in both city and rural areas.

These districts, as they

appear in Plan A, are shown on figure 24.
LAUDERDALE COUNTY PLAN A
Black

% Black VAP

District

Population

% Deviation

79

18,316

53.37

47.59

80

18,291

+ .79
+ .65

11.72

10.80

81

18,209

+ .20

32.74

27.57

%
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FIGURE 24
MERIDIAN PLAN A
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When Plan C was adopted, Lauderdale County was in a
different configuration, with a larger southern portion of
the County combined with a portion (instead of all) of
Clarke County, and a smaller part of the northern area
combined with all of Kemper County.

This meant that

District 81 in Plan A (which is District 83 in Plan C) had
to be redrawn.

The two Meridian Districts (79 becoming 84,

and 80 becoming 85) remained the same.

The remaining por-

tion of Meridian was divided between Districts 83 and 86.
District 83 now contained 4 percent fewer blacks.
At the time that Plans A and C were being merged into
A/C, the staff investigated the possibility of a black
district within Meridian.

They found this to be possible,

so they redrew Districts 83, 84, and 85, with the following
result (see figure 25):
LAUDERDALE COUNTY PLAN A/C
% Black

% Black VAP

.95

17.69

15.06

18,140

.17

64.19

57.60

18,466

+ 1.62

8.71

7.41

District

Population

83

17,998

84
85

% Deviation

This new black district, located entirely within the
City of Meridian, was considered only a marginal black
district.

Unfortunately, as happened in other counties,

the switch to precincts resulted in degredation of the
black percentages in this district.

The black percentage

in the Statutory Precinct Plan was 58.45, and the VAP
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FIGURE 25
MERIDIAN PLAN A/C

....... ·························:..
.
:

..........

:

..

···•····
.•. .......

r:............
..

..........

.

...
....•

.....•········
..

85

..,·-·
..
...
.... _____...............
.....~
.
.:·····
..
.. 83
..
.:~ni
~~!f~1
.... ....
....
t

-~

~

,

..:..

e., ;.;:..-..;i

.?

::l.iii

40 Pere ent or More Black

SOURCE:

..
•.
..
...
..
...
...
.

Joint Committee Files (Plan A/C)

257

percentage 51.41.

Again, this was due to the large size

of the precincts in Meridian, which offered fewer possible
combinations than did the ED's.
Harrison County
This County was the second largest in the State.

Its

population of 134,582 entitled it to seven House seats,
with 7,385 people left over.

The vast majority of the

County's population lived along the coastline, from Pass
Christian on the west to Long Beach, Gulfport, Mississippi
City, and Biloxi farther east.

The Biloxi metropolitan

area spilled over into the neighboring County of Jackson,
consisting of the suburbs of D'Iberville and Ocean Springs.
(D'Iberville actually sits astride the county line just
north of Biloxi.)

Harrison County's heavily populated

coastal area was separated from the remaining portions of
the County by bays, canals, and swamps.

Suburbs

were

"spilling over" to the north, with considerable growth in
Orange Grove, North Long Beach, and Holly Hills.

The

coastal area itself, however, contained enough of the
County's total population to form six of the seven-plus
districts to which it was entitled.
The staff adopted a very straightforward approach to
dividing this County.

The northern portion of the County

was made into one district.

The coastal area was then

divided with north-south lines into six more districts.
The remaining portion of the County, which was just the
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part of D'Iberville lying inside Harrison County was combined with the portion of D'Iberville in Jackson County in
a district that continued on east to take in part of Ocean
Springs.
This seemed to be a simple approach, but when presented in Plan A, it caused several difficulties.

First,

some of the lines had to be adjusted to correct incumbency
problems.

Then, the delegation from Harrison County

requested that the staff attempt to create a black district
in Gulfport.

The Gulfport area did indeed have enough

blacks to form a black district.

The problem was that they

were spread out all around the City.

About 6,400 blacks

lived in West Gulfport (which is actually an unincorporated area to the northwest of the City).

Gulfport's

remaining blacks were divided among six areas, none of
which had more than 1,500 blacks living in it.

In an

attempt to accommodate the members from that area, however,
the staff drew a district that encompassed West Gulfport
and four of the small black neighborhoods.

This district,

which was highly irregular in shape (see figure 26), contained a black percentage of 58.52 and a black VAP percentage of 51.87.

Such figures denote a very weak district.

When the Statutory Plan was moved to precinct lines, the
planners could not make this district fit into the configuration of the County.

Thus, it does not appear in the

Statutory Plan.
The only other controversy to arise in Harrison
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FIGURE 26
THE GULFPORT "BLACK"' DISTRICT (114) IN PLAN A/C
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County concerned the splitting off of the northwestern
portion to form a district along with portions of Pearl
River and all of Stone Counties.

This action was necessi-

tated by incumbency problems in Jackson County, which are
described below.
Jackson County
The County, with a population of 87,975, was the
third largest in the State.

Its principle cities are

Pascagoula, Moss Point, Ocean Springs, and D'Iberville.
In 1975, Jackson County was combined with George County to
form a six-district area.

This same general configuration

was utilized in Plan A, with the addition of a single ED
from Green County.
The plan for the division of Jackson County in the
original version of Plan A was as follows.

First, a

district was formed which included all of George County and
the single ED from Green County.

Since this area did not

contain enough people for a full district, the northeastern
portion of Jackson County was added to it (see figure 27).
Next, a full district was formed within the City of Moss
Point.

Then a full district was created within the City

of Pascagoula.

Since the remaining portion of the County

east of the Pascagoula River was not populous enough for
another complete district, the staff reached across the
river to include the only ED with enough population to
complete the district without making it too populous.
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FIGURE 27
JACKSON COUNTY PLAN A
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A

portion of the County's western coast had already

been combined with Harrison County to form the D'IbervilleOcean Springs district.

The area remaining on the western

coast thus formed the sixth district.

The only problem

with this design was that two of the districts now had two
incumbents living in them.
When Plan C was presented, the incumbent situation
was somewhat alleviated by a rotation of the Harrison,
Jackson, George, and Stone County districts, as shown in
figure 28.

When Plan A/C was in its final stages, this

same sort of rotation was performed in Plan A (the plan
being used in this part of the State).
is shown in figure 29.

The Plan A rotatim

District 108 was withdrawn from

Jackson County and pushed into eastern Stone County.

This

gave enough population to the Jackson County area east of
the Pascagoula River to solve one of the incumbency problems.

Unfortunately, the initial rotation made it neces-

sary that other districts be rotated.
As District 108 pushed into eastern Stone County,
District 107 was forced into northwest Harrison County.
District 121 was then pushed into District 119, and all
the districts--except 115, the easternmost Biloxi district-were bumped eastward.

District 116 was bumped north across

Back Bay into D'Iberville.

This allowed the D'Iberville-

Ocean Springs District (114) to reach out and take in the
residence of the other incumbent.

This rotation of dist-

ricts was a somewhat controversial maneuver, but it
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FIGURE 28

JACKSON COUNTY PLAN C
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FIGURE 29
JACKSON COUNTY PLAN A/C
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violated no constitutional criteria.

It was exactly the

type of adjustment, in fact, which must be made in any
redistricting plan requiring legislative endorsement.
The Statutory ED Plan
Many legislators, as we have seen in the previous
section, acquiesced to the Court ED Plan under the condition that a statutory plan was to be brought before them
for consideration.

They believed that a statutory plan,

which would come into being by the authority of the State
rather than of the Federal Courts, would bring about a
less disruptive division of the State.

Their basic premise

was that the population equality standards governing
redistricting by state legislatures (as enunciated by the
Supreme Court) were less stringent than those governing
court-ordered redistricting.

The Chief Counsel to the

Joint Committee had advised Committee members that deviations ranging from -5.00 percent to +5.00 percent from
ideal district size were considered prima facie de minimis
by the Supreme Court for legislative redistricting plans.
The drawing of the Statutory ED Plan proved that this
increase by 3 percent could rectify many of the problems in
the Court ED Plan.
The major problem area in the Court ED Plan was the
east-central portion of the State.

This area, consisting

of eleven counties, was heavily fragmented by the Court
Plan, and there had been great dissatisfaction expressed

266
by the thirteen legislators from the counties involved.
In addition, members from the northeastern area were also
very unhappy with some of the districts in the Court Plan.
This was particularly true of the legislators from Alcorn
and Prentiss Counties, which had been very badly fragmented.
The primary task in the creation of the Statutory Plans was
to correct these problems.

In other areas, attempts would

be made to reunite portions of counties and to reduce the
number of fragments.

As many counties as possible would

be brought up to maximum representational status.
To accomplish this task, the State was divided into
thirty-one areas consisting of whole counties.

These areas,

shown on figure 30, contained from one to ten counties
each.

Under the Statutory Plan, all of these areas would

either be made into full districts, or would be divided
into multiple-full districts.

Figure 31 demonstrates how

the Court ED Plan (A/C) was modified to create these thirtyone areas.

The planners recognized from the very beginning

that the average district size would vary considerably
among these areas.

There was no attempt in the Statutory

Plan to create the most equal set of districts possible;
rather, the goal was to stay under the+ 5.00 percent deviation limit.

For example, in Area 2, a ten-county area,

the staffers recognized that the average district deviation
for the nine districts to be drawn in that area would be

+ 2.268 percent.

On the other hand, in the three-county

Area 21, the five districts would have an average deviation
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FIGURE 30
CREATION OF DISTRICT GROUPS FOR CONVERSION
OF PLAN -A/C TO STATUTORY PRECINCT PLAN

SOURCE:

Author's Files
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FIGURE 31
THE STATUTORY PRECINCT PLAN
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of - 2.446 percent.

Having formed the desired thirty-one

areas--nineteen of which were both multi-county and multidistrict areas--resubdivision had to take place from the
configurations that were in the Court ED Plans.
Once the Court ED Plan had been literally stretched
and squeezed into these thirty-one areas, many of the
resultant districts now had unacceptable deviations.
were twenty-seven such districts.

There

There was no way to

redraw these districts without creating a "ripple" effect
throughout many of the districts in the twenty-seven
affected areas.

Thus, a majority of the districts in the

State had to be adjusted to fit into this plan.

The result

of this effort was that fourteen more counties were left
without district fragments, and the total number of fragments was reduced from 110 to 66.

On the 9th of December,

1977, the Statutory ED Plans for both the House and Senate
were passed and sent to the Governor for his signature.
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Footnotes to Chapter V

1 The Author does not wish to infer that Dr. Morrill,
in his design of Plan B, could not have balanced the populations. He was forced by the timetable to send the Plan
unfinished to the staff in Jackson.
The Plan was set
aside for its general configuration, not excessive population deviations.
2

House Court ED Plan A, October 6, 1977.

3House Court Plan A, October 14, 1977.
4 H.B. 1491, the Statutory House Precinct Plan,
March 31, 1978.

CHAPTER VI
CONNOR v. FINCH

THE OTHER PLANS
Following the most recent Supreme Court decision in
the Connor litigation, the Federal District Court in
Mississippi issued orders for all parties to file proposed
plans.

At this time the Legislature, per se, was not a

party to the suit.

The actual defendants were the

Governor, the Attorney General, the President Pro Tempore
of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House.

The Legisla-

ture, however, was invited by the Court to submit a proposed plan.

It should be understood that all plans

requested by the Court were for that Court's use in developing a Court imposed plan, and were thus subject to the
more stringent guidelines dictated for Court plans by the
United States Supreme Court.
Thus, the Connor Plaintiffs, with the assistance of
Msrs. Gordon Henderson and Henry Kirksey; the Justice
Department, with the assistance of Mr. John Tanner; and
the Legislature, with the assistance of Msrs. Morrill,
Dunn, Webb, Fortenberry, and Hofeller, all set out to draw
plans for the District Court.

In the period between

October 29th and November 4th, eight plans were filed with
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the District Court.

The Legislature filed an ED plan for

each house, the Justice Department filed both an ED and a
precinct-based plan for each house, and the Connor Plaintiffs filed a precinct plan for each house.
During the ensuing months, all of these plans, except
for the Justice Department's ED Plan, were modified by
further submissions to the Connor Court.

The final version

of the Legislature's Court ED Plan was submitted in January
of 1978, the Legislature's Court Precinct Plan was submitted on March 7, 1978, the final version of the Connor
Plaintiff's Plan (the Henderson Plan) was submitted on
March 23, 1978, and the final version of the Justice Department's Precinct Plan (the Tanner Plan) was submitted on
February 7, 1978.

The Special Master, acting on behalf of

the Connor Court, submitted his plan on May 18, 1978.
This chapter will examine the following three plans
in some detail: the Henderson Plan (Connor Plaintiff's
Plan), the Tanner Plan (Department of Justice's Plan), and
the Neal Plan (the plan proposed by the Connor Court's
Special Master).

As previously mentioned in the chapter

on the history of this redistricting, the Connor Court's
Special Master was directed to submit a plan for each
house to the District Court following the submission of
plans by all other parties.

This plan represented the

best efforts of the District Court, and should be examined
as an example of what difficulties the courts can get into
in developing their own plans without proper technical
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support.

The Henderson and Tanner Plans are discussed

because they were submitted in evidence in the hearings
on Mississippi v. United States.

The United States and

their defendant intervenors (the Connor Plaintiffs) leaned
heavily upon these two plans for several reasons.

The

first use of these plans was to present them as an example
of what they considered to be a proper allocation of seats
to the black areas of the State.

The second use was as a

Beer standard in an attempt to prove retrogression in comparison to the State's plan. 1

These plans had one charac-

teristic in common: in terms of technical accuracy, they
were all disasters.
This writer does not wish to question the motivations
of any of the plan drawers involved in this redistricting.
It is proper, however, to point out that many of the plans
submitted to the Connor Court were technically deficient.
Many of these errors appeared to be due to "bookkeeping"
problems (keeping track of the populations assigned to
each district).

Others were due to the practice of taking

the accuracy of estimates of precincts' population made
for local supervisorial redistricting efforts for granted.
Some were, perhaps, due to the fact that racial results
were carefully watched, but total population statistics
were not.

Unfortunately, many errors were simply due to

carelessness.

One could not fault many of those persons

involved for addition errors--they were all (with the
exception of the State Legislature) drawing plans without
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benefit of a computer.

There is, nonetheless, some room to

question both the motivation and expertise of some of those
involved--particularly when they presented themselves in
court as redistricting "experts."
A note on the District Court is also in order at this
point.

In its 1977 decision in Connor v. Finch, the

Supreme Court admonished the District Court to take special
care when constructing a plan for Mississippi in documenting the "genesis" for the population figures for each
district.

This admonition was, no doubt, due to the com-

plaints from the Connor Plaintiffs and the Department of
Justice regarding the deviations in the 1976 Plan.

When

the District Court received the 1978 plans of these same
two parties, the Court instructed them to produce documentation of their asserted populations by precinct.
This request for precinct-by-precinct demographic
data on the part of the District Court was motivated both
out of a desire for proper documentation of the Tanner and
Henderson Plans, and, perhaps, a desire to provide data
for use by the Court's Master in the construction of any
plans which he might draw.

This request was, in all fair-

ness, unreasonable and unnecessary.

It was never neces-

sary to determine the populations of all precincts in the
State--it was just necessary to determine the populations
of the districts in each plan.

This requirement could have

been satisfied by a listing for each proposed district of
all the EDs and portions of EDs (in terms of population)
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for each district.

Tanner and Henderson, nevertheless, had

been requested by the Connor Court to prove adequate documentation for their plans.

If such a document had been

compiled, both Tanner and Henderson might have corrected
many of the errors in their plans.

However, to the best

knowledge of this author (who was in a position to have
received these figures for verification),such documentation
was never produced.

Accurate and complete documentation

of population data is a sine qua non of any redistricting
plan--especially if it is to be presented in court.

It

could be inferred, therefore, that if the Tanner and
Henderson Plans were not properly documented, the submission of these plans to the Court was never completed.
The overriding need for accurate documentation is
set forth in a passage from the trial transcripts drawn
from the testimony of this author.

Mr. Frank Dunham, the

attorney for the State of Mississippi, is questioning the
author concerning the accuracy of the data in the Tanner
and Henderson Plans:
MR. HOFELLER:
Let me say all of this goes to the point of showing
that without proper bookkeeping, so to speak, and
good maps and good enough assistants and a computer
to keep it going and such, it's very difficult to
keep track of all of the units involved and to
present an accurate summation of the census data
involved.
It's my belief that the data has to be in terms
of accurate census data, even though you present
the plan in a bill in terms of precincts, the data
has to be reported out on an ED-by-ED basis or at
least a census unit basis so that not only the
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drawer of the plan can be convinced in his mind
that the data is accurate, (but) so can anyone
else be convinced in (his) mind that it's
accurate.2
This lack of accurate and convincing data was precisely the problem in Mississippi.

All of the local

experts were accustomed to preparing plans that combined
counties into districts.

In making the switch from 82

county units to more than 2,400 enumeration districts,
they simply did not realize the difficulties involved until
it was too late.

Computers have their place in redist-

ricting, and their most valuable application is in keeping
track of the data.
It is extremely difficult for a person who is not
familiar with the State of Mississippi, nor trained in the
examination of redistricting plans, to make much sense of
plans as complex as those for redistricting the Mississippi
House.

The plans are extremely difficult to critique

technically.

One must look not only at the demographic

differences within each area, but also at the way the districts fit together to form a whole.

Plans such as those

produced in Mississippi are like giant jigsaw puzzles in
which all the pieces must be equal in population.

.

And, in

the case of Mississippi, the pieces must "carved" out
against a backdrop of counties--which are not equal in
population--and racial communities.

No one can know for

sure what is the best way to divide up a state into 122
districts; there are probably hundreds of ways in which
that State could be divided.

All one can really do is try
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to produce a plan that gives a proper balance of all the
criteria.
Ripple Analysis of the Major Plans
Another problem in the comparison of plans is that
individual districts or groups of districts cannot be
lifted out of one plan and placed into another, except in
those rare instances when districts or groups of districts
have common boundaries in both plans.

A question such as

"Why did you not draw Bolivar County the way we did?", may
require an answer such as "We would have had to change half
the State in order to do that.
plan, not ours."

Then we would have had your

This problem of boundaries brings into

play what may be called the "ripple effect."
The "ripple effect" can be described by reference to
a hydraulic system.

Just as there is little give and take

in a sealed hydraulic system, there is little give and take
in the allowable variation from ideal district population
of a district or group of districts.

Just as one pushes

on one end of a hydraulic line and creates pressure on the
other end of the line, so if one takes excessive population
from a district or group of districts, one must add back
that population at another point.

The same rule holds when

one adds population into a district (or group of districts): one must remove that population at another point.
The total "give" in the district, or group of districts,
equal to the maximum deviation times the number of districts involved.

Because of this phenomenon, population

.

lS
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adjustments in a single district must be "rippled" through
a group of districts until the excess population (or
deficit) is absorbed or adjusted.

This has been charac-

terized as the "ripple effect."
The less departure allowed from absolute equality of
population in the criteria governing the construction of a
plan, the less room there is for changing one district
without changing them all.

In the Statutory House Plan,

the allowable deviation from equality of population was
+ 5.00 percent.

Keeping this in mind, and aiming to main-

tain as many county lines as possible, the State's
planners expanded and contracted groups of districts in
order to fit them into groups of counties.

In many cases,

however, the planners came very near the limits of the
allowable deviation.

One more addition or subtraction of

population would have resulted in the district passing over
or under its population limit, and all the districts in the
area would have required redrawing.
For the purposes of examining four plans at hand
(Tanner, Henderson, Master's, and State), the State of
Mississippi will be divided into areas.

The perimeter of

each area is established by coterminous district and
county boundaries.

Thus, in an area which we shall define

as Coterminous County District Area (CCDA), a single district or a number of complete districts fit into a full
county or a group of full counties.

Within each CCDA,

districts lap over county boundaries or are isolated within
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a county.

Adding population to any one district within

this CCDA will cause a ripple to be generated.

Assuming

that the ripple can travel through a CCDA with greater ease
than over a CCDA boundary (a crossing of the boundary of
the CCDA would go against the criterion of not breaking
counties), then a ripple path (RP) may be established
within the CCDA.

Some ripple paths may be long, extending

over a large part of the State.
two districts.
eddies.

Others may be confined to

Still others may have side ripples or

At any rate, through the examination of CCDAs and

ripple paths, we can analyze the possible effects of
changes made in plans and in this way we can also better
compare one plan with another.
The four plans under examination are shown on figures
32 through 35, with the CCDAs and ripple paths marked on
each.

For a further comparison, the same procedure has

been followed for the House Court ED Plan, which is shown
on figure 36.

It should come as no surprise that, in the

State Plan, the CCDAs are smaller and fewer in number,
while in the House Court ED Plan the CCDAs are very large
and very few in number.

This is because the State Plan was

allowed deviations of+ 5.00 percent, while the ED Plan was
limited to+ 2.00 percent.

This increase in the allowable

deviation, although it involved just 544 people in each
district, made a considerable difference between the two
plans.
In the State Plan, the longest ripple path is in
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FIGURE 32

RIPPLE PATHS IN HENDERSON PLAN
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FIGURE 33

RIPPLE PATHS IN TANNER PLAN
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FIGURE 34

RIPPLE PATHS IN l'1ASTER'S PLAN
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FIGURE 35
RIPPLE PATHS IN HB 1491
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FIGURE 36
THE HOUSE COURT E.D.

SOURCE:
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CCDA

1.

This RP extends from Attala County to Tippah

County, with an eddy into Chickasaw County.

In the State's

ED Plan, there is a ripple path which begins in Jackson
County, at the far southern end of the State, and sends
one large eddy up to Clay County and another up to
Tallahatchie County.

In the Henderson Plan, the longest

ripple path appears to be the one from Simpson County to
Coahoma County.

Tanner's ripple paths are somewhat shorter

than those of Henderson, and follow wide, circular paths.
The Master's Plan has two ripple paths running side by
side up the eastern side of the State; these RPs are really
two large eddies, both originating in Jackson County with
one of them ending up in Montgomery County and the other
in Oktibbeha County.

The Master has another long RP

extending from Madison County to Calhoun County.

One can

see, by overlaying the State's Plan with the RPs and CCDAs
in all these other plans, that very little of the other
plans could be incorporated into the State's.

Many changes

had to be made in the districts proposed in these other
plans before seven of the altered districts could be incorporated into the State's Plan to construct a Compromise
Plan.
Specific Problems in the Tanner
and Henderson Plans
A second method of comparing all the plans is by
judging the accuracy of each.

In October and November of

1978, following the hearings in Mississippi v. United
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States, the author, assisted by Mr. John Beyers (from the
staff of the Rose Institute of State and Local Government,
Claremont Men's College) began a detailed examination of
the population figures presented by Msrs. Tanner and
Henderson with the final versions of their plans.

This

examination was performed at the request of counsel for
Mississippi and was initiated for two reasons.

The first

was the conclusions drawn by Dr. Richard Morrill after his
detailed examination of the Tanner and Henderson Plans as
they were originally presented to the Connor Court in
1977. 3

Dr. Morrill, both in his conversations with the

Joint Committee staff and in his deposition in the Connor
case, expressed the opinion that the Tanner and Henderson
Plans were inaccurate.
lations were incorrect.

In several cases, even county popuIn Dr. Merrill's deposition, for

example, the following exchange took place:
DR. MORRILL:
When I add up the population of the parts
of districts in Washington County in the
Plaintiff plan, the population which is
attributed to Washington County totals
73,000, but there's only 70,000 people. So
somehow in the plan, precincts may have
been counted twice or something because
there's not enough people to go around in
Washington County for all those districts.
In the case of . . .
MR. LEONARD:
Did you say Washington County?
DR. MORRILL:
Washington County . . . . The same thing
happens in Yazoo County in the Plaintiff
plan. There are 27,000 people in Yazoo
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County, but there are 30,000 people attributed to it. And the problem there, I think
you can see, is that--I think it's South City
Hall precinct--is included twice in two
different districts.
So . • .
MR. MC CRATH:
Have you made a comparison of the Department's
(Justice) plan in that regard in Yazoo
County?
DR. MORRILL:
As I recall, I have looked at that, and I
think that it adds up all right. Well, no,
there's a problem in the Department of
Justice's plan too, in Yazoo County of discontiguous precincts in the city . . . 4

Dr. Morrill indicated numerous problems with both plans.
The second factor which alerted the State to possible
accuracy problems was a cursory examination by this author,
the results of which were covered in his rebuttal testimony
in Washington, D.C.
both plans.

This author found obvious errors in

Further examination by this author revealed

many errors in the two plans. 5
A comparison of the first version of the Henderson
Plan, as submitted to the Connor Court, with the final version reveals that 71 of the 122 House districts were, somehow,
tics.

changed in their configurations or in their statisThese 71 districts represent 58.2 percent of all

the House districts.

In many cases, although the district

descriptions remained unchanged, both the black populations
and the total populations cited for the districts were
altered.

Some of these changes reflect adversely on the

methodology, the statistical credibility, and, perhaps,
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also the intentions of Henderson.
For instance, although the precinct of Police Station
was contained in District 45 in the first Henderson Plan,
it was dropped in the final version.

Despite the loss of

this precinct, however, the population cited for District
45 in the final plan actually increased from 18,195 to
18,250, while the black percentage cited for the district
also increased from 66.48 to 73.78.

According to

Henderson, then, the precinct of Police Station contains a
negative total population of 55 persons and a negative
black population of 1369 persons.

These remarkable figures

made their appearance, moreover, after Henderson had
assured the Connor Court that the Plaintiffs possessed
accurate information on precinct populations.
A second example of Henderson's doubtful methodology
is contained in District 86.

Between the time the first

version was submitted and the time the final version was
ready for submission, Dr. Henderson mysteriously located
nine more persons in this district, while at the same time
discovering 164 more blacks.

(The overall description of

the district, however, was not changed.)

This statistical

"sleight of hand" pushed Henderson's computation of the
black percentage in the district from 49.30 percent to
50.14 percent--thus enabling him to count this district as
a black majority district.
We see another example of questionable methods in
Henderson's District 85.

In this district, which contains
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no split EDs, the black population cited in the first version of the Henderson Plan was 13,522; in the final version
it was 13,811.

This change in statistical data was made

without any alteration whatsoever in the configuration of
the district.
In the Henderson Plan, deviations were found of up to
54.36 percent in excess of ideal district population, and
up to 68.36 percent below ideal district population.

Thus,

Henderson's Plan contains a total deviation of 122.72 percent.

Moreover, this total deviation was accompanied by

numerous examples of deviations in excess of the acceptable
standard of 10 percent from highest to lowest district.
These figures for the Henderson districts examined in
detail are found on table

7.

In the Tanner Plan, deviations of up to 24.74 percent
above, and 28.28 percent below, the ideal district population were found.

Thus, Tanner's Plan contained a total

deviation of 53.02 percent.

Tanner's total deviation, too,

was accompanied by numerous examples of deviation in excess
of the acceptable standard of 10 percent from highest to
lowest district (see table 8).
It should be pointed out also that Mr. Tanner omitted
precincts throughout the State from his plan, while listing
other precincts more than once.

For example, he failed to

place Amite County's SD 5 in any district, but listed the
same County's SD 3 in both District 90 and District 106.
Similarly, in Pike County, Precinct 18 was assigned to both
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TABLE 7
HENDERSON PLAN HOUSE DISTRICTS
DEVIATIONS IN EXCESS OF 15% FROM IDEAL
District
Number
6
11
12
18
90
99
101
104
105
118
120
122
SOURCE:

Population

Deviation

Percent
Deviation

21,861
21,503
15,290
14,839
21,198
5,748
28,049
21,612
14,453
21,098
21,956
13,741

3,690
3,332
-2,881
-3,332
3,027
-12,423
9,878
3,441
-3,718
2,927
3,785
-4,430

20.30
18.33
-15.85
-18.33
16.65
-68.36
54.36
18.93
-20.46
16.10
20.82
-24.37

Joint Committee Files

TABLE 8
TANNER PLAN HOUSE DISTRICTS
DEVIATIONS IN EXCESS OF 10% FROM IDEAL
District
Number

Population

Deviation

Percent
Deviation

1
10
25
26
29
34
35
59
60
73
94
96

16,268
20,058
22,668
13,031
14,120
14,446
16,198
20,204
16,353
20,109
20,555
15,944

-1,903
1,887
4,479
-5,140
-4;051
-3,725
-1,973
2,033
-1,818
1,938
2,384
-2,227

-10.74
10.38
24.74
-28.28
-22.29
-20.49
-10.85
11.18
-10.00
10.66
13.11
-12.25

SOURCE:

Joint Committee Files
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District 90 and District 105.

The Precinct of South

Greenwood in Leflore County was not assigned to any district; nor do two precincts in Harrison County--North Bay
and outside Long Beach--appear in any district.
Mr. Tanner likewise failed to provide adequate geographic descriptions of the districts he created.

In

Calhoun County (Districts 29 and 30), Neshoba County
(Districts 53 and 77), Covington County (Districts 93 and

102), and Wayne County (Districts 81 and 97), Tanner
claimed he was unable to ascertain the precinct lines.
However, he presented a district without alternative geographic descriptors, namely, metes and bounds.

This defect

is comparable to selling a piece of land without a boundary
description.
Both the Connor Plaintiffs and Justice claimed that
more black seats were created in their plans than in the
State's Plan; and in this respect it is true that the
Tanner and Henderson Plans compared favorably with the
State's Plan.

However, analysis of the Tanner and Hender-

son Plans shows that many of the majority black seats they
created are found in the North Delta Area of Northwest
Mississippi, and that the seats were made possible only by
the excessive fragmentation of the sixteen counties in this
part of the State.
The State's Plan maximized representation in fourteen
of the sixteen North Delta counties.

The Tanner Plan maxi-

mized representation in ten of the sixteen counties.

The
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Henderson Plan maximized representation in only two of the
sixteen.

When a plan departs from the neutral criterion of

maintaining county integrity, and uses awkward configurations in order to create more black seats, it could be
construed as a gerrymander in favor of the maximization of
black seats.

Such gerrymandering activity clearly exceeds

the constitutional requirement of avoiding the dilution of
black voting strength.
The Court's Plan
The Plan of the Special Master was described by the
Master as a hybrid of the State's, the Henderson, and the
Tanner Plans.

This appears to be the case.

However, the

Special Master made serious statistical errors merging the
three plans.

In figure 37, we can see that the shaded

districts were adopted from the State's Plan.

The Master

offered the Court alternate solutions for Hinds County
(twelve districts) and Warren County (two districts).
In rough terms, the Plan appeared to have been composed of approximately 26 percent of the State Plan, 6
percent from Henderson's Plan, 9 percent from Tanner's
Plan, 19 percent from all plans or alternatives from all
plans, and 40 percent original construction of the Master.
Almost all of the districts drastically reconfigured by
the Master were in rural areas.

It is interesting to note

that many of the same general problems occurred in the
Master's Plan that caused objections to be raised by Justice
against the State's Plan.

Yet in Justice's objections to
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FIGURE 37
DISTRICTS IN THE MASTER'S PLAN TAKEN FROM HB 1491
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the Master's Plan filed with the Connor Court, many of
these objections were not raised. 6

Analysis of the

Master's Plan by the staff of the Joint Committee revealed
that 28 of his districts varied by more than 4 percent
from ideal district size.

The highest district was+ 12.18

percent and the lowest was - 21.36 percent.
to a total deviation of 33.54 percent.

This amounted

It is amazing to

note that neither Justice nor Connor Plaintiffs raised
objections to these excessive deviations, even though they
raised objections to the State's total deviation of 10 percent.

This is probably due to the fact that (1) they did

not examine the plan for violations of "one man, one vote,"
and (2) they were only interested in racial percentages
and this plan solved all problems which they felt were
constitutionally important in nature in terms of racial
representation (not "one man, one vote")--as compared with
the State's Plan.
At any rate, the Master's Plan could have been corrected to fit the Court guidelines.

In fact, Committee

staff made suggestions (along with criticisms) that would
have corrected most of the problems.

A detailed critique

of the Master's Plan appears in the Appendix.

This plan

was set aside, however, when the Connor Court ordered the
parties to the Connor v. Finch lawsuit to attempt to reach
a settlement in the summer of 1978.

When the Connor Court

was again forced to act--at the direction of the Supreme
Court in April of 1979--the Master turned to the
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Compromise Plan, which had been certified by the Committee

staff as statistically correct.

The Master, however, chose

to modify Rankin County from its configuration on the
Compromise Plan.

In so doing, he created one district

which has a deviation of 6.1 percent.
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Footnotes to Chapter VI

l See d'1scuss1on
.
.
h ap. III under the
o f Beer inc

heading "Section 5."
2Mississippi v. U.S., trial transcript p. 1472.
3 or. Morrill is a Professor of Geography, University
of Washington, and was Special Master for redistricting in
that State in 1971.
4 oeposition of Dr. Morrill, Connor v. Finch, pp.
27-29.

5 The Court Master's Plan will be discussed later.
6 see Appendix A for critiques of Master's Plan.

CHAPTER VII
MISSISSIPPI V. UNITED STATES:
THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS
The first section of this chapter will deal with
the complaints that both the defendant and the defendant
intervenors made against the actual redistricting plan for
the House of Representatives (HB 1491) . 1

Later in the

chapter, an examination of the other issues brought before
the Court--such as the interpretation of previous court
cases--will be made.
The complaints against HB 1491 fell naturally into
two groups.

The first group consisted of complaints about

the differences between HB 1491 and the Compromise Plan.
These differences provided the only grounds on which the
defendants might rightfully have questioned the constitutionality of HB 1491.

The other group of complaints

consisted of all the other issues that the defendants
threw in as superfluous additions to a weak case.
As we have already seen, both the Connor Plaintiffs
and the State of Mississippi agreed to the Compromise
Plan.

The Attorney General of the United States also

agreed to approve this plan (even though his approval was
not necessary under Section 5 for a Court settlement).
297
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When asked at the final hearing of the case whether the
Compromise Plan was constitutional, the United States
Attorney agreed that it was.

This was a position that the

Court knew the Attorney General's office must take, since
it was highly unlikely that they would give their approval
to an unconstitutional plan in settlement of the Connor
case.

The Court then reasoned that if the United States

contended the Compromise Plan was constitutional, but
HB 1491 was unconstitutional, then the aspects of HB 1491
which made it unconstitutional could be discovered by
finding the differences between the two plans.

Essentiall½

the United States fell into a trap of its own making.
They had demanded the introduction of the Compromise Plan
into evidence over the objections of the State of
Mississippi, but, in so doing, they had invalidated 90
percent of the evidence which they presented in the case.
This blunder, together with the allegation by the intervenors' witnesses that they would have preferred any court
settlement to a plan passed by the Legislature is probably
why they lost the case. 2
It was surely not enough for the United States to
contend that just because the Compromise Plan was agreeable to them while HB 1491 was not, that this fact alone,
a priori, proved that HB 1491 was unconstitutional.

At

the very least, they would have to have presented some
good reason for their complaints against HB 1491.

Further-

more, they would have to have proven the validity of their
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complaints.
The paramount issue in the case concerned what constituted a district in which the black voters could expect
to "elect a candidate of their choice. 113

The Connor

Plaintiffs and the United States introduced conflicting
and confusing testimony before the Court on this issue.
The confusing nature of their arguments is best demonstrated by the briefs presented to the Court.
The position for the United States was as follows:
Generally, today, a district should contain a
black population of 65 percent or a black VAP of
60 percent to provide black voters with an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice.
However, subsequent to the 1970 Census, a significant out-migration of blacks from Mississippi-particularly from rural portions of Mississippi-has occurred.
Therefore, if the 1970 Census data
is used, a rural district should contain a 71.1
percent black total population or a 66.2 percent
black VAP to allow black voters a 50/50 chance to
elect a candidate of their choice, whereas an
urban district should contain a 65.7 percent black
total population or a 60.5 percent black VAP.4
Under the facts of this case, districts generally
should contain no less than 60 percent black
voting age majorities to provide black voters with
a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of
their choice.
The necessary percentage may be
higher in a rural area or slightly lower in an urban
area in which there is a politically active and
geographically identifiable and contiguous black
community placed entirely within one district.5
Mayor Charles Evers stated that:
. . . a black candidate would not have a realistic
chance of gaining election if opposed by a white
candidate unless the constituency had a black
voting age population of 60 to 75 percent.6
Expert testimony concludes that for blacks to have
a viable chance to elect a candidate, an urban
district should contain a 59.7 percent black VAP
and a rural district should contain a 60 percent
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black VAP.
However, such testimony cautions
that because of a net out-migration of blacks
from Mississippi . . . where 1970 Census figures
are used, an urban district should contain a
black total population of 65.7 percent and a
black VAP of 60.5 percent, while a rural district
should contain a black population of 71.1 percent
and black VAP of 66 percent.?
It is difficult to believe that anyone would make a
maJor issue of the difference between a 59.7 percent VAP
and a 60.0 percent VAP.

It is also doubtful that any

qualified statistician would declare that a 0.3 percent
population difference in rural versus urban districts
would make the difference between winning and losing a
House seat.

Even a sample much larger than the one cited

in court would have a confidence interval of 1 percent or
greater.

Moreover, the error in calculating the VAP for

any given district (assuming precincts were split) would
certainly be greater than .3 percent.

To go on record as

advocating such a degree of precision simply suggests a
marked lack of statistical expertise.
The United States also claimed that the gap between
winning and losing a rural versus an urban district had
increased in some areas due to "out-migration" of rural
blacks.

Thus, they claimed that a 60.5 percent VAP was

required to win an urban area, while a 66.0 percent VAP
was required in a rural area--a difference of 5.5 percent.
Yet, there was no proof presented that whites were not
departing the rural areas in equal numbers to blacks.
And, if out-migration was to be taken into account, surely
the total population figures ought to be adjusted
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accordingly, along with the black percentages, if the
districts were to conform to the one person, one vote rule.
The United States closed its brief with the following
statement:
However, the Court should not use 1970 data (sic)
census data to the exclusion of other factors
such as population shifts which have occurred since
1970, the size of the district, as well as the
relative political abilities of the black or the
white voters included in the district . . . all are
critical in considering whether the reapportionment
"designedly or otherwise" dilutes black voting
strength.a
It is interesting to note that the chief technical
witness for the United States, in his testimony before the
Court, made the following statement in regard to the
factor he would use in the construction of a redistricting
plan:
(Mr. Leonard, Attorney for the State, questioning):
QUESTION:

"Now, how about voter apathy among blacks.
Would you consider that?"

(Dr. James W. Loewen, Director of Research for the
Center for National Policy Review, Catholic University
School of Law, answering for the United States):
ANSWER:

"I don't think so.

I would consider that in

assessing the plan, I guess, but not in drawing
l. t •

"

QUESTION:

"How about education among blacks?"

ANSWER:

"No. "

QUESTION:

"How about the political expertise or acumen of
the black community?"

302

ANSWER:

"I don't know how that could be measured, you
know, in a statistically viable manner, other
than just hearsay."

QUESTION:

"It's kind of amorphous, you can't really get
your hands on it, is that the idea?"

ANSWER:

"Well, yes."9

Dr. Loewen also had the following exchange with Mr.
Leonard:
QUESTION:

"And I believe you already said that you would
take some cognizance of the availability of
black incumbents in other offices to run (for
the Legislature).

So that would be some kind

of factor?"
ANSWER:

"No, I

didn't say I would take that into account

in drawing the plan."
QUESTION:

"You would not?"

ANSWER:

"I don't know if I would or not.

I really don't

know."
QUESTION:

"You're not sure?"

ANSWER:

"Correct."

QUESTION:

"Would you take into account the political
activity of blacks within the particular area
that you were focusing on to reapportion?"

ANSWER:

"All of the factors that you have been mentioning, the political activity and availability
of the incumbent, and so on, I think that I
would not be able to take into account.

For
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one thing, it is difficult to do it statistically, and I would want a plan that's statistically correct.

I would have to say at most

I don't know. 1110
In his testimony, Dr. Loewen drew the conclusion that
it was difficult to quantify much of the data that the
United States claimed should be used in drawing a plan.
He said that he would not use much of it.

He then went on

to state that he would have, and did, use the same data to
judge a plan that he would not have used to draw that same
plan.

It appears, then, that he would place the State of

Mississippi in an utterly untenable position.

He would

have them draw a plan using one set of data, and then have
it judged by another--with the latter data being of a
nature that is difficult to quantify, and some of it being
just plain hearsay.
At any rate, the United States' own expert (Dr.
Loewen) set a black VAP percentage of 60.5 percent in an
urban area, and 66 percent in a rural area, as constituting
a district in which a black candidate would have a 50/50
chance of winning. 11

The D.C. Court accepted a 60 percent

VAP as the minimum figure for a black district in its
opinion in this case. 12

Bearing these three percentages

in mind, we can now examine the differences between the
State's Plan and the Compromise Plan to determine if the
differences did indeed represent a constitutional violation
on the part of the State.
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Seventeen districts in HB 1491 were modified in order
to win approval of the Compromise Plan by the Connor Plaintiffs and the United States.

These seventeen changes took

place in seven sets of districts.
will now be discussed in turn.

Each of these seven areas

Before beginning this

review, however, one additional point should be made.

It

is presumed that neither the Connor Plaintiffs nor the
Justice Department in constructing any of their plans
intended to discriminate on the basis of race.

Furthermor~

it is presumed that they did not present any plans which
they believed had the effect of discrimination.

Therefore,

if an unintentional discriminatory effect is found in any
of their plans, the effect does not prove an intent.

This

is an important conclusion, as will be demonstrated
throughout the remainder of this chapter.
Hinds County
The United States contended that the State's three
western districts in this county were discriminatory.

They

also claimed that these districts--numbers 73, 74, and 75-were "gerrymanders."

They contained black VAP percentages

of 31.86, 29.38, and 39.21.

The Compromise Plan contained

the following VAP percentages for the same three districts:
73 was 59.07 percent, 74 was 26.17 percent, and 75 was
15.33 percent.
The State contended that these districts were compac4
and that they followed generally the lines which were
dictated by the Federal Court in 1975.
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According to the United States' own standard,
Compromise District 73, being situated in a rural part of
Hinds County, fell 5.97 percentage points short of being a
black district.

Also, the configuration of these three

districts in the Compromise Plan, which was designed to put
more blacks in District 73, resulted in under-representation of the voters in Districts 74 and 75--where extensive
population growth, in comparison to a very slight growth
in the area of District 73, has taken place since 1970.
It follows from these facts that, while the State
could have created an "influence" district for blacks in
this area, the resulting malapportionrnent would have been
unconstitutional in effect.

The HB 1491 districts are not

strangely shaped by any objective standard.

Finally, since

the Federal Court in 1975 dictated the configuration for
this area, the burden of proof must be on the United States
to prove that a plan conforming to that configuration is
unconstitutional--especially when it adds an additional
black seat to the Court configuration.
Warren County
The United States contended that HB 1491 split the
black community in the City of Vicksburg, and that this
community, if merged with rural blacks to the north, would
create a black district.
56, and 57.

The districts in question are 55,

The United States also contended that these

districts in HB 1491 were irregular in shape, indicating a
gerrymander.

The black VAP percentages in the three dist-
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ricts were as follows: 55 was 48.23, 56 was 47.10, and 57
was 28.39.

The black VAP percentages in the Compromise

Plan, on the other hand, were as follows: 55 was 44.64, 56
was 56.22, and 57 was 20.17.
The State contended that the districts were not
highly irregular in shape, and that their configuration
resulted from a rational State policy of forming city/rural
districts.

The State further contended that district 56

was not a black district anyway.
The facts are that:

(1) the configuration in the

Compromise Plan was more compact;

(2) neither configuration

was excessively irregular--particularly as pertains to
District 55;

(3) a district could have been created totally

within the City of Vicksburg, which would have had a black
VAP

of 53.33 percent (based on EDs);

(4) according to the

Loewen standard, this possible Vicksburg district, being
7 percent rural and 93 percent urban, would need a black
VAP

of 60.88 percent to be a black district; and

(5) Compromise Plan {CP) District 56 fell 4.66 percent
short of the lower Loewen limit for a black district.
Thus, while the State may have unwisely split up black
political influence in Warren County, it did not prevent
the formation of a viable black district.
Leflore County
The United States contended that the State split the
black community in the City of Greenwood.

They further

contended that this black community should have been
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combined with the rural blacks in the northern end of the
County to form a stronger black district.

The districts

in contention were House Bill 1491 Districts (HP) numbers
34 (black VAP 64.26) and 35 (black VAP 37.72).

The United

States contended that Compromise Plan (CP) District 35
(black VAP 71.72) was constitutional and black, while HB35 was not black.

The United States concluded that HB-35

was a gerrymander. 13
The State contended that CP-35 was less compact than
HB-35, and contended that all other configurations for this
County were less compact than HB-35.

The State also con-

tended that HB-35 combined blacks from Greenwood with
blacks from the rural area because this created a better
black district than would have resulted if whites from the
City were to have been combined with rural blacks.

The

State contended that HB-35 was a black district.
The facts are that the best district that could have
been formed within the City of Greenwood would have had a
53.61 percent BVAP; that the State's Plan was the most
compact; that the only way the State could have raised the
BVAP (Black Voting Age Population) percentage would have
been to fragment the City of Greenwood further (as was the
case in CP-34 and CP-35); and that HB-34, being 31.5 percent urban and 68.5 percent rural, required only a black
VAP percentage of 64.26 to qualify as a black district
according to the Loewen standard.

As it turralout, HB-34

met the Loewen standard and passed the Court's criterion
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of 60 percent BVAP by 4.26 percent.

HB-35 was a black

district and was constitutionai. 14
Adams County
The United States contended that the State, in
creating HB-95, deliberately kept the BVAP percentage at
just 60.63.

They contended that CP-95, with a black VAP

of 66.45, was a black district, while HB-95 was not.

The

State claimed that HB-95 met the 60 percent BVAP criterio~
and was, therefore, sufficiently black.
Applying the Loewen standard, with HB-95 being 20
percent rural and 80 percent urban (Natchez), this district
should have had a black VAP of 61.6 percent.

Thus, although

its BVAP was .5 percent above the Court's standard, HB-95
fell 1 percent short of being a black district under Loewe~
This district probably should have contained a few more
blacks, but a difference of 1 percent in one district is
.

1~

hardly enough to justify throwing out an entire plan.~
Marshall County

The United States contended that the black VAP of
56.02 in HB-5 was too low, and that in this district the
State should have followed the Connor Plaintiffs' configuration, which resulted in a BVAP of 61.25 percent
(State's figure).

The United States also claimed that the

State was obliged to fragment the City of Holly Springs and
to follow the lines of the supervisorial districts.
The State contended that the district of the Connor
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Plaintiffs was not compact and was a gerrymander.

They

contended that HB-5 was essentially the same as District 3
in the Justice Department's Plan, which had a black VAP of
only 55.83 percent.

Finally, they contended that the

Justice Department could not logically claim that another
party's district was unconstitutional, by either intent or
effect, if it were better than the one in their own plan.
In arguing against the districts in this County, the
United States clearly erred.

In effect, they branded their

own plan for this County as unconstitutional.

Moreover,

using the Loewen standard again, the CP-5 BVAP of 62.04
does not constitute a black district.

CP-5 was 20.4 per-

cent urban and 79.6 percent rural, requiring a BVAP of
64.88 percent to make it a black district; CP-5 was 2.84
percent under that standard, even though it was 2.04 percent above the Court's standara. 16
Panola, Quitman, and Tunica Counties
The United States contended that HB-9, HB-10, and
HB-11 fragmented concentrations of black voters in the
northern portion of this three-county area.

The United

States also complained that these districts were oddly
shaped and malapportioned.

By inference, they claimed

that CP Districts 9, 10, and 11 were more compact, and were
constitutional, while the State's were not.
The State, on the other hand, contended that HB-9
was a black district, and that HB-10 and HB-11 were as
black as they were required to be.

The State pointed out

310
that changes made in these districts by the Compromise Plan
actually resulted in decreases of the black VAP percentages
in HB-9 and HB-11--from 63.48 percent to 62.68 percent
(- 0.8 percent) and from 46.47 to 45.90 (- 0.57), respectively, without any significant increase in the black VAP
percentage of HB-10 {the increase was from 41.74 to 43.52,
up 1.78).

The State further pointed out that HB-10 and

HB-11 were not black districts by any standard, and that
changes of one or two percentage points would not have made
any difference in this situation.
The fact is that under the Loewen standard, the
change in configuration in these three counties between
the State and Compromise Plans lowered the black VAP in the
only black district of the three.
should not have taken place.

This change, therefore,

It should also be pointed

out that the Tanner Plan (DOJ) fragmented this three-county
area to a much greater extent than did HB 1491.

The Tanner

Plan also created a district equivalent to HB-9 (Tanner 19)
which weakened the district equivalent to HB-9 from a black
VAP of 63.48 percent to 61.87 percent.

The Henderson Plans

for these counties were even worse, with districts containing black VAP's of 51.33 percent, 45.59 percent, and 53.17
percent.

On this issue, the United States was clearly

throwing stones at its own glass house.
De Soto County
Having broken the glass house in Panola, Quitman, and
Tunica Counties, the United States proceeded to raze it to
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its foundations in De Soto.

Here, the Justice Department

contended that HB 1491 split a "concentration" of rural
blacks, while this "concentration" was left intact by CP-6
and CP-7.

(The Connor Plaintiffs even contended that their

districts in this County were more compact than the State's.
Figure 38 demonstrates that this configuration was absurd.)
Further, the United States held that raising the black VAP
from 41.87 in HB-6 to 43.74 in CP-7 would have given blacks
significantly more influence in elections in this area.
The State contended that complaints in this County
were groundless.

The truth is,that by the changes in

HB 1491 resulting in the Compromise Plan, the Connor
Plaintiffs were attempting to improve the Compromise Plan
statistics for the upcoming court battle.

These changes

raised the total black percentage of HB-6 from 48.36 to
50.07, thus giving the Compromise Plan one more black
district and a better set of statistics with which to confuse the issue.

Also, both the Justice Department and the

Connor Plaintiffs should have been aware that the
Southhaven area in northern De Soto County is one of the
fastest growing areas in the State.

Indeed, De Soto County

may well rate three districts in 1980.

Thus, if the line

between Districts 6 and 7 were drawn in an east-west direction--as it was by both Henderson and Tanner--the result
would be a malapportionment of the County without the
result of anything more than a marginal gain for black
influence.
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FIGURE 38
THE STATE, HENDERSON, & COMPROMISE PLANS FOR DE SOTO COUNTY
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Thus, out of seven challenges to the State's Plan,
only one of them resulted in a change in the number of
black districts, as determined by either the Court's
standard or by Loewen's standard.

The challenges in

Marshall County, in the Quitman-Panola-Tunica County area,
and in De Soto County were clearly without merit.

The

cases in the other four areas were marginal at best.

While

it is true that the State might have constructed different
districts in these four areas, the United States failed to
prove intent to discriminate in any one of these areas.
Furthermore, in only one area (Adams County) could the
United States prove that the configuration of the district
made any crucial difference in black voting power--even by
their own standards.

The Court concluded that a difference

of one seat out of 122 was not significant enough to decJare
the State Legislature's plan to be discriminatory.

It

remains to be seen what the Supreme Court will say concerning this issue.
In Mississippi v. United States, the United States
brought forth nine more complaints concerning the composition of the State's districts in HB 1491.

These complaints

differed from those discussed above in that all of the
features of HB 1491 that were complained about were later
retained in the Compromise Plan--a plan which the United
States has conceded to be constitutional.

The complaints

in question concerned the Justice Department's contention
that the State's district lines had split up concentrations

314
of blacks, with the effect of minimizing the influence of
black voters in district elections.
In light of the nature of Justice's complaints, it
is interesting to note that there is no legal definition
of what constitutes a "concentration,

11

nor is there a

standard for determining when such a concentration becomes
constitutionally important.

Also, given Dr. Loewen's

contention that the minimum black VAP percentage must be
60 percent for blacks to have even a 50/50 chance of winning
an election, it would be helpful to have some definition of
what the marginal difference is between 55 percent and 50
percent, or between 50 percent and 45 percent, and so on.
It might be presumed that after the percentage drops below
50, then each additional one point decline is probably less
and less important.
It should also be emphasized that there was a difference in philosophy between the experts who drew the State's
Plans and Mr. Tanner.

Mr. Tanner seemed to have believed

that every ED in the State should have been examined as
each district was drawn--or at least that is the conclusion
that can be drawn from a close examination of his plans.
The State's experts felt that neutral criteria should be
the primary determinants of the configurations in rural
areas, particularly in cases involving the possible fragmentation of counties.

The State experts contended that it

was not their duty to make race the overriding concern in
every one of the State's districts.

Where there was the
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possibility of making significant differences in black
voting strength, districts were to have been shaped accordingly.

Otherwise, other considerations could have been

applied.
Even allowing for an honest difference in opinion,
many of the Department of Justice's complaints seem illogical, and were probably brought forward simply in an
effort to add bulk to the Justice Department's arguments.
Each of these complaints will be discussed below.
Harrison County
The Justice Department, in their plan (referred to
hereafter as the Tanner Plan), created a black district in
the City of Gulfport. 17

(By black, it is meant that

blacks made up over 50 percent of the total population.)
This district, TN-114, had a black VAP of 47.49 percent.
The Department of Justice's complaint was that although a
similar district had appeared in House Plan A/C (District
119, with a black VAP of 51.87 percent), it did not appear
in HB 1491.

The State, realizing that A/C 119 was extremely

awkward in shape--and could not, within the configuration
of the total plan, be created in precinct form--had simply
dropped the district from the Statutory Plan.

The drop¢ng

of this district should not have been a "burning" issue,
since the Connor Plaintiffs, facing similar configuration
problems, had not attempted to draw a black district in
Gulfport either.

If Henderson had not discriminated,

neither had the State.
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Jones County
Jones County presented another case in which the
Tanner Plan and the Henderson Plan differed.

Tanner

combined the black precincts of Laurel with a number of
rural black precincts to create a 51.97 percent BVAP
district.

The highest BVAP district that Henderson had

created in Jones County, however, was 29.48.

Obviously,

the civil rights activists did not see the creation of
this black district as a "burning" issue in Mississippi.
Wilkinson and Amite Counties
Justice contended that the State split up a concentration of blacks in Amite to create HB-98.

They also

contended that Tanner's Plan was better--a difficult position to defend when one realizes that the black percentage
in HB-98 was higher than it was in Tanner's Plan.
Copiah County
Here, the United States contended that the black
community in Copiah County was divided by the State's Plan.
In fact, the blacks were spread out all over the county.

Mr. Tanner simply wished to draw attention to the fact that
his Copiah County district TN-86 had a black VAP of 52.16
percent, while the State's HB-77 had a black VAP of only
44.18.

What Justice failed to point out, however, was

that Henderson's Plan for Copiah County divided the blacks
to a greater extent than did the State's Plan.

Even though

it took in a heavily black area of neighboring Jefferson
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County, Henderson's district had a BVAP of only 45.02-just 0.84 percent higher than the State's district.

It

should also be made clear that Tanner's District 86 was
made possible only by the construction of TN-85--the most
irregularly shaped district of all those presented in any
plan in this case (see figure 39, The Tanner Plan).
Jackson County - City of Moss Point
Here again was a case of much ado about nothing.
HB-111 had a BVAP of 36.76 percent, while TN-121 had a
BVAP

of 39.12.

This difference of 2.36 percent, in a

district where the BVAP falls only in the 35-40 percent
range, cannot be very significant.

The Deparment of

Justice's complaint was made to look weaker by the fact
that Tanner's district was not even contiguous.

Perhaps

the State could have switched a precinct, but this hardly
seemed a significant problem at the time, especially in
comparison to the incumbency problems in Jackson County.
At any rate, if a 39.12 percentage was all that important,
then why was Justice willing to drop HB-35 in Leflore
County (in constructing the Compromise Plan} from 37.72 to
31.93, in order to raise an already black district in that
county to an even higher BVAP percentage?
Kemper and Lauderdale Counties
(East Central Mississippi)
Here Justice was unhappy with the fact that the State
combined Kemper County with the northwest corner of
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FIGURE 39
THE TANNER HOUSE PRECINCT PLAN
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Lauderdale County, instead of the northeast corner.

What

they failed to mention was that Henderson combined exactly
the same area in Lauderdale County with Kemper County.
(He then added three more precincts from Lauderdale which
had only an 18 percent BVAP.)

Justice also failed to infonn

the Court that HB 1491 contained the only district in
eastern Mississippi with a BVAP in excess of 60 percent.
This was HB-40 in Noxubee, Oktibbeha, and Lowndes Counties,
with a BVAP of 63.68 percent.

In these counties, the

nearest that Tanner came to HB-40 in terms of BVAP was TN52, with a BVAP of 51.98.

Perhaps this is an example in

which Justice broke up a black concentration.
Madison and Yazoo Counties
In this area, the State was simply trying to build
one full district within each of the counties of Yazoo and
Madison.

Neither the Tanner nor the Henderson Plan assigned

either of these counties a fully contained district.
State's HB-58 was compact and so was HB-59.

The

In fact, HB-59

was the highest BVAP percentage district in the two-county
area contained in all the plans.

Certainly the State's

combination of the Ridgeland-Madison area with Yazoo County
was no worse than Tanner's combination of that area with
northern Madison County, northwestern Leake County, and
Southwestern Attala County.

Also, the State intended that

HB-60, which splits Yazoo County, should take in all the
black areas of the county that it could.
had its facts wrong.

Justice simply

The "black concentration" mentioned
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in Justice's brief involved only 1,200 persons, and of these
only 42.85 percent were actually black.

Such figures are

hardly significant.
Washington County
In this County, all of the parties drew the same
black district in the City of Greenville.

When the

Department of Justice's attorneys, in their brief, congratulated their Department and the Connor Plaintiffs for
creating this district, they failed to mention that the
State had created the exact same district.

The issue in

Washington County, therefore, must have concerned the
County's other three districts.

A comparison of these

districts in the various plans is shown in figures 13 to 15.
In this instance, Justice may have had a legitimate
complaint.

There are clear indications from the shape of

the State's districts that they had been constructed in
order to give a district to each of the three incumbents.
The State could have drawn a plan that would have created
one additional 55 percent or better black VAP district in
Washington County.

Under Loewen's standard, none of these

districts in any of the three plans would have qualified
as a black district.

Even TN-45 fell 6.7 percent short of

the required 66 percent BVAP--and it is a rural district.
Finally, it should be pointed out that in the Compromise
Plan, the Justice Department did agree to the State's
configuration in Washington County.

Perhaps, however, the

State should pay careful attention to the 1980 Census
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figures when it redistricts this area in 1981.
One conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is

that some of the issues raised by the Justice Department-such as those involving Moss Point, Amite, Copiah, Kemper,
and Madison-Yazoo--are totally without foundation.

Other

of the Department of Justice's complaints, including those
concerning districts in Gulfport and in Washington and
Jones Counties, have a degree of legitimacy, but certainly
do not raise grave constitutional issues.

A

passage from

the testimony of John Tanner indicates that the Department

of Justice, in bringing up numerous unimportant issues,
was simply trying to throw superfluous arguments into the
case.
HB

Tanner, it will be recalled, was the analyst of

1491 for the Justice Department.

In rehearsing the

litany of "problems" with HB 1491, Tanner stated the
following under examination by Mr. Scadron, the attorney
for the Justice Department:
TANNER:

Finally, in Neshoba County, Neshoba
County containes the only really significant number of American Indians in the
State of Mississippi. There are not
enough Indians to comprise their own
district, or control a district.

THE COURT:

What tribe are they?

TANNER:

I believe those are Chocktaw (sic)
Indians.
I'm not certain of that, Your
Honor.
District 47, Leake County, cuts
right through the largest concentration
of American Indians in the State of
Mississippi, thus separating them from
the rest of the Indians.
It's a relatively small matter, but in this one area
where there are a significant number of
Indians . . .
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THE COURT:

What percentage do the Indians have in
Neshoba County?

TANNER:

I'm not sure of that number, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

It's pretty small, isn't it?

TANNER:

I would think it would be about 10 percent, but the number is increasing.
I
just feel that this sort of split is
gratuitous. You shouldn't go out of your
way really to split off that area,
especially since . . .

THE COURT:

They (the State) might have done it in
order to even up the size of the districts.
I don't know.

TANNER:

Well, some area of Neshoba County must
be taken out in combining it with Leake
County, which is just as good as anything else.

MR. PARKER:

1,603 Indians.

THE COURT:

What's that?

MR. PARKER:

1,603 American Indians listed in Neshoba
County in the 1970 Census, Your Honor.

(a break to discuss the nature of precincts in Neshoba
County)
THE COURT:

You're taking on the cause of the Indians
now, are you? I think you ought to stick
to your original proposition of showing
that these various changes resulted in a
dilution of black voting strength.
It seems to me if we're going to get into
the Indians, particularly with only a
thousand people in the entire Neshoba
County, you're weakening the credibility
of your testimony. You lose your objectivity.18

Somewhere along the line, it seems, the Justice
Department itself had lost its credibility--and its objectivity.

Judging from their criticisms of HB 1491, and the

way in which they presented the facts in the case, they
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certainly seem not to have been interested in an objective
appraisal of the State's Plan.
Let us now turn to the Justice Department's and
Intervenor's other technical objections concerning HB 1491.
Their first objection was based on a contention that "The
Mississippi Legislature departed from its own neutral guidelines in promulgating the statutory plan at issue here. 1119
There is nothing wrong with this contention, except that
the State's criteria were mis-stated in the briefs opposing
the State Plan.

Connor Plaintiffs listed the following as

the State's "neutral" criteria for the drawing of districts:
(1) creation of black majority districts,

(2) avoidance of

fragmentation of black population concentrations,
tion of compact districts,
subdivisions,

(3)

crea-

(4) preservation of political

(5) equality of population.

In writing up

this list, Connor Plaintiffs did not draw the necessary
distinction between neutral and constitutional criteria
(see discussion on criteria in Chapter III).

They also

mis-stated the intent and content of three out of the five
criteria.

Finally, they distorted the facts about HB 1491

and the other parties' plans in order to strengthen a weak
position.

The five criteria are reviewed below:
Creation of Black Districts

The criterion followed by the State in this regard
was not the "creation of black districts."
the avoidance of racial dilution.

It was, rather,

The creation of black

districts is just one of the ways in which dilution is
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avoided.

Moreover, the fact is that the Defendants et al

did not produce even one significant instance where a black
district could have been created by the State, but was not.
It is true that there were some districts that came close
to falling into this category, but none of these districts
provided solid evidence of State malfeasance.
Compactness
Here, Connor Plaintiffs stated that the inability of
the Chairman of the Joint Committee to define compactness
was prima facie evidence that the criterion was not
followed.

Such a contention is patently absurd.

There is

no nationally accepted standard by which the compactness of
any district may be measured.
district would be a circle.

Certainly the most compact
Beyond that, however, compact-

ness is "in the eyes of the beholder."

Connor Plaintiffs

also ignored the fact that it was not the Chairman who
drew the districts.

Their question about compactness should

have been put to the technical consultants, not to a legislator.

Furthermore, an examination of the Tanner and

Henderson Plans shows that their districts are no more compact than those of the State.

The fuzzy map that Tanner

submitted to the Court along with his Plan does not even
begin to do justice to the irregularly shaped districts in
his Plan.
Court.

Dr. Henderson did not even submit a map to the

Again, it seems, we have a case of the defendants

throwing rocks through the walls of their own glass house}O
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In attacking HB 1491, Connor Plaintiffs asserted that
the districts in west Hinds County were" . . . not regular
in shape, showing an intent to gerrymander.

Most obviousl½

the House districts in Warren and rural Hinds Counties are
irregular in shape and are overly elongated . . . . . . 21
Figures 40, 41, and 42 show the shapes of the districts in
warren County as they appeared in the Plans of the State,
Tanner, and Henderson.

Figure 43 shows the State's

Hinds County districts.

rural

The reader must draw the obvious

conclusion that the State's districts were not unreasonably
shaped.

Rather, the Tanner and Henderson Plans were the

ones that had irregularly shaped black districts.

This

gives rise to the suspicion that the real racial gerrymandering in the redistricting process was on the part of
the Justice Department and the Connor Plaintiffs.

These

"gerrymanders" were performed in an attempt to maximize
black seats--an act in direct conflict with the ruling of
the Supreme Court and with the briefs of both the
Department of Justice and the Connor Plaintiffs.
Preservation of Political Subdivisions
Connor Plaintiffs again mis-stated the criterion of
the State.

They stated that,

"Another guideline (of the

State) was to preserve political subdivisions, such as

.
.
. t ac.
t 1122
coun t ies
and precincts,
in

On the next page of

their brief, however, they made the gratuitous statement
that, "Supervisor districts also are another basic unit of
•

•

•

•

•

government in M1ss1ss1pp1.

11

23

And finally, in their
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FIGURE 40
THE STATUTORY HOUSE PLAN IN WARREN COUNTY
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FIGURE 41
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FIGURE 42
THE TANNER HOUSE PLAN IN WARREN COUNTY
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FIGURE 43
THE STATUTORY HOUSE PLAN IN WEST HINDS COUNTY
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conclusion, they widened the definition of subdivisions to
include areas having "natural or historical boundary
lines. 1124

What they were trying to do, apparently, was to

tie these points together in the reader's mind and convince
the reader that the State's criterion on political subdivisions was a very broad one.
The State's criterion was actually very simple: as
many counties as possible were to be left intact, and
precincts were to be left intact, if doing so did not
totally disrupt the general configuration required by
adherence to the other criteria.
On the matter of preservation of county integrity, an
examination of the plans presented by the State, Henderson,
and Tanner is most revealing.

On Table 6 , the counties

of the State are divided into five groups.

The first group

includes counties with no district fragments; they are
either whole or internally subdivided.

In the case of some

counties, however, one or more full districts can be
created within their boundaries, but there is some population left over.

This portion of the county containing that

excess population (which is less than the size of a full
district) is called a fragment.

I

If this leftover area is

attached to one district also formed out of another county,
then the county in question still has maximum representation.

Counties with the appropriate number of full dist-

ricts plus one fragment form the second group.

The third

class are counties which have all the districts within them

331
to which they are entitled by population, but also have
more than one fragment.

This is not a serious departure

from the guidelines, but is not as satisfactory as the
lines drawn for the second group.

Fourth are counties

that are split, but not badly so--they still have political
control over the proper number of districts.
job has been done.
badly fractured.

Here, a poor

Fifth, and last, are counties that are
The table clearly shows that the State's

Plan does a decidedly better job of meeting the criterion
of county integrity.

This is true not only as it applies

to whole counties, but also to the number of counties that
are at maximum representational status in the House.

It is

clear Mr. Parker misled the Court on this issue.
Connor Plaintiffs have also "blown" the issue of
split precincts out of proportion.

The following exchange

took place in the courtroom between Mr. Frank Dunham
(Attorney for the State) and the Author.

Mr. Parker, the

Connor Plaintiffs lawyer) was present and heard this testimony.
MR. DUNHAM:

Now, Mr. Hofeller, since you testified
earlier in the case, have you reviewed
the House reapportionment bill . . . ,
and determined the number of precincts
that were split in the entire state?

MR. HOFELLER:

I went through the House bill and read
the precinct-by-precinct descriptions
and circled or underlined some of the
precincts that were split.
I believe
I got them all.
I counted 15, I
believe, that were split.

MR. DUNHAM:

How many precincts are there in the
entire state?
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MR. HOFELLER:

I think there are approximately 2,000.

MR. DUNHAM:

So what percentage of that total would
be the number of good precincts?

MR. HOFELLER:

I believe that would be somewhere in
the neighborhood of about threequarters of one percent.25

It was clear from this exchange that only 0.75 per-

cent of the precincts were split.

Connor Plaintiffs push

the limits of the Court's credulity if they expect it to

believe that this is a significant issue.

Moreover, it

should be pointed out that only one of the split precincts
was put back together in the Compromise Plan.

No plan

should be judged unconstitutional over the splitting of one
additional precinct out of 2,000!
In addition, the importance of some of these "splits"

was exaggerated.

For example, complaints were made about

the splitting of the predominantly black American Legion

Precinct in Warren County (see figure 44).

All that was

split off from this precinct was one end--an area containing only 486 people, of whom only 158 were black
adults!

Surely one should not make a constitutional issue

out of the transfer of 158 blacks from one precinct to
another.
Connor Plaintiffs then turned to the subjects of
supervisor districts and natural and historical boundaries.

It was well known that the Supreme Court spoke out against

the use of Mississippi supervisor districts for legislative
redistricting.

It was also well known that many of these

districts were severely contorted and irregular in shape,
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FIGURE 44
AMERICAN LEGION PRECINCT IN WARREN COUNTY
SHOWING AREA DIVIDED OFF FROM MAIN BODY
OF PRECINCT (SHADED} IN STATUTORY PLAN
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FIGURE 45
PEARL RIVER COUNTY IN HENDERSON PLAN
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and that it was not the State's policy to follow the lines
of these mis-shapen districts.

It was not the State, but

Henderson, because he was leaning heavily on the shakey
data available from local county redistricting efforts,

who followed these lines in his redistricting plan; the
result was districts like those shown in figure 45.

If the

State had built districts based on supervisorial lines, it

.
would probably have had the strangest looking districts in
the nation.

Moreover, there is nothing historical about

these beats; they have been forced on Mississippi's counties by an outmoded policy applied by the Federal Courts,
and they have all come into existence since 1970.

If

Connor Plaintiffs do not object to the shapes of
Mississippi supervisor districts, clearly they should not
be objecting to the shapes of the State's House districts.
Regarding the role of natural boundaries in the
redistricting plan, no significant testimony on the subject
was ever offered in the case.

The defendants, it seems,

brought up the point for no good reason.
Population Equality
Connor Plaintiffs should never have brought up this
issue.

All the other plans, with the exception of the

Compromise Plan,were court plans, not legislative plans.
Therefore, they (not the Statutory Plan) required smaller
population deviations.

Connor Plaintiffs knew full well

that different standards applied to the de minimis rule
when it was exercised in the redistricting of a state by
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its own legislature.

The larger deviations in the State

Plan clearly resulted from an effort to avoid the fragmentation of counties.

Neither the Justice Department nor

the Intervenors presented any evidence to prove that any
malapportionment (creation of districts of unequal population) in the State's Plan resulted from an intent to
discriminate, or that it led to a significant dilution of
black voting strength.
Thus, one can conclude that this attack on the
State's application of its own criteria was, at best,
extremely weak.

At worst, it was deceptive.

Only one other statement in Connor Plaintiffs' brief
bears discussion.

In their conclusions of law they stated

that:
Racially motivated gerrymandering of district lines
is also shown when:
(1) The redistricting plan unnecessarily fragments
a minority community, or unnecessarily pairs
black population concentrations with white
population concentrations to deny black voters
the opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice;
(2) The districts are not compact or contiguous;
(3) Racial statistics are used in the drafting of
the plan;
(4) The district lines depart from political
subdivision and natural or historical boundary
lines;
(5) The plan was enacted for the express purpose of
protecting incumbent white officeholders. 2 6
The United States et al did not prove that any con- centration of blacks, large enough to elect a black, was
denied a district (except perhaps in one case where the
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argument was over 1 percentage point of black adult population).

The Defendants did not prove that any of the

State's districts were excessively irregular.
no non-contiguous districts.

They found

They supported the use of

racial statistics in drawing district lines.
no departure from historical boundaries.

They found

And, they were

unable to show any instance in which blacks were denied a
winnable district in order that a white office-holder might
be protected.

For all these reasons, the Defendants did

not win the case.
In the proposed conclusions of law submitted by the
Justice Department, the following principle was asserted:
Where there is a substantial black population
which is geographically concentrated and has,
therefore, potential for electing representation,
of its choice, a districting scheme which fragments
that population and submerges it among majority
white districts, denies the minority an equal
opportunity to participate in the electoral process. 27
(emphasis added)
Justice's principle as stated above required that a
denial of equal opportunity to blacks required first a
"substantial" black population, plus a potential for election of a black candidate.

It is clear from the analysis

of Justice's case and the Connor Plaintiffs' case in the
preceding portion of this chapter that many of the districts about which Justice complained were not in violation
of this standard.
It is the contention of this paper that Justice
Department attorneys, in their criticisms of the State
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Plan, repeatedly ignored their own legal criteria for
judging the reasonability and constitutionality of district
lines.

A black population spread out over more than half

a county is not a "concentration."

A black population

that makes up less than forty percent of a district is not
"substantial."

And, according to the standard set by Dr.

Loewen--Justice's own expert witness--such a district (40
percent black) would not be one holding even a "potential"
for electing a black representative.

Thus, if the condi-

tions for electing a black never existed in an area where
the State drew its lines, then the State's Plan could not
be the reason for a denial of representation for blacks;
therefore, the State's Plan in that particular area does
not represent a case of unconstitutional discrimination.
One more issue raised in the Justice Department
briefs deserves some attention.

It concerns the following

conclusion of law:
Where, as here (referring to the plans of the
State), a reapportionment plan combines heavily
black counties with areas which under the 1970
Census appear heavily black but which have experienced population shifts since 1970 and are no longer
heavily black, the legislature must be presumed to
have been aware when they approved the State's
Plan that such configurations in the State's Plan
would reduce black voting potential. 28
This assertion is based upon the testimony of Dr.
Loewen at the trial.

Dr. Loewen, however, based his

entire analysis of this issue on faulty data and faulty
statistical principles.

He cited a study, included in the

Appendix of this paper, which does not support his own
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testimony.

Dr. Loewen also alluded to the use of linear

analysis on his contention that he could predict current
levels of black rural population.

Linear analysis cannot

be performed using only two population figures (1960 and
1970 Census) per census unit.

What follows are excerpts

from Dr. Loewen's testimony; with Mr. Schwartz, an attorney
for Justice, handling the questioning:
SCHWARTZ:

Given out-migration of blacks from
Mississippi, is 1970 population a
good basis for analyzing the voting
strength of blacks in Mississippi today?

LOEWEN:

No, it is not. Any competent demographer or political sociologist would
want to use data that had been updated.

THE COURT:

Such as?

LOEWEN:

I have many demographic objections (sic)
based on 1960 and 1970 Census and on
'75 census estimates that project
voting age population by race as of
1978.

SCHWARTZ:

Could you respond to my question which
I believe was how you explained your
methodology in arriving at that projected
total population, 1978 figure percentage
of blacks in the State of Mississippi?

LOEWEN:

Yes, I used the basic demographic technique called the linear projection which
probably any demographer would use a~ a
first step.
Demography, of course, is a
sub-branch which is connected with population, population changes.
If we would refer for a moment to the
population pyramids which are on_p~ge 14
of the Defendant Intervenors Exhibit
that we've been referring to. The population pyramid shows the bar for male
whites of given age groups such as 40 to
44 years of age, and female whites of the
same age, for male blacks and for female
blacks.
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The projected technique I used was to
determine the decrease in population
for each of those groups and for each
of those age spans or age cohorts from
1970 to 1970 (clerk should have typed
1960 to 1970).
Then I obtained a ration showing how much
that group had decreased or increased,
and I applied that ratio to the 1970
group of the same age.
In short, I
found out how much, let's say,that 30
to 34 year olds had declined in number
as they became 40 to 44 years old in the
ten years.
I then applied that same
decline to 44 year olds --

I then applied that ratio to the 30 to
34 year olds in 1970 to have obtained
how much change there would be in that
group between 1970 and 1978.
I corrected those projections by using
the census update which are available
as of July 1st, 1975, for total population for each county.
As far as I know, this is the most
accurate way to do such a projection in
the absence of update information by
race.
The census has no update estimates
by race beyond 1970. And aga~n, this
conclusion was -- these conclusions ·are
based solely therefore on the 1960 and
1970 Census by race and age, and sex
and on the 1975 census update estimates. 2 9
Dr. Loewen is a sociologist; he certainly is not a
statistician or a demographer.

It is ridiculous for him to

try to project the demographic trends of one decade by
using the census data for another.

If it were possible to

do this, we would not need a census every ten years.

Dr.

Loewen assumed that the same migration patterns that were
in force in the 1960's would also apply in the 1970's.

He

also assumed that a decrease in the percentage of a certain

341
age group within the State would be uniform throughout the
state.

Dr. Loewen

as unfamiliar, perhaps,

ith the best

methods of demographic and statistical analysis.

If this

is the best expert advice that the Justice Department could
come up with, perhaps they should hesitate before analyzing
the redistricting plans of any other party.
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Footnotes to Chapter VII
1

The Connor Plaintiffs became the Defendent Intervenors in Mississippi v. U.S.
Similarly, the Connor
Plaintiff Intervenor (Department of Justice) became the
Defendent; and the Connor Defendents (State of Mississippi)
became the Plaintiff.
2

The strategy of the State was to object to the
introduction of the Compromise Plan, but then to use it to
narrow the issues in the case.
3

The phrase used by the Connor Plaintiffs and the
U.S. throughout the entire case.
4

Mississippi v. U.S., suggested findings of fact by
u. S. , no. 7, pp. 2-3.

5
6

rbid., suggested conclusions of law, no. 26, p. 22.
rbid., brief for the U.S., p. 13.

7 rbid., brief for the U.S., p. 79.
8

rbid.

9 rbid., trial transcript, p. 1442.
lOibid., pp. 1439-40.
11

Ibid., suggested conclusions of law.

12A ccepting
.
Dr. Loewen ' s unproven asser t.ion argumen ts
for purposes of the following discussion.
13 HB 1491 (the State's) districts will, in the future,
be referred to as HB (district number) while Compromise
Plan districts will be referred to as CP (district number).
14

HB-35 elected a white in 1979.

15 A black won election to that seat in November o f

1979.
16

HB-5 elected a white in 1979.

17 Tanner Plan districts will be preceded by "TP-" and
Henderson Plan districts will be preceded by "HP-".

18 Mississippi v. U.S., trial testimony, PP· 1238-40.
19 rbid., Defendent Intervenor's findings of fact,p. 29.
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20 rbid., p.
21

22
23

24

25
26

27
28

29

30.

rbid., p. 28.
rbid., p. 30.
rbid., p.

31.

rbid., p. 40.

rbid., trial testimony, pp. 1454-5.
rbid., p. 40.

rbid., Justice's conclusions of law, p. 21 (1979).
rbid., p. 19.

rbid., trial transcript, pp. 1380-85.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the period from 1965 to 1979, there was a
massive failure of the redistricting process in the State
of Mississippi.

Until HB 1491 and SB 3098 were passed in

March of 1978, no party had successfully brought forward
satisfactory plans for the 1970 redistricting of the
Mississippi State Legislature--plans that were satisfactory
in terms of equality of population, in terms of appropriate
representation for blacks, and in terms of appropriate
regard for county boundaries and precinct boundaries.

Of

course, no plan could have been devised that could have
perfectly satisfied the goals proposed by all parties.
The State's 1978 plans, however, came as close as one could
have expected, given the character of a legislative
redistricting process.
Clearly, the primary responsibility for a constitutionally acceptable redistricting of Mississippi rests
with the Legislature.

There can be no doubt that this

body consistently resisted redistricting in accordance with
the one man, one vote doctrine and was unwilling to create
districts in which minority rights would be properly protected.

It was not until 1977, when the leadership of the

Legislature finally accepted reapportionment, that they
344
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decided that they should perform their proper duty--a duty
which required the Legislature to do the job correctly.
It was unfortunate that, by the time this job had been

completed, the lines of dialogue between the civil rights
movement and the legislative leadership were so irreparably
damaged that neither side could agree to a compromise which
would save face for both sides.

In the opinion of this

writer, who was intimately involved in this process, the
State Legislature came 90 percent of the way toward satis-

fying the important demands of the civil rights forces.
It is unfortunate that the other side could not have moved
10 percent toward the Legislature's position.

The fact

remains, however, that the Legislature had been afforded
numerous opportunities to act and had chosen to stall.

One

can only hope that they will perform correctly in their
role in the 1981 redistricting.
The Connor Plaintiffs were not without some fault in
this failure.

As we stated above, they resisted compromise

with the Legislature, and avoided involvement in the legislative redistricting process--even when to do so might
have resulted in a settlement.

The so-called Compromise

Plan did not come into existence until both parties were
threatened by the Presiding Judge of the District Court
with a reduced number of legislators--a prospect that could
not have been pleasant for either side.

Connor Plaintiffs,

however, should not be too severely blamed for their position.

Throughout the period from 1965 until 1977, almost
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all of their legitimate demands for fair black representation had been frustrated by the Legislature and the Federal
District Court in Jackson.
It was to be expected, perhaps, that both the
Legislature and the Connor Plaintiffs would act in the
manner they did.

What was unexpected was the performance

of the three federal judges hearing the Connor case and
the Department of Justice.

The District Court failed to

properly perform its judicial function.
to act.

First, it failed

Then it failed to act soon enough.

failed to act correctly.
law correctly.

Then it

Then it failed to interpret the

Then it failed to insure that it retained

sufficient technical expertise to do the job.

A

competent

court would have drawn a constitutional plan in 1973--in
time for the elections.

Up until 1978, the Court did not

develop a solution to Mississippi's redistricting needs
that was even near constitutional requirement--either in
terms of population equality or racial representation.
Perhaps the Presiding Judge, as a former Governor of
Mississippi and a former legislator, should have disqualified himself for conflict of interest.
The United States Department of Justice should also
share major responsibility for its failure to act properl~
It was clear to anyone viewing the performance of this
· a 11 owe d
f e d eral department that it

1· tself

to be "captured"

by the Connor Plaintiffs in the litigation.

The Departmen4

in some cases, assigned both legal and technical staff to
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this case who were not qualified to handle a process
involving major constitutional issues.

The Department

allowed the Connor Plaintiffs' lawyer, Frank Parker, to
handle the major portion of the case and never once was
able to take an independent position from him.

The

Department refused to give the Legislature guidance on
racial redistricting standards when requested to do so.
The Department could have acted to encourage compromise
between the parties; but they became a cipher for one of
the parties.

Beating the State in Court became the main

goal, not the proper redistricting of the Legislature.
The issues involved in the 1977-78 process are not
simple.

The proper balancing of various constitutional

and neutral criteria,one against the other,is not easy.
Many state legislatures and courts have grappled with
these issues--and with no better success than Mississippi
during the years 1965 and 1977.

Yet none of the parties

seems to have learned, or to have been willing to learn,
from the experience of others.
What is most valuable in the study of this particular
redistricting is that Mississippi's black minority was
both very large and dispersed throughout the State in
widely varying levels of concentration.

The problem of

entitlement of legislative seats in proportion to percentage of population is very difficult to judge.

This was

not a case, such as that found in Richmond, in which almost
all the blacks were in clearly identifiable areas

This
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case offers the United States Supreme Court a clear opportunity to lay down standards by which minority representation can be assured.

As minorities in this nation become

more and more integrated, their demands for representation
will become more and more difficult to attain.

The High

Court should, perhaps, examine the difficulty of application of Section 5 of the Civil Rights Act to redistricting
and attempt to build on the Beer standard handed down in
the New Orleans case.
The major lesson to learn from the Mississippi experience is that the technical problems of redistricting, even
in a smaller state, are legion.

Any legislative body or

court approaching such a task should make sure that it has
adequate technical expertise available.

This is particu-

larly true if court challenges are expected.

It is confu-

sing enough to redistrict a state even under the best of
circumstances; but when one anticipates litigation, it is
vital to insure that one's data is correct and properly
supported with technical evidence.
TheDis:rict Court in Mississippi, once it had decided
actively to involve all of the parties in the Connor litigation in the drawing of court plans, should have taken
the following steps:

(1) the Court should have clearly

declared that only the 1970 Census data would be used-either to build districts or to determine the constitutionality of the racial makeup of those districts;
(2) the Court should have made it clear that it would not
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accept an ED plan;

(3) the Court should have brought all

of the parties who wished to submit plans (or who were
being ordered to submit plans) together to agree on the
following technical items: a) the creation of a common
census data format and data base, b) an agreement on a
common methodology for the splitting of Enumeration
Districts in order to follow precinct lines, c) the creation of a common base map set, d) the creation of a
common body of computer software with which to draw plans,
e) a statement by all parties of what they felt constituted
racial dilution, f)

a common agreement on what level of

deviation from the ideal district size would be acceptable,
and g) a practical common agreement about the treatment of
counties in the context of the one man, one vote decisions
If this procedure had been followed in the summer of 1977,
many of the arguments in court over district statistics
could have been avoided.

The parties could have focused on

the substantive issue of the case--the racial composition
of the districts.

It is the contention of this author

that the Court simply did not understand the technical
difficulties involved in redistricting--and that they still
do not understand these difficulties even after all the
problems which have been encountered in the last two years.
This study has covered the history of the Mississippi
redistricting process in detail from 1977 through 1979.

It has explored most of the technical issues, the nature
of the relevant plans presented for the House, and the
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arguments presented by all parties in defense of or in
opposition to the State's Plan for the lower house--HB

1491.

It has dwelled in great detail on the racial issue

and the problems in meeting the one man, one vote requirements as presently defined by the United States Supreme
Court.

Several issues could benefit from further investi-

gation--issues not addressed in this study.

The first is

a detailed account of the development and defense of the
plans for the upper house.

The second is an in-depth study

of appropriate measurements of racial representation-given the heterogeneous racial composition of the political
entity which is to be redistricted.

Nonetheless, it is

hoped that this study will serve as a history of the
Mississippi process and as an important source of information for those approaching similar redistricting situations
in the 1980's.

APPENDIX
The Appendix contains illustrations of the types of
gerrymanders discussed in Chapter I which are explained
therein.

In addition there are maps of plans and districts

from the Mississippi redistricting, the report on the plan
of the Mississippi Court Master (Connor v. Finch) prepared
by the Joint Committee, a affidavit of William A. Allain,

presently Attorney General of the State of Mississippi -which contains a chronology of the Mississippi redistricting process from the time of the Supreme Court decision
in May of 1977 to August 2, 1978, the decision of the
District of Columbia Court in Mississippi v. United States
and the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mississippi handed down in February of 1980.
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FIGURE 46
HOUSE PLAN B

SOURCE:

Joint Committee
Files
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FIGURE 47
THE 1965 HOUSE PLAN
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FIGURE 48
THE HOUSE STATUTORY ED PLAN

SOURCE:

•
Joint Committee
Files
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FIGURE 49
THE HOUSE COURT PRECINCT PLAN
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FIGURE 50
THE STATUTORY HOUSE PLAN IN MERIDIAN
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FIGURE 51
DISTRICT 85 IN THE TANNER PLAN
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APPENDIX
EXAMPLES OF LEGISLATIVE GERRYMANDERS
Illustrations of "the art of the gerrymander" are
shown in the attached maps from California Assembly Bill
No. 12, a redistricting plan authored by the Democratic
majority in 1972. The plan was bitterly opposed by the
Republicans, who countered with a "model redistricting
plan" of their own. Finally, after a gubernatorial veto,
the California Supreme Court appointed Special Masteisto
draw an entirely new plan.
It is worth noting that the Democratic plan provided
for very low population deviations. All these districts
meet rather strict criteria of "population equality."
This is a good illustration of the sophisticated
use of precinct data (vote history and registration data) in district design. The greater part
of the proposed District lies within Orange County,
an area of traditional Republican strength; but a
part of Los Angeles County is also included. Each
precinct in the area that had better-than-average
Democratic voting proclivity was surveyed: the
best were aggregated into District 69 (sometimes
referred to as the "Corydor") to secure the
re-election of Assemblyman Kenneth Cory. The
District stretches octopus-like through Republican
territory, sending out tentacles to pick up
Democrats in widely separated areas. Parts of
thirteen cities and two counties are included; but
none of the cities falls entirely within the
District.
This is a dramatic illustration of the use of
narrow, very thinly populated corridors to link
centers of population many miles apart. There are
three areas of heavy population in the District:
at the top left and right-hand corners of the
District and in the extreme tip of the curving
"tail" at the bottom of the map. Each population
center is located in a different county (Contra
Costa, San Joaquin, and Santa Clara). The District
meanders almost a hundred miles through the
California Coast Range; it by-passes almost a
million people in the populated areas of Alameda
and Santa Clara Counties.
This map illustrates the practice of c~rving ~istricts out of city precincts and balancing poli-
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tical characteristics through the addition of agricultural areas.
In this case, a virtual swathe
is cut through the center of Fresno. The District
was created to assure the election of a Democratic
candidate and the defeat of a popular, long-term
Republican incumbent (Kenneth Maddy).
The bizarre shapes of these districts (District 78
in San Diego and District 19 in the Bay Area) and
their total lack of compactness illustrate other
contortions that result from the reach for political advantage.
District 78 assumed its shape as
the result of an effort to concentrate Republican
voters.
District 19 is almost--not quite-- divided
into three: note the impact in the neighboring
district, which balloons into the 19th through a
pencil-thin corridor.
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FIGURE 52
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 12 (1971) DISTRICT 10
"THE CORYDOR"
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FIGURE 53
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 12 (1971) DISTRICT 10
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FIGURE 54
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 12 (19 71} DISTRICT 32
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FIGURE 55
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 12 (19 71) DISTRICT 78
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FIGURE 56

CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 12 (1971) DISTRICT 19
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
I

U.1. ITED ST.ATE ET AL. v. ST.ATE OF fl IS IPPI and
AARO E. HE ... RY ET AL. V. TATE OF l\lII 1 IPPI
1

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLU~fBIA

os. 79-504 & 79-52 . Decided February 19, 1980

The judg111en t is affir1ned.
MR.

JusTICE STEYENS,

concurring

in

the judgn1ent.

In H)65 a three-j udo-e Di trict Court was convened in
l\!Iissis ippi to d al with allegations of 1nalapportion1nent in
iviissis~ippi · \,./tate lr 0 'i.Jature. By 1975 an acceptable reapportioninent plan till had not been for1nulated; nevertheless,
quadrennial elections w re held under a court-ordered plan. 1
In 1978 the ii issippi Legi lature enacted a statutory reapportionn1ent plan, ·which was sub1nitted t-0 the Attorney General of the lrnite 1 ~ tate for preclearance under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 lJ. . C. § 1971, et seq. When the
Attorney General objected to the plan, the tate brought this
action in a three-j ud()'e District Court in the District of Colun1bia, sc::eking a <l claratory judg1nent that the plan was in
compliance with the Act. In 1979. ,vhile the Voting Rights
case was still pending, the three-judge court in Mi~issippi
entered a judgn1ent putting into effect a reapportionment plan
agreed to by all parties. Connor v. Finch, 469 F. upp. 693
(SD 1'Iiss. 1979). That. plan was essentially a rnodified version oi the ~tatutory plan.
Under the Voting Rights Act the task confronting the
District of Colun1bia court was to determine whether the
statutory plan had the "purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U. . C.
§ 1973c. An i1npennissible effect is created whenever a reap1

The hi tor· of that litiO'ation i d<>scribed at length in l\!R. J ~ ·-r1cE
l\lARSHALL' di ·entinO' opinfon in Connor v.. Coleman, 440 U. . 12, 614"
1
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portion111eut plan ha the effect of diluting exi~tin black
Yoting treugth. :.·Pe B er Y. r·11ited States, 425 l'"'. ~ . 130.
141. The Di trict of Culu1nbia court co1npared the ~tatutor:;,:
reapportio11u1eut pla11 tu the 1079 court-orderPd plan in
order to detennine whether any prohibited retrogre ion had
occurn ·d. Co11rludi11g that it had nut litul that th<rP wa ... no
purpo::-e to di cri1ni11atP t'vidPtlt in tJw -tatutor·y plau. the court
granted the ~ ~tat a dt:>elaratory judg1nent approviug tlw pla11.
Both the r·nited :·tate · and iutervenor · ( blaek voter in l'viissi sippi) appPalPd. 1"he Court today aftfr1n ~. without opinion.
In 1ny judg11H'nt th(! only .--ig11ifica11t i · ue prP <'llted on
appeal i wh )ther tht' ·~tatutury plan had thtt in1per111i ·sible
effect of diluti11~· l>lack Yotiug .-tr<'ngth. I11 hi Ji . eating
opiuion :.\lH. ,J ·. ·~1 LC'~: . IAH~HALL pre~e11t .. a per ·uasive case
that then\ wer \ ·i 0 ·11ific:a11t discrppancie · b(~tweeu the . . tatutory
plan and the 10,U eourt-urdered plan. Because I believe that
the 1U7U 1)la11 wa . uot the propt'r b uchn1ark to be u . e<l in
dcter1niui11° wh ,thcr th<\n, wa all i1npertni · ·ibll, effect. I have
no occa ·io11 to c0111111t_t1t 011 hi couC'lusiou that the <liffere11ces
betwPen the t\\·o plan"-' wer<' ·uffieieut to cou titut a "dilution"
of black voting ~tr<11 wth.
As o tech11il'al 111attl'l'. the court-or<lert d 1 lan wa . the plan
"in effect'· at th(' ti1ne the District of Colu111bia court decided
the ca~(.'" _~ P\'PrthPh~~~. al] of thr partir.s to both actions
realized that thcl ·tatutury plan would be use<l in thE' In79
electio1i if it rt1et1iv<' l cuurt approval in ti1nf\. :·ee Cunnor Y.
Colenian. 440 l·. ►-·· 012. 022 ( ~IARSHALL. J .. disseuting). Thus
in practical terin . the court-ordered plan was uever inure than
l.

1

T'lH' ,":'ta t u1 or>· pbn t·ottld nut lx·<·omt· (•ffN:t ive until it wa.-:5 c:lt.'a rt•d pur· uant to tliP \·otin~ Hid11:-- ..\t·I b~· (•ithe1· th Attonwy Gt-1wral or the
thrc· •-ju lrrt• <·otu1: in rht• Di:--triel of Cohnubi~l. Cowwr Y. Wa/lt>r. 421
r. . 656. Thc- judo-nwnt ellt Pl'Pd br r1i~ :\Ii ·Hi;-: ·ippi cour , 011 th<.' other
hand, .:;p(•eifi ·nlly pruvid<·d that th(• eourt-or<lnP<.l phm wa3 to be in
'·full tor<.:t' au l t·ff<·c· fur tlw lH,9 n.•crular "tatP l~gi.fative elettion., nnd
ther •aftn unlt•...; · aud ttlll il ah •rc,J at'eordiug: to law.'' Comw,· Y. Finch. 4G9
F. -\1pp. t.m:3, t1Y4 (~D ~[i:--~. 1H,Y . Thu.:, the c•tJttrt-orderPd pla11 would
haYe rnuainl'd in dfoet if rhe Di~tri"tt of Col 111nlJia cu lrt lwtl 110t "l'J>rovcd
:!

tbe• ·tu.t utory 1>l·u1 .
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a backup. 'I'o uL fl ~uch a plall a .. a be11eh1nark for judging
the effect of the --tatutory plan ou voting rights see1ns to n1e
to be logically illdPf(-ltL__ihle. • ""o voting rights in Ii i sippi
were ever affect d by the backup plan and thu any "chauges"
due to the i1upu ·itiou of thP --tatutory 11lan could hardly have
diluted tho P ri 6 ht . ~Ior~over. to require a state legi lature
to pr~<lict what cuurt-ordPrP<l plan 1nay be t.'Htered while
a Voti11g !light suit is pending and the11 to draw it plan to

ensur that 110 dilutioll occur o..;ee1ns to n1t.i to be a futile exercise clearly Hot required by thr tatute.
Thus. in n1y ,·iew the statutory plan was per1nissible under
the Act '"'O lu11g as it did nut have a discri1ni11atory purpose
and di i not di]utP black votiug ttrength a· it exi ted at the
tiiue the legi.Jation wa~ pa._ . .ed. '] he l)i trict Court's findings
of fact 111ake i clear that the plan 1net the e cotH..litions. 3 I
therefore concur in the judg1ne11t affinning the decision uf the
court below .

s The eourt not<1d that when eompared to th{-l 1975 apportionment plan

that ha<l cron~rned thP ]a~t Plt•rtion~: the ~fatutory plan <·on.:tituted a ·•clear
enhaueem~ut o tlw po:--ition of nwial minoriti~ with rt> ·pec-t to their effective exerr1.:e of th Plt•t·toral frnn<'hi~ •... .'· Jur. ~rntement, at 3:fa. n. G.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
U . . ITED r-,TA.TE ET
AARO . . .,. E. HEXRY'
ON APPEAL

v. TATE OF IIS I IPPI and
ET AL. v. TATE OF fl, I , IPPI

AL.

FROi\I THE C~ITED STATES DISTRICT COCRT FOR THE
DI. TRICT OF COLl!MBIA

l\IR. JrHTlCE l\1Att:-;HALL, with who1u ~IR. Jr TICE B1u;. · AN
and . . Iu . .J r~TICb \\' HITE .ioi11. di --sen ting.
For 1not'P than 1.'3 Y<~ar~ private litic,ants. often join l by
the l-nited . 'tatt' ... . have sought to obtai11 an apportio111nent
plan in Nli~\j ·•-..;ippi whieh ~ati fie-..; the require1nents of the
Equal ProtPctiun ( ,lau.J-~ and the Votiug R.ights Act of 1965.
By to lay· ·u1nn1ary afiinnance. thP ( ourt as ure that these
effort will re111c1111 to a ·· ub ta.utial degrre un ucce..; ful. I
1

dissen .
T
.I

Brougl t in lf)fi,'"j thi: case ha a procedural hi tory that can
charitably he d . ·erihed as bizarre. Both state officials and
the three-j udgc Di~ trict ( ;uurt for the ·outhern District. of
~Iis ...i ·ippi have hown a fir111 dPtPr111i11atiou to avoid in1plementatjou of an apportio1uneut plan ·w hich con1plies with
constitutional and tatutory requiren1ent.:. 1 The case has
been before thi Court no fewer than ei 0 ht tin1es; we have
invalidatrd plan propo~<l by the District. Court on four
occasions. Cunnor Y. Johnson, 402 l-. S. 690 ( 1971); Connor
V. }rilliauzs, 404 (T. ~-~· ;""j49 l 197:2); Cunnor Y. Jraller, 421 U. s.
656 (1975); Connor Y. Finch . 431 C. S. 407 (1977).
In Connor ,·. F-inch, s-upra, we ordered the District Court
to draw a lawful apportiorunent plan "with a con1pelling
awarenes of the nPed for it expeditious acco1nplish1nent. so
that. the citizen-..; of 1Iissis~ippi at long last will be enabled
to elect a l gislature that properly repre~en ts the1n." Id., at
The procedurnl baekground i~ dP~ctiberl in rletuil in my di ·"'enting
opinion in Com,ot , . Col~mau , -140 'C ~ 612, 614-621 ( 1979 .
1

#
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426. T,vo more yea.rs passed. a.nd no such plan was drawn.
When the ca e '"·as here last 1"erm the plaintiffs sought leave
, to file a petition for a writ of 1nallda1nus to require the Di trict Court to do what we had ordered. On wiarch 26. 1979,
the Court granted leavP to filf' the petition, but it postponed
action for 30 day . in tructing the District- Court to enter a
plan "forthwith and without dPlay." Connor v. Coleman 440
U.S. 612. 614 (1Di9). 2 On Aprjl 13, 1979. the Di trict Court
entered a final j udg1nen t ernbodying a plan agree<l to by all
partie~.-~ lTnfortu11ately, this.; ~ttle1nent plan did not. end the
litigation.
Ahno t a yPar rarli~r. on April 21. '1978. the Governor of
l\'Ii i~sippi had approvPd a statutory rea.pportionn1ent. plan
de~ignrd to ~upt>rs('de any court-orclered plan to be produced
in this litiO'atio11. The tatutory 1>lan was subn1itte<l to the
Attorney Ci(-\neral of the t·11ite<l States for preclearance under
the y·oting Right~ Act of 1965. 42 l?'. f4. C. : HJ71 et seq. On
July 31. 1078. thP Attorney General entered a ti111ely objection
on the c,rou11d that the ►.:tate had failed to carry its burden
of provinc, the ab~encp of a <liscriininatory purpose or effect.
See 42 l~. ~ . C. : I973c·. 1'he f4tate of lviissi sippi filed the
present action in the i:-nited :tates District Court for the
District of Col un1hia. 'Peking a rleclaratory j udg1nent under
the ·voting Right..: :\ct- that the statutory plan did not have
the prohibited purpoS(-l or effect. Ten Mi sissippi X egro voters
intervened. urging that the ~tatutory pla.11 be declared invalid.
On June 1, 197f). the l)i8trict Court entered the declaration
reque ted by the ~ tate. and it is that judgment which is the
subject of the present appeal.

II
The 1 gality of the statutory plan depends on whether it
I would have j.·~ued the writ immediarely. ~ee Connor v. Coleman)
440 r. ::. 612. 614 di:.::--enring opinion).
3 The petition for ·1 writ of maudamu~ wu.: denied on ~fay 21, 19i9;
we noted that the Cler·k of the Di triet Court hnd •i.·tated that aJl partie"'
to the liti(7'arion ha,·e anno1111red in open court that there will be 110
appeal .' Connor v. Coleman, - "G. •:,, (1979).
2
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has the purpo e or effect. of diluting .... egro voting trength in
lVIississippi. If the tatutory plan is retrogre sive. it is forbidden under the v· oting Rights Act. Beer "· CJ nited States,
425 U. . 130 ( 19i6). The District Court correctly 111easured
the statutory plan again t the present apportio1uuent of the
l\i1i sL·sippi Legislature. whieh is the settletnent plan e1nbodied
in the final judg1nent entered bv the Di trict Court for the
► outhern District of :\Ii si ·sippi in respon e to our instruction
to enter a plan "forthwith and without delay." '
The District Court· findiugs reveal a long history of denial
of .. •egro voting ri(J'ht in .. Iississippi. Official use of racially
discri1ninatory devices . uc-h as literacy tests. poll taxes. and
whitP pr1111arie~ effectively excluded Xegroe · fro1n participation in thP Ple ·toral 1>roct--1.,;~ until the pa__, ·age of the Yoting
Right Act in 19<-Vi. The current effects of pa:;t di ·crin1ination
are 111a11ifP ·ted i11 seriou .. underrepresentation of ...... egroes in
the state legi lature. Although the latest census showed that
Missi ippi"s population i ~ :36.8o/c Xegro, prior to the 1979
election there were only four ~egroes in the 122-inember
House of Repre~entative and none in the 52-1ne1nber ~enate.
Because of racial bloc voting and low X egro voter registra ...
The ar<rmu •nt thar rc·t.rO!!rt':--:--iun :--hould bt• lllf•a~urrd a~ain~t
tlw 1975
COltri-ordnPd pbn whith w;1 ., 111 pffp<-f whrn thP re~i~laturt> adopted the
stat 1tory pla11 1~ m.mitP:o:tl.,· int'orn•<·t. The nwrn.latt- of tht- Yoting flight,
A.et. i.· tha1 u plan nw~- not 1,p :Hloptf\d if it woul<l Jihttt· t.. xi ·tin" . ~egro
voting .·trpngth. Th •rP i~ no di~putt- that. tlw lff,Y <·onrt-onlPrrd plan
was the> ~ovt>rni1w law at r'lu'\ tiuw tlu· c·ourt u<1low re11der{>d it.; deri.·ion.
If thl-' .-tatt1tor~· pl;111 \\'l'n· uot put into f•ffeet, futurP t>lec·t1on.-5 would be
condttc♦tt· l und r t hr c:m1rt-ordPrP1 l pb11. Ae<·ordingly, it i:" ;-;imply ineorr ~ct. to -'tl~ge:--t th:tt _-pgro ,·otlllg rig:ht~ w<>n• 11ot "affP(•t.f~d'' l>~· the 19i9
court-ord r~l JJl:m or r'ha1 :t ~uh:-,;t.i.qutant .-tat.utory plan c·rntld not dilute
the rio-ht., won u11<.k·r rh:lf pl:111. To. uggP:--t, ,1:- dOt':-: .Jh{ . .Jc:-;T1c~ 'TEn; .. · ·,
ante. }at. thr c·ourt-orden·tl pbn tlwt i:- now thP law i11 :\fo-·i:.:~ippi may be
di:-;rt1ganlt1d I <":lll:-:P llw parti<':' ,·it1wc~l it a:-: a nwrp "hal'knp•t u~t 0~1ly
denigra <. a tiwd judgnu.. 11 t of a ff>dNal eourt, t•ntPrc~l at our J111.•tt1011
· ft Pr on r a dPeadP of )iri~at ion: it- would a.1.-o 1wrmit a ~tat•· lt-gi:-,larure
fret·h· to dilttt(· ~<•gro n,ri11_g :-:tn·n~th gain{>([ through :iuy <·ourt-ordt•red
pbu· m1dpr whith c·lc-t·t ion . . had uot. yt•t. u ~n heltl. :;tLl'h a n.:ult i:'! pl:iinl:;. COllltranr
to dw Yoti11 Hid1t~
.\ ·t..
.
•1

~
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tion and turnout. ~egroPs must constitute a substantial
1najority of eitjz011.~ in a di:trict in order to have a reasonable
opportuHit.:v to elr£'t a candidate of their choice. The court.
concluded that t1ith<1r a XPgro population of 655{- or a . . "'egro
voting age population of HO% ,vas necessary to provide such
an opportu1 11t .v.
It is evide u t fron1 t hP ti ndings of the District Court that.
the statutory plan significa11tly weakens the voting strength
of Negroes in ct 11 t11nber of ways. The statutory plan divides
and diminishes - •egro population concentrations. con1bines
the1n with h(:lavily \vhite populations. and creates oddly shaped
districts for 110 apparent reason other than to dilute the
Negro vote. l . . uder the plan presently in effect, 49 districts
contain a n1ajority of Xegro voters; the statutory plan contains only 46 ... uch districts. As the District Court acknowledged. Ullder 4'the tatutory plan's redistricting of \Yarren
County. a heavy black population concentration is divided
an1ong three propo Pd house districts, turning a black n1ajority
in to a black 111 i nori ty in all three districts.'' Jurisdictional
State1nent of the l~nited States. App. 18a-19a.
The court concluded that the elin1ination of three 1najority
districts was insignificant. relying on its finding that a ~egro
voting age population of 605{: was necessary in order for
~egroes to have a fair opportunity to elect a candidate of
their choice. Apparently the court reasoned that the din1inution in the 11un1ber of districts ,vith a 1nere n1ajority of.:.. "'egro
voters was not retrogressive since even under the plan presently
in effect. X egro voters in those districts could not elect candidates. But a 1nujority population gives .. ~ egroes at least
some opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice; a
minority aives then1 practically none. Indeed in s01ne of the
counties with . . •egro 1najorities under the existing plan but not
under the statutory plan. Xegroes have been extre1nely active
in city govern1nent and have a genuine opportunity to elect a
candidate of their choice.ii The District Courfs rnechanical
5 For exmnple, in the \Varren County di:-:trict the rommunitY of Vieksburg hus re •ently elected a ~earo to the City CoLmcil. In <tddition , Bolton
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application of the 607r tandard eli1ninates that opportunity.
In a number of other districts appellees failed to carry
their burden of disproving retrogression within the meaning
of Beer. In Leflore County _
for exa1nple, existing law provides for a l. egro voting age population of 71.72%; the statutory plan reduces that population to 64.26%. The statutory
plan frag1nents a heavily Negro population in that county,
combining the larger portion with a white co1nmunity. The
record sho\ved that because of past discri111ination, .. "'egro
voting strength was severely inhibited in the county~ in part
because 1110 t ....egroes re ide in rural areas, where voter turnout is far le s than in urban di tricts. There was testimony
that a 655{ . . - et1 ro voting age population ubstantially con1posed of rural X e(J'roe was in ufficient to provide a fair opportunity to elect candidates. By contrast, the il.72% population provided by the existing plan is fully adequate.
The District Court' findings show that the statutory plan
frag1nents a 11u1nber of cohesive voting districts, combining
comn1unities ·where • "'egroes have been politically active with
white populations for no discernible reason. There was uncontradicted testin1ony that in seven districts, the statutory plan
deprives ~ "'egro voters of an opportunity to elect a candidate
of their choice. 0 In the e circu1n tances, I an1 unable to accept
and Edward..:;, primarily .. -:-egro town.: in the Hind~ County di-.:trict, have
predominantly l • ~ro c·ity government .
6 For example, in we::::ten1 Hind.:- Count:v, a heavily .. Te(7ro di'"'trict under
the present law i~ divided into three ertiou ·, each of which is combined
with greater white populations in .:;urrounding '-'uburb..;. In 1far ·hall
Countv the onh· di trirt that ha, electrd a Negro ... upervi ·or i;::; "'plit up,
and the votina :·trength of .. ·egro voter~ in the county'· hou'"'e di.:trict is
diluted by the in<"lu~ion of the predominantly white Holly pring.:: precinct.
The count.:.: • •eo-ro votina population i... thu"' reduced from 62% to 56%.
Tn Adam . Count,·. the ~tatutory plan divide~· the only ·upervi. . or~' di ·trict
with n majority .... .,. earo popuhtion into two di~trict-... The northern portion of Adam'"'· County i~ then <"ombined ·with heavily white populations,
which reduce~ · the _·r(7ro population from almo~t 70% to 63%.
The Di~trict Court altogt•ther icrnored the retrogre:;::5ion in the electoral
strenath of _·euro vott r~ w-ithin the countic:. Thi wa ~ a .::eriou.., error, for
county delegation~ to the :\Ii~ ·i~8ippi L ai~Iature play a crucial role in
..
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the conclusion that the statutory plan ,vould not lead to a
retrogression in the position of ~ . . egro voters.
The District Court acknowledged the e differences between
the two plans, but upheld the statutory plan nonetheless, concluding that the differences were insufficient to constitute
a discriminatorv effect. The Court pointed out that both
plans had the sa1ne nu1uber of districts ,vith • •egro voting age
population of 607c or n1ore, and it relied heavily on "the fact
that legislative reapportionn1ent is the preferred vehicle for
reapportion1nent. as is reflected by the broader tolerances
which are allowed to legi latures, but not to courts, in the
n1atter of deviations fro1n unif orn1 population require1nent ."
Jurisdictional tate1nent of the linited tates. App. 32a.; It
a.lso reli~d on finding that the interveners had not offered
sufficient objP.ction~ during the · formulation of the statutory
plan.
The District Courts rea ·oning a1nounts to a conclusion that
there is a de mini-tnis exception to the fundan1ental proposition that changes n1ay not be 111ade if they would produce a
retrogression i11 tbe electoral potential of .Lr egro voters. Beer
v. [Tnited States, 425 1·. ,. 130 ( 1976). I am unable to discern such an exception in the Voting Rights Act or in any of
Jocal government. l.~gi.:lation affecting the county i., enacted by a .:ch me
of bill· of local applitation in the .·tate legi..:lature: board~ of .:upervisor
exerci~e little leo-i...:Iative power. .\.3 a remit, the county dele(J'ution. i.:
largely re .. ponsible for local governance. lf the . tatutory plan j .. vi wed
from the per"pectivr of particular countie .. , it L even more difficult to
account for the Di.:tritt Court'~ finding that any retroureti..:ion wa ·
';in~ign ificant."
7 The court al··o found that the State had carried its burden of r>roving
that the ~ta tutor~· plan wa: not th product of n discriminatory intent, a
conclu ion that i in my view hiuhly que:-:tionable. The UIH~. ·plaiurd di..;criminittory elt--ment" of the .:tu tutor~· plan~ when eombinrd with thr
State'.... prior hi tory of di:--:criminatiou. :·u~ue 't that he tate had not
carried it· burden. Indeed, the eourt entir~ly ignored tt» ·timony tending
to .. how that memb r~ of the ~tate legi..;lature ·.- joint reapportionment
committee were awure that the .. tatutory plan dilut~ the strength of the
Xegro vote an<l that alternative couficyurations would preserYe exi.:ting:
_-eO'ro population concentration .
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our d<\<·isiutt~·. ► ' urlt a gloss on the Act would invit€ a ► 'L)rie~
of changes, ee1ningly insignificant in the1nselves. which over
the cour e of years could result in a substantial decline in
~ egro voting trength. • ,. or is the decision below justified by
the principle that legislatures 1uay deviate more broadly than
courts fro1n unifor1n population require1nents. The v·oting
Rights Act flatly prohibits ·tate legislatures fro1n "'undo[ing]
or defeatlina] the right· recently won by Xegroes'' Beer v.
l]u-ited :State8, supra, 425 l~. ., at 140. Finally, the asserted failure of the intervener . to offer ~ufficieut objections
to the statutory plan is wholly irrelevant to the inquiry
required by the .. oting Rights Act. The Act's proscription on
retrogre ~iot1 i . j1nply not "Ubject to waiver. The District
Court's conclusion would perinit a State freely to dilute
_. . egro voting ·tre11gth whPnever the X egro co1nn1unity is
unable or unwilling to participate in the apportion1nent
process.
By today's . . ununary affir1nance, the Court perinits the
rights won le"s than a year ago, after generations of political
efforts and well O\ er a decade of litigation. to be thwarted by
recalcitrant state official~. In so doing, the Court appears to
condone a novel interpretation of the law that would find a
de rnininl'is exception to the clear and absolute require1nents
of the \·otin(T Rights .Act. and anctions the application of this
new doctrine to a ca..:e in which. as the record an1ply demonstrates. the dil u tiou of ...... paro voting strength is not de 1ni-nintis
at all. but ·ub . :tantial. 'The plan approved today ensure·
that the _. . egro voters of ~Iis issippi will not yet obtain an
apportion1nent plan which nwets the require1nents of the .\ct,.

I dissent.

375

APPENDIX
REPORT ON THE MASTER' PLAN FOR
THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
One of the greatest technical proplams facing the
Reapportionment Committee has been the necessity of remain-

ing within the bounds of the "one man - one vote" rule of
the Supreme Court and still preserving the full integrety
of the county boundaries in this State.

In addition, when

the Committee directed its staff toward the use of precincts
- as opposed to enumeration districts - the problem of split
census divisions was added to the reapportionment process.
We have not yet found a solution to the reapportionment of
the House which will totally follow precinct lines, will
totally maintain counties, and yet stay within the bounds
of the "one man - one vote" rule.
It is clear, upon the completion of the analysis of the
Court Master's Plan, that the Master has not been able to
accomplish this feat also.

In his plan he has sacrificed

accuracy for the purpose of county int~grety.

His plan is

described as a hybrid of the State's, the Plaintiff's
(Connor}, and the Federal Government's
fact, appears to be the case.

plans.

This, in

However, there have been

serious statistical errors made by him in the merging of
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these three plans.
The Master appears to have accepted the Legislature's
proposed districts for the shaded areas shown on Map 1.
These districts, along with those of Hinds County were not
included in the analysis presented herein.

In addition,

the districts contained in Amite, Franklin, Lincoln, Pike
and Wilkinson Counties were also not included as the Committee is offering an alternate solution for these areas.
Although the Master offered the Legislative solution for
Warren County along with two others, an analysis of both
alternate solutions for the Warren County districts is
included.
This analysis was approached from the following viewpoint:

Although this plan is a "precinct" plan, the sta-

tistics describing the districts should be based upon the

1970 Census -- and no other data should be brought into
the analysis.

This includes later censuses or approxima-

tions based upon significantly later house counts.

Thus,

for purposes of statistical analysis, each district is
considered a combination of 1970 geographic units or portions thereof.

This district lines were superimposed upon

census maps and the MCD's and ED's were added together.
We consider this to be the most accurate and vilid method
for computing population data for all districts.
Due to time considerations, some of the district populations could not be computed.

In Leflore County the two

districts entirely within the county were considered as a
whole unit.

This was also the case for the two Rankin
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county districts, the Copiah, Lawrence, Jefferson county
Districts, and the four Lauderdale Districts (77-80).

In

the case of districts 5 and 6, the Committee did not have
a precinct map of Tippah County.

Due to this fact, no

check could be made for that split.

In reading this report,

therefore, one should not assume that these district are

evenly balanced.

In two of these cases, there is evidence

that the populations quoted cannot be correct.
In the case of the Lauderdale County Districts, our

analysis shows this area to be 1,856 persons under four
ideal districts {This is within 2.55% on the average).
Master shows a surplus of 172 persons.

The

This difference

could be spread out through all the districts, or it could

be in one or two districts.

In the latter case, this could

produce deviations in excess of 5% plus or minus.

These

districts should be checked before the populations assigned
by the Master should be relied upon.

In Rankin County we show the area which has been formed
into districts 73 and 74 to be 1,243 persons over the ideal
population for two districts.

If this overage is concentra-

ted in one district, that district would be in excess of 6%
over ideal population.

Again, a detailed check should be

made.
The Copiah-Lawrence Districts (87

&

86) appear to be

close to the ideal population for two districts.

If the

populations are close to those stated by the Master then
there will be no deviation problem.

In addition, the Benton
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-Marshall-Tippah-Alcorn-Prentiss districts (5
to contain the correct number of people.

&

6) appear

However, in this

case, they are sandwiched between two districts over 7% off

the ideal district population.
Map 3 shows the districts which are in excess of 3%
deviation from the ideal district size.

Although these

deviation "problems" appear to be contained in reasonably
small areas of the State, the ripple effect caused by an
attempt to bring them all under 4% (given just as an example)

plus or minus, would cause considerable ripple effects
throughout greater areas.
Map 4 shows the boundaries of "areas" in which the districts which are greatly off the ideal district size could
be corrected.

This analysis will precede through these

areas in commenting on the problem districts.
Area A contains DeSoto County.

District 1 which is

-6.78 could give a precinct with about 720 persons to district 2.
Area B contains Tunica, Panola and Quitman Counties.
A trade of 900 persons from District 17 to 16 would correct

this problem.
Area C contains Grenada, Leflore, Carroll, Holmes
Humphreys, Yazoo and Madison Counties.

This excess popula-

tion from the grenada County District (26) could be shifted
through Leflore County to the Carroll County District(40).
In addition, the Holmes County District could give up 1,800

persons to the Carroll County District.
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Area D containing Marshall, Benton, Tippah, Alcorn,
Prentiss and Tishomingo Counties contains two districts
which are problems.

District 4 should be made larger

and 5 and 6 can pick up population from Alcorn County.
Area E contains Lee, Itawamba, Chickasaw, Monroe
Clay and Lowndes Counties.

This area contains only 673

persons in excess of 10 ideal districts.

If the Monroe-

Lowndes district (32) were moved farther into Monroe and
the western Monroe District (30) were moved farther into
Lee then this problem could be corrected.
Area F contains a large group of counties from
1ontgornery to Perry.

There is a group of districts too

small up at the northern end of this area and a group of
districts too large at the bottom.

This could be corrected

by moving district 82 farther into Jones.

There could

then be three districts created within Forrest County, the
Perry-Greene District could be created, and a Wayne-Jones
district could be created.
Area G contains Oktibbeha, Noxubee, and Kemper Counties
with a portion of Lauderdale.

District 35 needs to

"take" 1,260 persons from the Kemper County District (52)
and give up an equal amount of persons to the Oktibbeha
County District (37).
Area H contains Rankin, Simpson, Jefferson Davis and
Covington counties.

The northern Simpson County District

must acquire about 1,080 persons from each of the Rankin
County Districts (73

&

74).
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Area J contains Washington, Sharkey, Issaquena and

warren Counties.

The Committee will present evidence that

the Master's solutions 2A and 2B contain districts which

have excessive deviations.
report)

(See last two pages of this

For this reason plan 2C should be accepted.

Area K contains Adams, Franklin, Amite, Lincoln and
Pike Counties.

The Committee is presenting an alternate

solution for this area.
In addition, the Committee is presenting an alternate
solution for the Smith-Jasper County Districts plus suggestions for Lamar, Forrest, Perry and Greene Counties.
The Table on the next page lists the districts in the
Master's Plan which exceed the ideal district population by
4% or more.

Outside of Warren County, 23 districts are

over or under four percent of ideal district population.

If Warren Plan 2A were to be accepted, this number would
rise by two to 25.

If warren 2B were to be accepted this

number would rise by three to 26.
Taking the populations of the Master's districts as
shown in this report, the total deviation of his plan would
be in excess of 20% from top to bottom.
These excessive deviations demonstrate the difficulty
in obtaining accurate population estimates when not following enumeration district boundaries.

It also clearly demon-

strates the difficulty encountered when not using accurate
maps and not calculating population data in terms of actual
census geographical units (even when following precinct

385

lines).
In addition to excessive population deviations, the

plan contains some non-contiguous districts.

Districts

32, 33, and 34 in Lowndes County are either overlapping

or non-contiguous.

In addition, a precinct in Lowndes

County is left out of the plan.

The solution 2B for

Warren County contains a non-contiguous district.

Here,

District 59 is divided by District 58.
District 16 in Panola County is listed by the Master
as being over 50% black.

This district is only 47% black.

The district contained in the Legislative Plan for Oktib-

beha, Lowndes and Noxubee Counties in East Mississippi
(Legislative Plan District 40) contains over 65% black
population.

It is replaced with district 52 in Noxubee,

which contains only 60% black in the Master's Plan.
In Hinds County the Master's report states that Alternate Plan 3A (Connor Plaintiff) is missing precincts.
Alternate Plan 3B (Justice) contains non-existent precincts and is missing precincts.

Alternate Plan 3C (Legis-

lature's) is correct and follows approximately the same
line as did the Court-ordered districts in 1975.

These

districts were put into effect when Hinds County was changed
from a multi-member district to 12 single-member districts.
The Legislative Plan should be accepted in Hinds County.

Respectfully submitted,
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CISTRICTS IN THE MASTER's PLAN FOUNO TO HAVE MORE

THAN FOUR PERCENT DEVIATION FROM IDEAL DISTRICT StZE.
Dfstrict

Number

Population

Percentage

of dfstrict

off ideal

32

14,289

- 21. 36

40

14,660

-19.32

7

20,384

+12.18

49

20,150

+10.89

59 ( 28)

20,114

+10.69

20,100

+10.61

60 (2A)

16,302

-10.29

58 (2A)

19,877

+9.39

26

19,787

+8.89

10 l

19,619

+7,97

106

16,735

-7.90

34

19.532

+7.49

33

16., 816

-7.46

4

16,830

-7.38

52

19,512

+7.38

37

16,872

-7.15

84

16,925

-6.86

l

16,939

-6.78

104 ·

19,292

+6.17

30

19,246

+5.92

17

19,093

+s .•01

16

17,290

-4.85

60 (28)

17,312

-4.73

29

18,992

+4.52

83

17,393

-4.28

2

18,946

+4.27

58 ( 28)

17,427

- 4. 09

11

18,898

+4.00

105
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SU~TION OF DATA - OISTS 58, 59, 60
Plan 28 for Warren County
District 58

Total Pop.

Sharkey & Issaquena Counties:

9,872

Warren County

District Total
Variation from ideal district size:
Percentage Black:

-744

Black Pop.

7,555

6,081
6,081

17,427

9,339

-4.09%

53.59%

Dis t ri ct 59 *
District Tota 1

·

Variation from ideal district size:
Percentage Black:

20, 114

+1,943

11,960

+10.69%

59.46%

District 60
District To ta 1

17,312

Variation from ideal district size:
Percentage ·slack:

*Note:

-859

3,137

-4.73%

18.12%

This district is divided from east to west by district 58.
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SU~T10N Of DATA - DISTS 58, 59, 60
Pl an 2A for Warren County ·

District 58

Total Popr

Warren County (North of Vicksburg)
Sharkey & Issaquena Counties
Cedar Grove Precinct (Warren)
District Total
Percentage Black

Black Pop.

8,735
9,872

3,437
6,081

1,270

58

19,877

9,576

48.17i

Variation from ideal district size:

+1706

+9.39%

District 59
North County (North of Vicksburg)
American Legion
Central Fire
St. A1oy.

Auditorium
ED 9900

District Total
Percentage 81 ack

1,394

777

6,347

3,416
2,390
5,167
22

3,198
2,679
972
3,835
0

18,736

11 , 461

61.24%

Variation rrom ideal district size:

+543

+2.991

District 60
District Total
Percentage Black

16,240
21.27%

Variation from ideal district size:

-1,931

-10.63%

3,399
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Action No. 78-1425
{Filed June 1, 19791
STATE OF MISSISfflPPI,

Plaintiff,

vs.

UNITED STAns OF AMERICA and GRIFFIN B. BELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, individually

and in his official capacity,

Defendant,.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This action was heard upon plaintiff's request for declaratory relief pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. It concerns the validity
of the Mississippi Legislature's statutory legislative reapportionment plan, Miss. Laws, 1978, Chs. 515 and 535,
H.B. 1491 and S.B. 3098, enacted in March, 1978. The
hearing took place September 18-27, 1978, at which a
record of more than 1500 pages of oral testimony was
compiled and more than 80 exhibits received in evidence.
The matter h~ been extensively briefed by all parties.
Based on this record of the evidence presented and on
the applicable law, we make the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT

I. Factual and Procedural Background:
1. In 1965, private plaintiffs filed a complaint entitled
Connor v. Johnson, in the Southern District of Mississippi

(hereinafter referred to as "the Connor Court") cha)..
lenging the constitutionality of Mississippi's 1962 Jegis}a...
tive reapportionment plan for the Mississippi Legislature. The 1962 plan, as we11 as successive legislative attempts to redistrict Mississippi's legislature for the 1967
and 1971 elections, were held unconstitutional by the
District Court. Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506
(S.D. Miss.), supplemented in 330 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.
Miss. 1971) ; Connor v. JohntJon, 265 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.
Miss. 1967) ; Connor v. Johnson, 266 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.
Miss. 1966). Consequently, court-ordered plans were implemented for the 1967 and 1971 elections.
2. In April, 1975, the Mississippi Legislature again
attempted a reapportionment plan. · The 1976 plan. although approved by the District Court, was declared ineffective by the Supreme Court until precleared pursuant
to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
11973c. Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975). The
Court's decision was without prejudice to a ruling by
the Connor Court ordering the 1975 plan into effect if no
other plan was formulated in time for the 1975 elections.

Id. at 656-57.
3. On June 9, 1975, Mississippi submitted its 1976
reapportionment plan to the Attorney General for section
6 preclearance, and on June 10, 1976, the Attorney General interposed an objection to the plan.
4. On June 25, 1976, the Comwr Court announced its
intention to formulate a "temporary plan for the election
of Senators and Representatives for the 1976 elections."
Connor v. lValler, Civ. No. 3830 (S.D. Miss. June 25,
1976). Then, by orders of July 8 and July 11, 1075, the
Connor Court ordered into effect an apportionment plan
for the 1976 quadrennial election (hereinafter referred
to as the .. 1975 court-ordered plan"). The 1975 quadrennial election in the Mississippi House and Senate, held in

accordance with the 1975 plan, resulted in the election
of the current Mississippi Legislature.
6. On November 18, 1976, the Connor Court f ormulnted an apportionment plan to take effect for the 1979
quadrennial election. Connor v. Finch, 419 F. Supp. 1072,
1089 (S.D. Miss.), supplenum,ted in 422 F. Supp. 1014
(S.D. Miss. 1976) (hereinafter referred lo as the "1976
court-ordered plan").
6. On May 31, 1977, the Supreme Court he1d that the
· 1976 court-ordered plan was unconstitutional on malapportionment grounds and returned the matter to the District Court with instructions to draft a new plan for the
1979 elections. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 ( 1977).
The Court cautione,I the District Court on remand to
draw legislative districts that were reasonably contiguous
and compact or to explain precisely why, in a particular
instance, that goal could not be accomplished. Id. at
425-26.
7. On August 2, 1977, the Conn-0r Court directed the
parties and invited the Mississippi legislature to file proposed plans for its con ideration.
8. On August 9, 1977, the Governor of Mi .. sissippi
calJed a special session of the legislature to consider the
e tabJishment of a joint legislative committee for the
f ormulalion of a legislative reapportionment plan.
9. At lhe August sp cial session of the legisJ.ature, a
Special Joint Committee on Reapportionment (hereinafter referred to as "the Joint Committee") was er ated
and Stale Repre entative Thomas Campb 11 was elected
its chairman. The Joint Committee retained as its SJlCcial coun el, Mr. Jerris Leonard of Washington, D.C.,
former As i tant Attorney General of the Unite<l Stat s
for Civil Rights.
IO. For the purpo e of formulating the propo ed plan,
the Joint Committee interviewed experts on apportion-

ment recommended by the Attorney General of Mississippi, Jerris Leonard, and Marshall Turner, Assistant
Chief of the Demographic Census Staff of the United
States Bureau of the Census. Of those interviewed, the
Joint Committee selected Mr. Thomas HofeJler of California, D1·. Delbert Dunn of Georgia, Mr. Calvin Webb
of New York, and Dr. Richard Morrill of the State
of Washington. Each of those selected had prior experience in the formulation of reapportionment plans.
11. In addition to those experts selected from outside
the state, the Joint Committee hired Earl Fortenberry,
formerly the Director of the Legislative Services Office
of the State Senate, as Director of lhe Joint Committee's
staff. Mr. Fortenberry had previously participated in the
development of reapportionment plans for the Mississippi
Senate. Fortenberry in turn hired as staff five people,
including two blacks who were graduate students at
Jackson State University, to assist with the efforts of
the Joint Committee staff.
12. In formulating the plan, Joint Committee experts
and staff were instructed by Special Counsel Jerris Leonard to minimize population deviations among districts,
to avoid diluting black voting strength, to create one
complete di~trict in counties whose populations were
large enough for the election of a representative or
senator, to avoid splitting a county into more than two
segments unless two or more districts could be derived
from the same county, and to create compact and contiguous districts.
13. To avoid dilution of black voting strength, staff
experts looked at the general demographic makeup of the
stale and noted that, as a general rule, black concentrations of population existed in western portions of the
state. 'l'hey further noted that, with certain exceptions,
counties in the eastern portion of the state contained
eignificanlly fewer blacks. The experts tried lo avoid

the combining of counties in the western portion of the
state, which contained heavy black population cone ntrations, with counties from the eastern portion of the
state containing heavy white population concentrations.
This goal was accomr,lished by running the district lines
from north to south rather than from east to we t.
14. A voiding dual incumbencies was another goal
which the Joint Committee attempted to achieve so long
as it could be accomplished while observing the criteria
given to the Committee staff for devising the plan.
Hofeller and Fortenberry first prepared the plan without
regard to incumbency. When requests for changes emanating from a dual incumbency situation arose, solutions
were checked to assure that they did not adversely impact established criteria, especially those concerning the
maintenance of de 1ninimus deviation and avoidance of
dilution of black voting strength. As a result of changes
made in the plan to avoid dual incumbency, 46 senators
and 106 representatives were preserved in their respective districts while 6 senators in three districts and 16
representatives in eight districts were pitted against
other incumbents for reelection.

16. The Joint Committee developed a computer data
base for the plan derived from 1970 census data acquired
from the Bureau of the Censu . The Joint Committee
chose 1970 census data because it provirled neutral data
considered to be as accurate as possible, available for the
entire state, collected by similar methodology throughout
the stale, available for geographic areas within counties
as well as for whole counties in the state, and easily
replicated and verified for any given district or area.
16. The J ofot Committee initia11y based its plan u1 on
Census Enumeration District Lines (ED's) rath r than
precinct lines. After clcvelopin, the ED plans for the
House and Senate, the Joint Committee submitted the
plans to the Connor Court. Both the Legislature and the
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Court expressed a preference for a plan using precinct
lines as a means of avoiding voter confusion and of eliminating the need for reregistration of volers.
17. Because of the preference expressed for precinct
lines the Joint Committee staff was directed to convert
the
Jllan to a precinct p]an by moving the boundaries
of districts based on EDs to the nearest precinct line.

ED

18. In order to convert the plans to precinct plans the
Joint Committee found it necessary to obtain duta on the
EDs when split by precinct lines. The Joint Committee staff
would draw the Hsplit" of an ED on a Census Bureau
map of the I•,D and forward the map to the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau would return population figures for both sides of the line splitting the ED. The
Census Bureau, howevet·, could not provide the exact
racial composition of the split. This was determined by
a computerized proportional a11ocali.on of blac~ an_d w~ite
population within the ED to each side of the spht0 lme.
19. The resulting shift from the ED-based plan to a
precinct-based plan was primarily ~ matter of .refinement. It is not disputed that the basic configurations of
the districts contained in the original ED plan and those .
of the resulting precinct plan are Urns essentially the
same.
20. The process used in developing the Joint Committee•s plan was open to public participation and input.
On October 11, 1977, the Joint Committee con~uct_ed
public hearings on those plans presented to the D1str_act
Court in Connor, and. on November 28, 1977, the ,Jomt
Committee conducted hearings on its statutory ED plan.
No hearings were conducted on the precinct plan subsequently drawn from the ED plan. The hearings of October and November, 1977, were well publicized in advance and opportunity was afforded to all interested
parties to submit their suggestions and objections.

21. The Joint Committee was responsive to · those suggestions ultimately submitted. Suggestions were incorporated into the plan whenever the resulting redistricting
was feasible in view of other criteria governing the formulation of the plans.
22. After months of co11sultation, the House plan as
drafted by Hofell er and the Senate plan as drafted by
Fortenberry were adopted by the Joint Committee and
were introduced on the floor of the legislature. These two
plans, submitted as H.B. 1491 and S.B. 3098 (hereinafter referred to as the "statutory plan") were adopted
without floor amendment.
23. On April 21, 1978, the Governor of Mississippi
approved and signed into Jaw the two bi11s, S.B. 3098
and H.D. 1491, (Mississippi Laws, 1978, Chapters 636
and 515).
24. In June, 1978, the District Court in Connor di-rected the parties to confer for the purposes of arriving
at a settlement of the Cowtwr v. Finch litigation pending
in the Southern District of Mississippi~ The Joint Committee participated in these negotiations. In response to
the objections to the statutory plan by the Connor plaintiffs, the boundaries of a number of districts in the plan
were altered by the staff of the Joint Committee and a
settlement proposa) was submitted to the Joint Commit..
tee. The Joint Committee then informally poJJed the
members of the Mississippi Legislature ( the Legislature
not being in session) to determine whether this settlement proposal was acceptable. In August, 1978, a majority of both houses of the Mississippi Legislature by a vote
of 80 to 18 in the House and 26 to 7 in the Senate voted
in favor of accepting the Connor seLtlement 1,lan as an
alternative to the statutory plan. After this poll, the
Joint Committee accepted the settlement plan and recommended to the defendants in Connor that they enter into
a consent decree incorporating this settlement proposal.

26. On June 1, 1978, the Attorney General for the
State of Mississippi, submitted the statutory plan to the
Attorney General of the United Stales for federal preclearance pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1966, 42 U.S.C. 11973c. By letter of July 31, 1978, the
Attor.ney General, by his designated agent Drew S. Days,
III, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Civil Rights Division, rendered a timely objection pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act stating that
4
' we have
been unable to conclude that the submitted
plans for the Mississippi Senate and House of Representatives do not have the purpose or etfect of abridging
the right to vote because of race or color." Letter from
Drew S. Days, III, to Mississippi Attorney General A. F.
Summer, July 31, 1978.
26. On August 1, 1978, Mississippi's Attorney General
received, by telephone, notification of the Attorney General's objection. The same day, the State of Mississippi
filed this action against the United States and Attorney
General Griffin B. Hell seeking a declaratory judgment
pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
27. On August 31, 1978, ten black citizens and registered voters of the· State of Mississippi filed a motion to
intervene as defendants and attached to their motion
their proposed answer denying the material allegations
of the com1>laint, denying that plaintiff was entitled to
the relief requested, and alleging as an affirmative defense that the statutory plans "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to
their etfective exercise of the franchise" in violation of
their rights secured by section 6 of the Voting Rights
Act, and further that the statutory reapportionment ·
plan dilutes, minimizes, and cancels out black voting
strength in violation of intervenors' rights secured by
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. On September 18, the

Court granted intervenors' motion for leave to intervene
and to file their answer in intervention ( order of September 18, 1978). As stated previously, this matter was
subsequently heard during the weeks of September 18
through September 27. Alter proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law with accompanying briefs had
been submitted, oral argument was conducted on J anuary 16, 1979.

28. On March 26, 1979, the Supreme Court, upon a
motion to seek a writ of mandamus, instructed the Connor court to issue a reapportionment plan forthwith, in
accordance with its previous mandate in Conn.or v. F-inch,
431 U.s. 407 ( 1977).
29. On April 13, 1979, the Southern District of Mississippi issued a final judgment in Connor v. Finch and
adopted a slightly modified version of the settlement plan
previously submitted to the court by the parties. It is
undisputed that the resulting court-ordered plan is not
substantia11y different from the settlement plan from
which it was drawn.'
II. Present Voting Conditions in Mississippi:
30. Pursuant to its Constitution, Mississippi has
maintained a bicameral legislature made up of a Senate
and a House of Representatives. Members of each bran h
are e1ected quadrennially. The Constitution of Mississippi requires that the Senate consist of no le e than 45
1 The court-ordered plan of April 13, 197n, while not in existence
at the time this Court heard thie case, is a mnlt.cr of judicial notice.
Throughout th •se Findings of Fact and Con fusions, Jt is treat :d
as substantially identical to the 11ettlement plan and has hcen so
conceded by 11II paries. Defendant United St.ates' Jett •r lo the
Court of April 17, 1979 ("Substantially the me as the Aetll mcnt
plan"); Defcndant-intervenors supplemental memor111u.Jum of April
27, 1979 ("The court-ordered plan of April 13, 1979 orders the
settlement plan into effect 'with three minor changes' whi h do not.
affect 'any of the majority black districts in the adU mcnt plan.'").

but not more than 65 members. Similarly, the Mississippi Constitution requires that the House consist of no
more than 122 members. The Senate currently consists
of 62 members and the House consists of 122.
31. Any registered voter in Mississippi can have his
or her name placed upon the ballot as an i nclcpendent
candidate in th~ general election for the Mississippi legislature by presenting a petition to the appropriate body
designated in the statute signed by 60 registered voters
60 days before the quadrennial general election. Miss.
Cocle Ann. § 3260 ( 1972). To be elecle 1, a candidate
thus nominated needs only a p1urality in a general
election, Miss. Code Ann. § 3279 (1972 & Supp. 1978)
aa amc1uled by H.B. 44 ( Chapter 429, Mississippi Laws
1978). A candidate for party nomination, on the other
hand, must win a majority of the votes cast in order
to win the nomination of his party. Miss. Code Ann.
I 23-3-69 ( 1972) .
· 32. According to the 1970 census, blacks in Missis ipJli
comprise 36.8 percent of the total population of the state
and 31.6 percent of the state's voling age population
(hereinafter referred to as "V AP").
33. Mississippi has in the past used such devices as
the literacy test, the poll tax and the white primary to
exclude its black citizens from participation in the electoral proce s. Indeed, until pa sage of tbe Voting Rights
Act in 1966, use of racia1ly di criminatory tests and devices effectively excluded black people in Mis issippi from
exercise of the franchL e. Stewart v. Waller, 404 F.
Supp. 206 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (three-judge court) (per
curiam) ; United States v. Stctte of Missis. i7>pi, 229 Jf~.
Supp. 926, 983, 987 (S.D. Mi s. 1964), rev'd and rernanded, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
34. The effect of Mississipt i's past history of racial
discrimination in voting and other areas continues to

affect black people in many portions of the state today,
which has resulted in a generally lower participation by
blacks than whites in the political process. Consequently,
proportional1y fewer blacks are registered to vote than
whites, and black voters turn out at the polls at a lower
rate than white voters.
35. Analysis of past election returns show that racial
block voting has prevailed throughout the State of Mississippi. Those participating in the electoral process suggest that racial bloc voling continues to occur throughout
the state today.
36. Low black voter registration and voter turn-out
combined with racial bloc voting make it necessary for
an electoral district in Mississippi to contain a substantial majority of black eligible voters in order to provide
black voters with an opportunity to elect. a candidate of
their choice. It has been genera11y conceded that, barring
exceptional circumstances such as two white cancHdates
splitting the vote, a district should contain a black population of at least 05 percent or a black V AP of at least
60 percent to provide black voters with an opportunity to
elect a candidate of lheir choice.
37. Recent legislative reapportionments in Mississippi
have failed to meet constitutional requirements and have
been marked by the racially discriminatory use of multimember districts. Conn-0-1· v. Willianis, 404 U.S. 649
(1972) ; Connor v. John on, 402 U.S. 690 (1H71). Such
uses of multi-member districts have, in the past, tended
to submerge black population concentrations in heavily
white concentrations.
38. The present legislature in Mississippi was elected
pursuant to a 1975 temporary court-ordered plan containing multi-member districts.
39. Only four out of 122 house seats in the Mis issippi
legislature today are occupied by blacks. None of the 52
senate seats is occupied by blacks.
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III. Nature of the Statutory Pla11,:
40. Viewing the state as a whole, and comparing the
statutory plan with the demographic distribution of population among Mississippi's 82 counties, the evidence
demonstrates that the plan, in overall statistical effect,
reflects the geographic distribution of black population

within the state.
41. The maximum deviation of S.B. 3098 is 11.39 percent. The maximum deviation of H.B. 1491 is 10.8 pe1·cent. These are consistent with the broader tolerances
allowed legislatures, but not courts, in fashioning apportionment plans. 2
42. Mississippi's counties are unequal in population.
While 30.5 percent of Mississippi's counties have a majority of black population, on1y 25.2 percent of the state's
population live in those counties. 30.8 percent of the
senate districts in S.B. 3098 have black majority populations. This percentage closely corresponds to the number
of counties that have a majority black population.

43. 24.6 percent of the house districts have a majority
black population. The percentage of black majority districts in H.B. 1491 is lower than the percentage of black
majority districts in S.B. 3098 ( 30.8 % ) and the corresponding percentage of black majority counties (30.6%).
Senate districts and counties, however, are larger geographically than the 122 house districts. The smaller
house districts in H.B. 1491 contain greater densities of

black population than do the larger geographic units.
Black majority house districts in H.B. 1491 average G6.4
percent in black population while the corresponding figure
for counties is 60.77 percent and for senate districts
in S.B. 3098 is 69.3 percent.
44. The statutory plan enhances potential black voting
strength when compared to the 1975 court-ordered plan.
The statutory plan contains two more black VAP majority districts in the senate ( 10) and fc;m r more black
VAP majority districts in the house (26) than the 1976
court-ordered plan. It also contains two districts in the
senate with a black V AP of 60 percent or more and ten
more districts in the house (14) with a black VAP of
60 percent or more. Furthermore, the statutory plan
contains single-member districts only.
45. A slatistical comparison of the 1975 court-ordered
plan with the statutory plan demonstrates the following
with regard to black voting age populatiu (YAP) :
1975 Plan H.B. 1491 1976 Plan S.B. 3098
(No. of
Dist.s

(No. of
Dist.s

(No. of
Dis ts

(No. of
Dis ts

House)

House)

Senate)

Senate)

40-100%
46-100%
50-100%

40

S8

80
22

30

14
12
8

16
14
10

56-100%
60-100%

11

20
14

-7

0

7
2

0

0

8
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0

%
Range

---65-100%

-

4
8
8
2
1

26

-1

2 Compal'iHon of total deviations from population equality of the
statutory plan with the setUement plan.
)louse
Senate

70-100%
75-100%
80-100%
86-100%

State's Statutory Plan
11.30%
10.08%
Connor Settlement Plan
11.39%
9.94%
Tolal deviation, as used herein, ie the total epan of vuiances calculat d by adding the largest plue vRl'iancc and the largest minu&
variance.

46. The following table contains statistical comparison of the statutory plan with the sctt1emcnt plan
adopted by the Co11,nor Court on April 13, 1979, broken
down to show the number of bJack majority districts and

0

0
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black VAP majority districts for both the Senate and
the House:
Slate's Statutory
Connor
Plan (Exs. P-4A
Settlement Plan
Black Pop.
Majority Districts
BlackVAP
Majority Districts

(Ex. P-36)

4B)

49

46

66% +
60%-66%

56%-60%
60%-65%
Black VAP
Majority Districts
66% +
60% -65%
55%-60%
60%-66%
SENATE
Black Pop.
Majority Districts
66% +

39

36

S4
18

80

6
6

6

6

+

60%-65%

66%-60%
50%-66%

VAP

POP.

VAP

16
6
4

Aaron Henry
Henry Kirksey
Bennie Thompson
Barney Schoby
David Jordan
Fr d Banks

eame
same

Coahoma

same

same

Bame

Hinds
Hinds

66.44
42.01

62.93
36.41

same

Arlnms

same
same

same
8ame
62.93

Leflore
Hinds

66.44

46.30
63.23
42.80
same

39.21
60.63
37.72
same

SETTLEMENT PLAN

28
9
6

26
7
7

-7

-6

6

6

Aaron Henry
Henry Kirksey
H nnie Thompson
Barney Schoby
David Jordan
Fred Banka

Coahoma

Hinds
Hinds
Adams

Leflore
Hinds

same
72.33
49.71
anme
same

72.33

same

same
same

same
same
66.79
69.40
76.77

same

same
same
69.02
66.45
71.72
snme

1. HOUSE PLAN
15

16

3
4
6
3

4

Black VAP
65%

HOUSE

POP.
- - - - - -COUNTY
---------------

60o/o-66%

-

SENATE
NAME

66%-60%
60%-55%

Majorily Districts

47. Defendant and defendant-intervenors object, in
particular, to the redistricting in the statutory plan of
the following counties: •
STATUTORY PLAN

HOUSE
Black Pop.
Majority Diebicts

IV. Defendant and Defendant-Intervenors, Objectiona to
the Statotury Plan,:

8
6

•

11

10

1

0

-

0
6
4

2

--

6
3

(a) Wan·en County

The defendants and intervenors complain that, in the
statutory plan's redistricting of Warren County, a h avy
black population concentration is divided among three
propo ed house districts, turning a black majority into a
'W note that A vcrnl of the d fcndant-intervcnore find themselves in di lricts more h nvily black under the Connor Rettl •mt•nt
Plan than und r the statutory pln11e. Thia fact., in addition lo
d •f ndont-intcrv non,' pr •fercnce for r apf)orlionm ut by Court dt~
ere rath r then r apportionm nt by lhe legislature, mny larg ly
provid the explanation for th(•ir intervention in lhis Htigalion.
(S e testimony of Aaron Henry, Tr. pp. 801 -02).
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black minority in all three districts. This expression of
concern regarding the statutory configuration of Warren
County was first reflected in the record during the January 10, 1978 deposition of Hofel1er. This configuralion
was in draft form at the time of the public hearings and
no objection had been raised. By that time, however,
expert Hofeller's discretion was limited to simply converting the ED plan into a precinct plan. The opportunity to make basic chang·es to the configuration of
districts was no longer open. The settlement plan, which
addresses the problem, is thus only a ma1·ginal improvement insofar as blacks are concerned, a ditfercnce which
would not translate into a difference in black reJ)resentation. The Warren County districts in the settlement plan
also remain below the 60 % black V AP requisite for districts in which blacks are able to elect a candidate of
their choice.
(b) Hinds

County

The defendants and intervenors complain that the
black population concentration in western Hinds County
is fragmented, and the resulting three portions of that
concentration a1·e paired with greater white population
concentrations in Clinton and the Jackson suburbs. In
the settlement plan, the boundaries of the three districts
that trisect rural Hinds County do not fracture the black
concentration in the western portion of the county. As
a result, the settlement plan provides a district in rural
Hinds County with a 69 percent black VAP. Representative Buckley, a black member of the Joint Committee
from Hinds County and the other three black house
members from Hinrls County, apparently never raised
the question of a majority black rural district prior to
the legislature's action. The present objections to the
redistricting of Hinds County were not brought to the
Committee's attention until December, 1977. The Joint
Committee original1y intended to follow existing districts

in the 1975 plan, which had been approved by the federal court, and to increase the number of black V AP
districts from 3 to 6. Representative Buckley objected
that such a plan would spread the black population too
thinly. In response to Buckley's objection, the plan was
changed by reducing the num~er of b1ack majority seats
to four. The enhancement now sought by the def end ants
and inlervenors is of debatable benefit and de1 arts from
the traditional plan approved by the federal court, which
drew lines from east to west rather than north to south.
In addition, in order to create the black V AP in rural
Hinds County, the settlement plan necessarily dilutes adjacent districts.
(c)

Ada-nu, County

Defendants and intervenors object to the statutory
plan,s redistricting of Adams County because the only
majority black supervisor's district is split between two
districts. 'fhe black voting strength in north Adams is
allegedly diluted by excluding the majority black airport
precinct from the north Adams district and by pairing
north Adams and north Natchez with heavily white precincts. In the settlement plan, the two legislative districts that bisect Adams County leave the only black
supervisor's district intact and entirely within the same
legislative district, i.e., district 95.
In a memorandum to the Legislative Committee on
Reapportionment written by an associate of defcndantintervenors' counsel on behalf of Representative Buckley
(hereinafter referred to as the "Barber Memorandum") ,4
Buckley requested a slight shift in the configuration of
district 95. In response to Buckley's request, the Committee increased the black VAP in that district, but did
• The vast majority of the augg tione contained in the Dnrber
MemorandunL wae incorporated in the alatulo1-y plan. Sec plaintiff's re1,ly brief, pp. 43-46 for detail.
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not realize that intervenors would not be satisfied unless
the Morgantown precinct were eliminated. The resulting
increase of five percent in the black VAP of Adams
County by excluding the Morgantown pl'ecinct, however,
would be at the expense of diluting neighborhood
districts.
( d) Lefl ore County

Defendants and intervenors complain that the statutory
plan fragments the southeast Greenwood black concentration. The greatest poi·tion of that black community
is paired with heavily white north Greenwood and a
white majority district. The remaining black community
is put in a predominantly rural dif;tricl, which, although
majority black, does not have a high enough black V AP
to enable blacks to elect candidates of their choice. 'f he
settlement plan keeps the black population concentration
in south Greenwood intact ( except for one heavily black
ED) and entirely within one legislative district. The
districts proposed in the settlement plan, however, are
less compact to a considerable degree than lhe di .. tricts
in the statutory plan and would also divide the city of
Greenwood to a greater extent. The settlement I Ian increa es the black V AP percentage from 64.26 percent to
71.22 percent, while it diminishes the influence of the
blacks 1·esiding in the adjacent district.
(e) Marshall County

Defendants and inte1·venors object that the statutoa·y
plan for Marshall County splits the only sup rvi . . ors' district which has ele ted a black supervisor in that county
and that the voting strength of the black voters in the
county's house district is diluted and minimized by the
inclusion of the heavily white Holly Springs precinct No.
6. In the ettlement plan, the black supervisors' district
i pla ed almost entirely within district 6 with the result
that blacks comprise 62 percent of the V AP. Prior to
1

voicing these objections, however, the intervenors had
indicated to the Committee a preference for keeping the
city of Holly Springs intact. The configuration now pref erred by the intervenors would split the city of Holly
Springs. The sole difference between the plans lies in the
allocation of one precinct. 'l'he result sought by the intervenors would create a district with a black V AP G percentage points higher. This gain is at the expense of
creating an irregular ehaped district that splits the only
major city in the district.
( f) Desoto County

Defendants and intervenors contend that the statutory
plan avoids the creation of a black 1,opulation majorJty
district in Desoto County by dividing the county by a
north/south boundary. The plan splits np the rural
predominantly black portion of the county and includes
in each district portions of the heavily white Memphis
suburban area in north Desoto County. In the settlement
plan, the black population concentration in rural Desoto
is left intact. As a result, a majority b)ack population
district is created. The settlement p]an, however, increases the black voting age population in the district it
seelcs to change by only 1.8 percent and fails to create
a 60 percent black V AP majority. The record does not
reflect when, if ever, this particular change was caUed
to the attention of the legislature. lntervenors' initial
plan, which they submitted to the Cminor Com·t, is identical in its configuration of Desoto County as the statutory plan.

2. SENATE PLAN
(a)

Hinds County

Defendants and int rvenors contend that the statutory
plan form a 0 seahor e district" in ils Hinds County Senate plan thal pairs a 1>ortion of the central black popula-
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tion with the heavily white south Jackson area. They
contend that alternative plans proposed to the Connor
Court are more compact and form black populations of
over 60 percent in districts 25 and 26. There is no
evidence that this change was ever called to the attention of Lhe Committee prior to the enactment of the
statutory plan. In any event, the change sought merely
increases the black population in an already 60 percent
black majority V AP district, a change of dubious benefit
to black representation.
(b) Holmes, Madison and Hump/treys Counties

Defendant and intervenors complain that out-migration of blacks in recent years from the Holmes, Madison
and Humphreys County has resulted in decreasing the
actual VAP percentage in the statutory plan's redistricting of the area to Jess than 60 percent. The settlement
plan combines Holmes and Humhpreys counties and the
northern portion of Yazoo County. Defendants and intervenors contend that this configuration is more compact
and would provide black voters with a better chance to
elect a candidate of their choice. The record does not
reflect any evidence that the requested combination of
these counties in a single district was called to the attention of the Committee staff at any time prior to the
passage, of the statutory plans. In any event, the settlement plan would split Madison County across the middle
and would dilute the vote in Yazoo County and in north
Madison. The change would result in a net de rease of
one 60 percent black V AP majority district.
(c)

Washington, Sharkey and Issaquena
Cottntiea

Defendants and intervenors contend that the statutory •
plan splits the heavy black concentration in north Greenville and north Washington County between two long,
narrow districts, which stretch south for more than 60

miles. The resulting district 22 is majority white, and
district 23, although majority black, is alleged to be so
diluted that black voters are denied representation of
their choice. The settlement plan creates a district that
preserves much of the black population in urban Greenville intact within one district. Defendants and intervenors argue that although the settlement plan's district
is only about 2 percentage points greatet'" in black majority VAP, it provides voters with a much better opportunity to elect a candidate because it comprises an urban
area where blacks are generally better organized and
more politically aware. Intervenor's expert testified that
any district di-awn in this area would look suspicious
because of the small population in the rural areas. The
drafters of the statutory plans attempted to draw a
more compact plan than the predecessor 1976 plan. The
resulting change increases the black VAP in one district
by 1.42 percent. We find that the changes in the settlement plan are not significantly different from those
created by the statutory plan or ameliorative of the problem of formulating compact districts in the area.
(d) Claiborne, Jefferson atul Copial,, Countie,

Defendants and intervenors object to the statutory
plan's pairing of Jefferson and Claiborne counties with
majority white Franklin County and the western half
of Copiah County. Alternative plans submitted to the
Connor Court excluded Franklin County or portions of
Copiah. The Connor plaintiff's plan combined Jefferson
and Claiborne with Copiah to form a district with a 66
percent black V AP. Under the statutory plan, however,
the Jefferson and Claiborne County districts have a 76.77
percent black population. The intervenors conceded in
their Barber Memorandum to the .Joint Committee that
the Claiborne/Jeffer·son area could not be hurt by either
plan because of its high black voting age population.
~
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48. The evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff's
agents in formulating the statutory plan did not act with
the intent or purpose of denying or abridging the right
to vote of any citizen of Mississippi on account of race.
Rather, the individuals involved in drafting and enacting
the statutory plans acted with the purpose of creating
black VAP majority districts.

49. The evidence demonstrates that differences in
black voting strength provided in the statutory plan and
in the Connor settlement plan are insubstantial. The
statutory plan covering both the Senate and the House
contains three (3) less black majority voting districts.•
Since there are 174 districts in the Mississippi legislature
this is an overall difference of 1.7 percent (1.7%). For
the Senate, the statutory plan contains one ( 1) more
black majority district than the Con11-0r settlement plan.
More important, both plans provide the saine number
(16) of black, VAP majority districts with a population
of 60 percent or more ( see Finding 36 for the signifi. cance of this fact and Table in Finrling 46 for critical
figures). When compared to the settlement plan adopted
by the Connor Court on April 13, 1979, the legislative
plan is not retrogressive in overall black voting strength
and does not have the effect of abrirlging or denying
the right to vote of any citizen of Mississippi on account
of race.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine
this case. Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (1974 & Supp. V 1975); 28 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2)
( 1976) ; 29 u.s.c. § 2001 ( 1976).
• In these three districts, the black majority is less lhnn 60 percent V AP. As "influence dintricb," they, standing alone, do not
rcpr sent a eignificant difference, according to the AsaiRlant Attorney G •n ral of the United State for Civil Right , Buch aA to
sugg st an im11roper purpose under Brction 6 ( Day's dcpo. Pltff's Ex.
26, Tr. pp. 112-116).

2. This Court has been properly convened as a court
of three judges. Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (1974 & Supp. V 1976) (hereinafter "section 6") ; 28 U.S.C. § 2284 ( 1976).

3. All the requirements for a Rule 23(a) and
23 (b) (2) defendants class action on behalf of the intervenors are met. The defendant class is defined as all
black citizens and black registered voters in Mississippi
qualified to vote in state legislative elections. Fed.R.
Civ.P. 23 ( a) & 23 (b) (2).

4. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
et seq. (1974), was enacted to insure the protection of
rights guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment and "to
rid the country of racial discrimination in voting." South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 ( 1966).
6. Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act was intended
to insure that the gains thus far achieved in minority
political participation would not be emasculated or destroyed through new discriminatory procedures and techniques. S. Rep. No. 94-295, at 19.
6. The State of Mississippi is a state subject to the
preclearance 1·equirements of section 6. 30 Ji'""ed. Reg. 9897
(August 7, 1965).
7. Under section 5, Mississippi may not enforce or
implement any change in "any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure
with respect to voting" unless such change has either
been approved by the Attorney General, or unless Mississippi obtains a declaratory judgment in the United
Stat.es District Court for the District of Columbia that
such change "does not have the purpm~e and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1974 &
Supp. V. 1976).

8. The reapportionment plan adopted by the Mississippi Legislature in 1978 regular session, approved by
the Governor on April 12, 1978, and the changes resulting therefrom are within the scope of Section 6 of the
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1974 & Supp. V.
1976) ; Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 581-35
(1973); Beer v. United States, 426 U.S. 130, 138 (1966).

9. In an action for declaratory judgment under section 6, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Georgia
v. United S'4tes, 411 U.S. 626, 638 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).

10. Plantiff's burden in a suit for declaratory re1ief
under section 6 is to demonstrate that the reapportionment plan described in S.D. 3098 and H.B. 1491
do not lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities, or that the proposed change (airly reflects
the strength of black voting power as it exists. Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130, 139 n. 11, 141 (1976);
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 368, 362 (1976).
11. Mississippi, in meeting its burden of proof, must
demonstrate that a racially discriminatory purpose was
not among the factors thnt motivated it in devising its
reapportionment plan. Richmond v. United State&, 422
U.S. 358, 362 (1976).
12. A discriminatory pur11ose need not be express, but
may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
13. Black voting strength is impermissihly diluted
when, d signedly or otherwise, an apportionment scheme
under the circumstances of a particular case would. operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
racial elements of the voting population. Bunu, v. Richarclson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Fortso11, V. Do1·sey, 379
U.S. 433, 439 (1965).

14. In a single-member districting plan, black voting
strength may be unconstitutionally and impermissibly
diluted, minimized, and cancelled out ( 1) when heavy
black population concentration are unnecessarily fragmented and dispersed, and (2) when black population
concentrations to deny black voters the opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice. Con.nor v. Fin,ell, 431

U.S. 407, 421-25 ( 1977) ; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisor& of Hinds County, Mississippi, 654 F.2d 139, 149
(5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977);
Robinson v. Cmnmissioner8 Court, Anderso-n County,

Texas, 606 F.2d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 1974); Moore v.
Leflore Co·u,n ty Board of Election Commissioners, 602
F.2d 621, 622-24 (5th Cir. 1974); Sims v. Baggett, 247
F. Supp. 96, 109 ( M.D. AJa. 1965) ( three-judge court).
16. No state or political subdivision is required to
search for ways to maximize the number of black voting
age population districts. Likewise, no racial group has a
constitutional or statutory right to an ap1Jortionment
structure designed to maximize its political strength.
Riclmunul v. United StateB, 422 U.S. 368, 370-72 ( 1976) ;
Gilbert v. Sten·ett, 509 F. 2d 1389, 1394 ( 5th Cir. 1976) ;
C01UJins v. City Council of the City of Chicago, 603 F.2d
912, 920 (7th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Mcl(ei.then, 490 F.
2d 191, 197 (6th Cir. 1973); 1/owa.rd v. Ada:m.s C01int11
Board of Supervisors, 463 F.2d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 1972).

16. A legislative reaJlportionment plan that enhances
the position of racial minorities with re pect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise cannot have
••the effect" of diluting or ahrirlging the right to vote
on account of race within the meaning of section 5 unlens
the new apportionment itself so discriminates as to
violate the Constitution. Beer v. United States, 426 U.S.
130, 141 (1976).

17. Although reapportionment plans, which are formulated with less concern for statistical accuracy and

the one-person-one-vote concept, may provide a greater
numbe1· of black majority districts, depa1·ture from equal
p1~otection one-person-one-vote strictures cannot be required or justified simply as an afflrmaU ve act to maximize black voting st.-ength. See Regents v. Bakke, 98 S.
Ct. 2733, 2761 ( 1978) ; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
328-30 (1973); White v. H'eiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790-93
(1973).
18. Beer commands comparison with a preexisting
plan to determine "whether the ability of minority
groups to participate in the political process and to elect.
their choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not
affected by the change affecting voting . . ." Beer v.
United States, 426 U.S. 130, 141 ( 1976).
19. The settlement plan, adopted by the Connor Court
on April 18, 1979, must now be considered the preexisting plan and the benchmark with which to compare the
statutory plan.•
20. When compared with the Connor Settlement Plan.
and taking into account the totality of criteria governing
the formulation of the statutory plan and its alternatives, we conclude that the slight differences are not of
euch significance to find that the statutory plan is retrogressive with respect to black voting strength in Mississi1>pi as it exists today. The proof in this case demonstrates that H.B. 1491 and S.B. 3008 would not lead
to a retrogression in the current position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
• When compared with the 1975 plnn. s.n. 3098 and 11.Il. 1491
constitute a clear enhancement of the position of racinl minoriliea
with respect to their effrctive exercise of the electoral frnnchise
because S.B. 3098 and H.B. 1491 have a grcalcr number of Llack
votinw age majority district than did the 1975 plan ond they provide higher percent.ages of black voting Rtr •ngth in those district.a
than did the 1976 plan. Moreover, the statutory plan is the first
plan to utilize single-mcmLer districtR only and avoids the diluting
cff~t of multi-member districts.

electoral franchise and therefore do not have the "effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color." This conclusion to disregard insigni fieant differences is further supported by the fact that
legislative reapportionment is the preferred vehicle for
reapportionment, as is reflected by the broader tolerances
which are allowed to legislatures, but not to courts, in
the matter of deviations from uniform population requirements. As the Supreme Court recently stated, .,The
Court has repeatedly held that redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which
the federal Courts shou)d make every effort not to pr~
empt." Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 639 (1978).
21. Legislative reapportionment plans must be scrutinized to determine if they were enacted with the prohibited "purpose" of denying or abridging black voting
strength. The prohibited 0 purpose" of section 6 may be
described as the sort of invidious discriminatory purpose
that would support a challenge to official action as an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection. A Jaw neutral
on its face and serving legitimate state ends cannot be
held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause without
proof of discriminatory purpose. Accordingly, in examining the statutory plan, proof of discriminatory racial
purpose is necessary for a finding of the '•purpose 0 proscribed in section 6. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239-48 ( 1970).
22. Mississippi's evidence demonstrates that the principal actors in the development of S.B. 3098 and H.B.
1491 acted with a benign purpose.7 Defendants concede
they have no evidence to the contrary and are unable to
name anyone they contend acted with improper purpose.
The basic configuration of the statutory plan wfts compl te in
December, 1977, well prior to the submission lo the Connor Court
of varioue alternative plan , which culminated in the settlement
plan adopted by the C<>1lnor Court. on April 13, 1979.
1

Defendant-intervenors, likewise, have failed to introduce
such evidence.

An order consistent with the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law has been entered this day.

23. Defendants and defendant-intervenors have suggested that incumbency concerns in the fashioning of the
legislature's plans resulted in an impermissibly raciallydisc1~iminatory purpose. It is not improper, however, for
a legislative body to consider incumbency in fashioning
a reapportionment plan, nor does it demonstrate invidiousness, especially here where the evidence shows Incumbency concerns were not permitted to encroach upon
configurations designed to 1·ecognize and protect black
voting strength. lVhite v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797
( 1973) ; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n. 16

/s/ Malcolm Richard Wi1key
United States Circuit Judge

/8/ J. H. Pratt
United States District Judge

(1966).
/s/ [llJegible]

24. The implementation of S.B. 3098 and . H.B. 1491
for the 1979 quad1·ennial legislative elections in the State
of Mississippi will not have either the purpose or effect of
denying or abridging the full and free exercise of the
right to vote of black citizens in that state.

United States District Judge
June 1st, 1979.

25. Plaintiff's prayer for a declaratory judgment pre. clearing S.B. 3008 and H.B. 1491 as a valid reapportionment plan for use in the 1979 quadrennial election should
be granted.
26. Since the statutory plan is upheld, it shall supersede the Connor Court plan of April 13, 1979. Per curiam
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Connor
v. Colema.n , No. 78-1013 decided March 29, 1979, 47

U.S.L. W. 3634.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Action No. 78-1426
(Filed Jun. 1, 1979, James It,. Davey, Clerk]

do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color is granted; and it is further
ORDERED,
dismissed.

that

this

action

be

and

hereby

is

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,

Plaintiff,
VB.

/s/ Malcolm Richard Wilkey
United States Circuit Judge

UNITED STAT~ OF AMERICA and GRIFFIN BELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, individuaJly

and in his official capacity,

Deferulants.

ORDER
Plaintiff filed this action on August 1, 1978, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1973c seeking a declaratory judgment
that Miss. Laws, 1978, Chs. 515 and 635, H.B. 1491 and
S.B. 3098, the statutory reapportionment plan, do not
have the 1mrpose and will not have the eITect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color. Defendants filed their answer denying that plaintiff was entitled to the relief requested, and the Court
allowed ten black Mississippi voters to intervene in this
action as defendants on behalf of the class of all black
citizens and black registered voters of Mississippi qualified lo vole in state legislative elections. The Court having held a hearing and having conducted oral argument
on the matter and having issued its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, it is, in accordance with the Cou.-t's
findings of fact and conclusions of Jaw, this 1st day of
June, 1979., •

/8/ J. H. Pratt
United States District Judge

/s/ June L. Green
United States District Judge

ORDgRED, that plaintiff's prayer for a declaratory
judgment that Miss. Laws, 1978, Chs. 515 and 635, H.B.
1491 and S.B. 8098, the statutory reapportionment plan,
ti::-.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (c).

Civil Action No. 78-1426
(Received June 8, 1979]

/s/ Richard S. Kohn

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,

v.

Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law
733 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20005
( 202) 628-6700

and GRIFFIN B. DELL, Attorney General of the United States, individually and
in his official capacity,
De/endants,
and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AARON E. HENRY, HENRY J. KIRKSEY, MRS. MARY HIGHTOWER, JOHNNIE E. WALLS, JR., CIIARLF.S VICTOR MCTEER, FRED L. BANKS, JR., DAVID JORDAN, JAMF.S E.
WINFIELD, BENNIE G. THOMPSON, and BARNEY SCHOBY,

FRANK R. PARKER
Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law
Milner Building, Suite 720
210 South Lamar Street
Jackson, Mississippi 39201
( 601) 948-6400

De/endant-lntervenors.
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that Aaron E. Henry, Henry
J. Kirksey, Mrs. Mary Hightower, Johnnie E. Walls,
Jr., Charles Victor McTeer, Fred L. Banks, Jr., David
Jordan, tlames E. Winfield, Bennie G. Thompson, and
Barney Schoby, defendant-intervenors herein, appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United Slates from the order
of the three-judge district court entered in this action
on June 1, 1979 which granted the plaintiffs prayer for
a declaratory judgment that Mississippi Laws, 1978,
Chs. 616 and 636, H.B. 1491 and S.B. 3098, the statutory reapportionment plan, do not have the purpose and

A.

MURPHY
NORMAN CHACHKIN
RICHARD S. KOHN
ROBERT

Plaintiff,

Attorneys for DefendantIntervenors
Dated : June 6, 1979

CHAPTER 616
HOUSE BILL

No. 1491

AN ACT to amend Section 5.. 1-1, Mississippi Code of
1972, to 1·eapportion the Mississippi House of Representatives using legislative criteria and precinct
lines; and for related purposes.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Mississippi:
Section 1. Section 6-1-1, Mississippi Code of 1972, is
amended as follows:

6-1-1. The number of 1·epresentatives shall be one
hundred twenty-two ( 122) and shall be elected from districts, composed as follows:
( 1) District 1 shall be composed of Tishomoingo
County, less the precincts of Belmont and Golden; and
Glen, Farmington and East Corinth precincts in Alcorn
County.
(2) District 2 shall be composed of that portion of
Alcorn County not contained in Districts 1 and 3.

(3) District 3 shall be composed of the precincts of
Rienzi, Biggersville, Bethel, Jacinto and Union in Alcorn County; and SD's 1, 2 and 6 in Prentiss County.
( 4) District 4 shall be composed of Tippah County;
and the precincts of Hopewell, Fairgrounds, Canaan,
Michican City and Lamar in Benton County.
( 6) Disti·ict 6 shall be composed of the precincts of

Barton, Byhalia, Cayce, Early Grove, Hudsonville, Mt.
Pleasant, North Holly Springs No. 1, North Holly
Springs No. 2, Red Banks, Slayden, South Holly Springe
No. 4, South Holly S1>rings No. 6, Victoria, Warsaw,
Watson and West Holly Springs No. 1 in Marshall
County.

( 6) District 6 shaU be composed of SD's 1 and 5 and
the precincts of Plum Point, Nesbit West and Hernando
West in DeSoto County.
(7) District 7 shall be composed of SD 3 and the
precincts of Southhaven East, Southhaven West No. 2,
Horn Lake, Aldens, Days, Eudora and Oak Grove in
DeSoto County.
(8) District 8 shall be composed of Tate County.

(9) District 9 shalJ be composed of Tunica County;
and the precincts of Sledge, Belen, North Marks, West
Marks, Darling and Mattie in Quitman County.
( 10) District 10 shall be composed of SD's 1 and 4
and the precincts of Court1and, East Crowder, East
Pope, West Pope, Towoco, East Batesville 2, West Batesville 1, West Sardis, North Sardis, East Sardis and East
Batesville 1 in Panola County.
(11) District 11 shall be composed of SD 2 and the

precincts of North Curtis, South Curtis, North Batesville, West Batesville 2 and West Batesville 3 in Panola
County; and the precincts of Marks, West Lambert, Lambert and Crowder in Quitman County.
(12) Distdct 12 shall be composed of the precincts
of Oxford 4, Burgess, Taylor, Orwood, Shackleford, Higgenbotham, Airport Grocery, Oxford 5, Oxford 1, Oxford
3 and Oxford 2 in Lafayette County.
( 13) District 13 shall be composed of the preci ncls
of Hickory J.,lat, Ashland, Harris Mill, Winborn, ~.,loyrl
and Shawnt.e in Benton County; the precincts of Wall
Hill, Marianna, Chulahoma, Laws Hill, Lake FJstates,
Potts Camp, Waterford, B thlehem and CornesviJle in
Marshall ounty; the precincts of Free Spring , CoJJ ge
Hill, Ahbcrville, Paris, Mullins, Spring Hill, Tula, Delay,
North Tula, Pine Bluff, Denmark, Lafayette SpringR,
Philadelphia and Yocona in Lafayette County; and the
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prE:cincts of North East, South East and North West
in Yalobusha County.
(14) District 14 sha11 be composed of Union County.
( 15) District 15 shall be composed of Pontotoc County.

( 16) District 16 shall be composed of SD 4 and the
precincts of Bissell, Brewer, Shannon, Richmond, Plantet·sville, Tupelo 5, East Heights South, Petersburg and
Kedron in Lee County.
( 17) District 17 shall be composed of SD 2 and the
precincts of Belden, Eggville, Gilvo, Mooreville, Auburn,
East Heights North anct Tupelo 3 in Lee County.
( 18) District 18 shall be composed of SD 1 in Lee
County; and SD's 3 and 4 in Prentiss County.

( 19) District 19 shall be composed of Itawamba
County; and the precincts of Belmont and Golden in
Tishomingo County.
(20) District 20 shall be composed of SD's 1 and 2

and the precincts of Amory 5th, Bartahatchie, Gattman,
Grubb Springs, Lackey, and that portion of Hamilton
In ED's 23 and 24 in Monroe County.
(21) District 21 shall be composed of SD 4 and the
precincts of Nettleton, Boyds, Bigbee, Central Grove,
Willis, Wern, Aberdeen 3rd, and that portion of Hamilton in ED's 26 and 27 in Monroe County; and Nettleton
precinct in Lee County.
( 22) District 22 shall be composed of Chickasaw
County; and the precincts of Wardwell, Bentley, Sabougla,
Denton, Slate Springs, Pleasant Hill and Derma No. 4 in
Calhoun County.

(23) Di trict 23 shall be composed of SD's 1 and 6
and the precincts of Boat Landing, Pine Valley, West
and Leggo in Yalobusha County; and SD's 1, 2 and 3

and the precincts of West Vardaman, East Vardaman,
Loyd, New Liberty, Calhoun City No. 4 and Derma No.
6 in Calhoun County.
(24) District 24 shall be composed of the precincts
of Holcomb, Oxberry, Pea Ridge, Hardy, Geeslin Corner,
precinct One, precinct i.,our, precinct Five, precinct Six,
Tie Plant and Elliott in Grenada County; and the precincts of Oakland, Tillatoba and Scobey in Yalobusha
County.
(25) District 25 shall be composed of Montgomery
County; SD 2 of Attala County; and the precincts of
Providence, Gore Springs, Mt. Nebo, Spears, Kirkman
and Futheyville in Grenada County.
(26) District 26 shall be composed of the precincts of
Clarksdale No. 3, Clarksdale No. 4, Lyon, Jonestown,
Mattson and Cagles Crossing in Coahoma County.
( 27) District 27 shall be composed of the precincts of
Friars Point, Lula, Clarksdale No. 1, Clarksdale No. 2,
Clarksdale No. 5 and Coahoma in Coahoma County.
(28) District 28 shall be composed of the precincts of
Roundaway, Farrell, Bobo, Sherard and Rena Lara in
Coahoma County; and the precincts of Duncan-Alligator,
Shelby, Mound Bayou, Merigold ( that portion east of a
line beginning at the southeast corner of Section 1, T24
N, RGW, south to southeast corner of Section 24, west
along section line to southwest corner of Section 24,
south on s ction line to sotuhwest corner of Section 26)
and North Cleveland in Bolivar County.
(29) District 29 shall be composed of the precincts of

West Cleveland, West Central Cleveland, East Central
Cleveland, Boyle, Merigold ( that portion west of a Ii ne
beginning at the southeast corner of Section 1, T24N,
RGW, south to southeast corner of S ction 24, west along
section line to southwest corner of Section 24, south on
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section line to southwest corner of Section 26) and East
Cleveland in Bolivar County.
(30) District, 30 sha11 be composed of the 1necincts of
Gunnison, Rosedale, Pace, Benoit, Longshot, Scott, Stringtown, Shaw and Skene in Bolivar County.
( 31) District 31 shall be composed of SD's 4 and 5 and
Sunflower precinct in Sunflower County.

( 32) District 32 shall be composed of SD 1 and the
precincts of Moorehead, Fairview, Hale, Indianola No.
2 and Indianola No. 3 in Sunflower County.
( 33) District 33 shall be composed of Tallahatchie
County, except Philipp precinct.

( a,1) Dista-ict 34 shall be composed of the precincts
of Schlater, North Itta Dena, South Itta Dena, Morgan
City, Swiftown, Rising Sun, Southwest Greenwood, South
Greenwood, Sidon and Southeast Greenwood in Leflore
County.
( 35) District 35 shall be composed of the precincts
of East Greenwood, Central Greenwood, North Greenwood and West Greenwood in Leflore County.
( 36) District 36 shall be composed of Carroll County;
Philipp precinct in Ta11ahatchie County; West precinct
in Holmes County; and the precincts of Minter City,
Money and Northeast Greenwood in Leflore County.
( 37) District 37 shall be composed of Choctaw and
Web~ ter counties.
( 38 > District 38 sha11 be composed of Clay County.
(39) District 39 shall be composed of the precincts of

Maben, Sturgis, Bradley, Double SJ)rings, Self Creek,
Adaton, Northwest Starkville, Southwest Starkville,
North Longview, South Longview, Southea t Starkville,
and that portion of Northeast Starkville bounded by a

1ine described as follows: beginning at a point where
the Northeast Starkville precinct line intersects the eastern boundary of ED 7, thence northerly along said boundary to its intersection with U.S. Highway 82, thence
easterly along said highway to its intersection with the
eastern boundary of the Northeast Starkville precinct,
thence northerly, westerly, southerly and easterly along
said precinct boundary to its intersection with the eastern
boundary of ED 7, the point of beginning, in Oktibbeha
County.
(40) District 40 shall be composed of Noxubee County;
Crawford precinct in Lowndes County; and the precincts
of Sessums, Oktoc and Craig Springs in Oktibbeha
County.

( 41) District 41 shall be composed of the precincts of
Caledonia, Air Base, Rural Hill, Caldwell School, Sale
School, Lee High School, Stokes Beard ( that portion outside the city corporation limits) and Brandon School
( that portion north of the Columbus and Greenville Railway) in Lowndes County.
( 42) District 42 shalJ be composed of the precincts
of New Hope, Fairview School, Coleman Elementary
School, Stokes Beard ( that portion within the city corporation limits), Hunt School and Franklin School in
Lowndes County.
(43) District 43 shal] be composed of the precincts
of Carrier Lodge, Mitchell Memorial School, W st
Lowndes, Artesia, Mayhew, that portion of Brandon
School south of the Columbus and Greenville Railway
in Lowndes County; the precincts of Hickory Grnve, Dell
School Hou e, Osborn, and Northeast Starkvi11e, except
for that portion boun<l d by a line d scribed as folJows: .
beginning at a point where the Northea t Starkvi11e
precinct line intersects the eastern boundary of ED 7,
thence northerly along said boundary to its intersection

with U.S. Highway 82, thence easterly along said highway to its intersection with the eastern boundary of the
Northeast Starkville precinct, thence northerly, westerly,
southerly and easterly along said precinct boundary to
its intersection with the eastern boundary of ED 7, the
point of beginning, in Oktibbeha County.
( 44) District 44 shall be composed of Kemper County;
and the precincts of Meehan, Sageville, South Nelliesburg, Valley, Obadiaff', Shucktown, Pine Springs, Nelliesburg, School Gap, Post, Collinsville, Suqualena, Schamberville, Martin, Center Hill, West Lauderdale, Daleville,
Lizelia, Andrews Chapel, Bailey, Prospect and Covington
in Lauderdale County.
(45) District 45 shall be composed of Winston County.

(46) District 46 shall be composed of Neshoba County,
excluding the New Woodland, Zephyr Hill and New Coldwater precincts.
(47) District 47 shall be composed of Leake County;
and the New Woodland, Zephyr Hill and New Coldwater
precincts in Neshoba County.
( 48) District 48 shall be composed of SD's 1, 3, 4 and
6 in Attala County.
( 49) District 49 shall be composed of the precincts of

Cruger, Thornton, Lexington 4, Lexington 1, Durant,
Goodman, Pickens, Ebenezer and Coxburg in Holmes
County.
(50) District 60 shall be composed of Humphreys
County; and Tchula precinct in Holmes County.
(51) District 51 shall be composed of the precincts of
1-1. 2-2 and 6-6 in Washington County.
(52) District 62 eha11 be composed of the precincts of
3-4, 4-1, 6-4, and that portion of 3-3 bounded by a line
described as follows: beginning at the intersection of

Hinds Sti·eet and Magnolia Street, thence southerly along
Hinds Street to West Union Street, to North Poplar
Street, to Alexander Street East, to Shelby Street North,
to Main Street, thence along Main Street and Main
Street e tended to its intersection with the western
boundary of precinct 3-3, thence northerly and easterly
along said boundary to the point of beginning, in Washington County.

(53) District 63 shall be composed of the precincts of
5-1, 6-2, 6-3, 2-4, 4-2, 4-3 and that portion of 2-1 not
contained in District 54 in Washington County.
(54) District 54 shall be composed of the precincts of
1-2, 3-1, 3-2. 1-4, 2-3, that portion of 2-1 described as
follows: beginning at the intersection of State Highway
1 with Reed Road, thence southerly along State Highway 1 to its intersection wilh Barbara Street, thence
generally westward along Barbara Street and Barbara
Street extended for about 2076 feet, thence generally
southerly along a line parallel to Irby Street extended
for about 900 feet to the extension of Pauline Street,
and thence generally westward along Pauline Street extended for about 1200 feet to Canal Avenue which is
the westerly boundary of precinct 2-1, thence northerly
and then easterly along the boundary of said precinct
to the point of beginning; and 1-3 and that portion of
3-3 not contained in District 62 in Washington County;
and the precinct of Delta City in Sharkey County.

"

( 55) District 55 shall be composed of Issaqu na
County; all of Sharkey County but Delta City precinct;
and the precincts of B1·unswick, Redwood, Oak Ridge,
Culkin, Kings and Wa1ters in Warren County.
( 56) District 66 shall be com po ed of the precincts of

Bovina, Beechwood, Tingle, No. 6 (Pipe Fitters and
Plumbers Hall), No. 4 (High School Complex B), Cedar
Grove, No. 1 (City Auditorium), No. 3 (American Legion
.i::.
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Home) (that portion east of First North Street), and
No. 2 (St. Aloysius High School) in Warren County.
( 67) District 67 shall be composed of the precincts of
Goodrum, Redbone, Jett, Jonestown, Yokena, No. 6 (No.
7 Fire Station), and No. 3 ( American Legion Home)
(that portion west of First North Street) in Warren
County.
(68) District 68 shall be composed of the precincts of
Valley, Benton, Free Run, West Midway, Lake City,
South City Hall, Robinette, Center Ridge, North City
Hall, West Courthouse, East Courthouse, East Lintonia,
West Lintonia, Carter, Eden and Zion in Yazoo County.

( 59_) District 69 shalJ be com po ed of SD's 4 and 6 and
the precincts of Canton 1, Canton 2, Canton 3, Canton 4
and Canton 6, and that portion of Canton 6 east of Highway 1-55 in Madison County.

Richland Creek to its intersection with U.S. Highway
80 and the southern boundary of North Brandon p1 ecinct
in Rankin County.
· (62) District 62 shall be composed of the precincts
of Antioch, Mayton, Puckett, County Line, Cato, Johns,
Dobson, Dry Creek, West Brandon, that portion of North
Brandon precinct not located in District 61, Whitfield,
Spring Hill, Shoto, West Pearl, Pearl, Cunningham ·
Heights, South Pearson, Patton Place and East Brandon
in Rankin County.
(63) District 63 shalJ be composed of the precincts
of Crystal Springs East, Carpenter and Crystal Springs
West in Copiah County; the precincts of Star, Monterey, East Steens Creek, North Plain, South Plain, Cleary,
West Steens Creek, Clear Branch and Mt. Creek in
Rankin County; and the precincts of Pearl, Fork Church
and Harrisville in Simpson County.

( 60) District 60 shall be composed of SD 3 and the
precincts of Canton 6 ( that portion west of Highway
1-66), Smith School and Flora in Madison County; and
the precincts of Dover, East Bentonia, West Bentonia,
Fugates, Deasonville, Harttown, East Midway, Mechanicsburg, Phoenix, Satartia, Enola, Fairview and Holly Bluff
in Yazoo County.

( 66) District 65 shall be composed of precincts 13,
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43 and that portion of precinct
17 not in District 66 in Hinds County.

( 61) District 61 shall be composed of the precincts
of North Pelahatchie, Leesburg, Pi gah, Fannin, Oakdale, Holbrook, Skyway Hill , North McLaurin, Flowood,
We t Pearson, Henry Grn'dy, Castlewood , Reservoir,
South McLaurin, South Pelahat hie, Shiloh, Cro sroads,
North Pearson, Cro Rgales, and that pol'lion of North
Brandon precinct north and enst of a line de .. crihed as
follows: b ginning at the interse tion of the south we t
boundary of North Brandon pr cinct and the Illinois
Central raill'oad in S tion 1G, then northeast and east
on Illinoi Central Railroail to it interestion with Richland Creek in the middl of S ction 12, then south on

( 66) District 66 shaJl be composed of precincts 5, 6,
8, 9, 14, 15, 16, that portion of ·precinct 17 de cdbed as
follows: b ginning at the intersection of State Street
and Ridgeway Street, proceeding north on State Street
to Council Circle, thence east and south along Council
Circle to Mohawk A venue, proc eding east on Mohawk
to Sherwo, d Drive, thence generally southea terly along
Sherwood Drive to Hawthorne Drive, thence outh on
Hawthorne Drive to the boundary of pr inct 17, thence
cnerally west rly along th southern boundary of the
pr cinct to the point of beginning, precincts 32, 33 and
34 in Hinds County.

(64) District 64 shall be composed of precincts 41,
44, 45, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, Cynthia and Liberty
Grove in Hinds County.
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( 67) District 67 shall be composed of precincts 21,
22, 23, 27, precinct 28 north of Ridgeway, p1·ecincts 29,
30 and 61 in Hinds County.
( 68) District 68 shall be composed of precincts 11,
12, 20, that portion of precinct 28 south of Ridgeway,
precincts 31, 65 and 66 in Hinds County.
( 69) District 69 shall be composed of precincts 61,
63, 64, 67, 68, 63, 64, that portion of precinct 52 west
of Prentiss, and precinct 66 in Hinds County.
(70) District 70 shall be composed of precincts 1, 2,
4, 10, 18, 19, 50, · and that portion of precinct 62 east
of I rentiss in Hinds County.

(71) District 71 shall be composed of precincts 47,
49, 72, 73, 74, 76, 76 and 77 in Hinds County.
( 72) District 72 shall be composed of precincts 24,
26, 59, 60, 62, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71 in Hinds County.
( 73) District 73 shall be composed of precincts 89,
92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 and the precincts of Byram, Old
Byram, Cayuga, Chapel Hill, Dry Grove, Learned, 'ferry,
Utica 1 and Utica 2 in Hinds County.
(74) District 74 shall be composed of precincts 26,
86, 87, 88, 90, 91 and the precincts of Midway, Van
Winkle No. 1, Van Winkle No. 2, Raymond 1 and Raymond 2 in Hinds County.
(75) District 75 shal1 be composed of the precincts of
Bolton, Brownsville, Clinton 1, Clinton 2, Clinton 3, Clinton 4, 85, Edwards, North Clinton, Pocahontas and Tinnin
in Hinds County.

(76) District 76 shall be com1>osed of that portion of
Scott County not in the precincts of High Hill, Lake,
Usry, Salem, Langs Mill and Northeast Forest.
(77) District 77 sha11 be composed of all of Copiah
County but the precincts of Crystal Springs East, Crystal
Springs West and arpenter.

(78) District 78 shall be composed of Simpson County,
less Pearl, Fork Church and Harrisville precincts.
(79) District 79 shall be composed of Newton County,

less Hazel Lawrence precincts.
( 80) District 80 shall be composed of Smith County;
and the precincts of High Hill, Lake, Usry, Salem, Langs
Mill and Northeast Forest in Scott County.
(81) District 81 shall be composed of Jasper County;
and the precincts of Hazel and Lawrence in Newton
County.
( 82) District 82 shall be composed of the precincts of

Stone Deavours School, City Barn, Sandy Gavin School,
Oak Park School, Ovett, Crotts, Tuckers, Glade, Northeast School, Myrick, Erata, Sandersville School and
Courthouse in Jones County.
(83) District 83 shall be composed of the precincts of
Meridian lA, lB, 28, 6E, East Gap, Russell, Kewanee,
Toomsuba, Dalewood, East Lauderdale, Lockhart, East
Marion, Lauderdale, Ponta, Alamucha, Vimville, Marion,
Odom, Bonita, Chapman, Long Creek, School Gap, South
Marion, and that area outside the city of Meridian south
of the South Marion precinct and west of Highway 46 in
Lauderdale County.

(84) District 84 shall be composed of the precincts of
Meridian 2C, 4C, 4D, 5A and 5B in Lauderdale County.

(85) District 86 shall be composed of the precincts of
Meridian lC, 2A, 3A, 3B, SC, 4A, 4B and 6C in Lauderdale County.
(86) District 86 shall be composed of Clarke County;
and the precincts of Whynot, Causeyville, Center Grove,
Zero, Pickard, Carmichael, Clarksdale, Jones Store and
Wanita in Lauderdal~ County.
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( 87) District 87 shall be com})Ofled of Claiborne
County; and SD's 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Jefferson County.
( 88) District 88 shall be composed of the precincts of
Mason School, 26th Street Fire Station, Anthony's Florist
Nora Davis, Harper Transfer, Sharon, Shady Grove:
Matthews, West Jones School, Calhoun, Gitano, Soso,
Bruce, Centerville, Hebron, Pleasant Ridge and Blackwell
in Jones County.

(89) District 89 shall be composed of Wayne County;
and the precincts of Rustin and Sandersville in Jones
County.
( 90) District 90 shall be composed of the precincts
of Lamar School, Prentiss School, Maddox School, Fairgrounds, Pendorf, Sandhill, Rainey, Pine Grove, County
Barn, Union, Moselle, Shelton, Ellisville No. 1 and Ellisville No. 2 in Jones County.
(91) District 91 shall be composed of Covington
County; and SD's 2 and 3 and Clem precinct in Jefferson
Davis County.
( 92) District 92 shaJl

be composed of Lawrence
County; and SD's 1, 4 (less Clem precinct) and 5 in
Jefferson Davis County.

( 93) District 93 shall be composed of SD 2 and the
precincts of Fair River, Brookhaven High School, Courthouse, Ole Brook, Southeast Brookhaven, Halbert Heights,
City Hall, Zetus, Lloyd Star and Northwest Brookhaven
in Lincoln County.
( 94) District 94 shall be composed of the precincts of
Johnson, Arlington, West Lincoln, Johnson Grove, Ruth,
Norfield, Bogue Chitto, Enterprise, East Lincoln and McClendon in Lincoln County; and the precincts of 4/18, 4/17,
3/16, 3/13, 3/12, 3/11, 4/19, 5/27, 5/26, 1/1, 1/2 and 1/3
in Pike County.
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(96) District 95 shalJ

be composed of the precincts of

Pine Ridge, Concord, Morgantown, North Natchez, Somerset, Anchorage, Northside School and Carpenter No. 1
in Adams County.
(96) District 96 shall be composed of the precincts of
Airport, Washington, Bellemont, Beau Pre, Oakland,
Courthouse, ByPass Fire Station, Liberty Park, Cloverdale, Palestine, Duncan Park and Kingston in Adams
County.

(97) District 97 shall be composed of Franklin County; SD 1
Jefferson County; the precincts of Vaughn,
Caseyville and Old Red Star in Lincoln County; and SD
3 and the precincts of New Zion, Zion Hill, South Gloster,
Smithdale, Liberty and Tangipahoa in Amite County.

in

(98) District 98 shall be composed of Wilkinson County; and the precincts of East Liberty, South Liberty,
Graves, Walls, Riceville, Tickfaw, Ariel, Berwick, East
Centreville, Street and East Fork in Amite County.

(99) District 99 shall be composed of the precincts of
2/8, 5/25, 2/9, 2/7, 4/20, 3/14, 4/21, 3/15, 1/5, 5/22,
1/4, 5/23, 2/6, 2/10 and 5/24 in Pike County.
( 100) District 100 sha11 be composed of Walthall County; and the precincts of Sandy Hook, Union, Hub, Pine
Burr, Balls Mill, Pittman and Kokomo in Marion County.
( 101) Disrict 101 shall be composed of SD's 1, 2 and
3 and the precincts of East Columbia, South Columbia
and Courthouse in Marion County.
(102) District 102 shall be composed of Lamar County; and the precincts of Brooklyn, Carnes, Maxie and
Rawls Springs in Forrest County.
( 103) District 103 shall be composed of the precincts
of Woodley School, Blair High School, Grace Christian
School, Hawkins Junion High (west of Main Street),
Pinecrest, Westside and Thames School in Forrest County.

(104) District 104 . shall be composed of the precincts
of Hawkins Junior High School (that portion east of
Main Street), Jones School, East Bowie, Walthall School,
Eaton School, Rowan High Schoo), Lillie Burney School,
William Carey, Dixie Pine and Camp School in Forrest
County.

Escatawpa, West Escatawpa, Bayou Casotte No. 4, Bayou
Casotte No. 3 and Jefferson Street in Jackson County.

(105) District 105 shall consist of the precincts of
EatonviHe, Glendale, Petal-Leeville, Macedonia, Petal
High School, Petal-Harvey School, Sunrise, McCallum,
McLaurin, Forrest County Agricultural High School,
Dixie, Central School and Davis School in Forrest County.

(112) District 112 shall be composed of the precincts
of Bayou Casotte No. 1, Bayou Casotte No. 2, Pinecrest,
Country Club, Jackson Avenue, EasUawn, Cen~ral, North
Pascagoula, Ingalls Avenue, American Legion, Sou~h
Pascagoula, 11th Street No. 1 and 11th Stteet No. 2 m
Jackson County.

(106) District 106 shaH be composed of Greene County
and Perry County.
(107) District 107 shall be composed of the precincts

of E1arbee, Thomas Price, Red Creek, South Central Wiggins, Perkinston and McHenry in Stone County; the precincts of Ladner, Lizana, Vidalia, West Lyman, Riceville,
Advance and West Saucier in Harrison County; and the
precincts of Hillsdale, Byrd Line, Hickory Grove, Caesar,
Sa1em, Henleyfield, Gum Pond, Wo1f River, Poplarville
East, Oak Hill, White Sand, Buck Branch, Poplarville
West, Progress, Silver Run, Savannah, Derby, Ford's
Creek, McNeill and Steep Ho11ow in Pearl River County.
(108) District 108 shall be composed of George County;
and the precincts of Bond, Central Wiggins, East Central
Wiggins, Tuxechena, I• lint Creek, Wisdom and Pleasant
HilJ in Stone County.
(109) District 109 shall be composed of the precincts
of Mill Creek, Pine Grove, Picayune 4, Nicholson, Picayune 6, Carriere, Picayune 3, Picayune 2, Picayune 1 and
Ozona in Pearl River County.
(110) District 110 shall be composed of the precincts
of Wade, Hurley, Big Point, Orange Grove, Helena, East

(111) District 111 shall be composed_ of the precincts
of Griffin Heights, Eastside, Moss P01?t No. 1, Moss
Point No. 2, Moss Point No. 3, Moss Pomt No. 4, Elder
Street and Kreole in Jackson County.

(113) District 113 shall be composed of the precincts
of North Gautier, Courthouse, Fire Station, Lake School,
Carterville Larue, North Vancleave, South Vancleave,
Latimer, St. Martin and Suuth Gautier in Jackson County; and D'Iberville precinct in Harrison County.
(114) District 114 shall be composed of the precincts
of South Fountainbleau, Ocean Springs No. 1, Ocean
Springs No. 2, Ocean Sprin~s No. 3, ~cean Springs No. 4,
Ocean Springs East, Gulf H1Jls, Satelhte and North Fountainbleau in Jackson County.

( 115) District 115 shall be composed

or

the precincts

of Biloxi 1, Biloxi 2, Biloxi 3, Biloxi 4, Biloxi 6, Biloxi 6
and Biloxi 7 in Harrison County.
(116) District 116 shall be composed of the pr~incts

of North Bay, Holly Hills, Biloxi 7 A, and that portion of
Biloxi 8 not located in District 117 in Harrison County.
(117) District 117 shall be composed of the precincts
of Biloxi 9, Biloxi 10, Biloxi 11, and that portion of East
Handsboro (south of Pass Christian Road), and that portion of Biloxi 8 west of Keesler Air Force Base and west
of St. Charles Avenue in Harrison Count.y.
.,::.

t-'
u,

( 118) District 118 shall be composed of the precincts
of West Han<lsboro, East Mississippi City, West Mississippi City, GuJfport 6, Gulfport 7, Gulfport 11, Gulfport
12 and part of East Handsboro ( north of Pass Christian
Road) in Harrison County.
( 119) District 119 shall be composed of the precincts
of West North Gulfport, East North Gulfport, Gulfport
3, Gulfport 4, Gulfport 6, Gulfport 8, Gulfport 9 and
Gulf port 13 in Harrison County.
( 120) District 120 shall be composed of the precincts
of Gulfpo1't 1, Gulfport 2, Gulfport 10, Gulfport 14, East
Long Beach, West Long Beach, East Pass Christian and
West Pass Christian in Harrison County.
( 121) District 121 shall be composed of the precincts
of White Plains, Howard Creek, Stonewall, Peace, Poplar
Head, East Lyman, East Saucier, New Hope, Outside
Long Beach, West Orange Grove, Pineville, DeLisle and
East Orange Grove in Harrison County.
(122) District 122 shall be composed of Hancock
County. _
For purposes of this plan, t.he term "SD'' shall mean
supervisors district as it exists upon the date of passage
of this act, "MCD" shall mean minor civil division as it
existed in 1970 when the 1970 Decennial Census was
taken in that county, and "ED" shall mean enumeration
district as it existed in 1970 when the 1970 Decennial
Census was taken in that county.
Section 2. This act shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof and to apportion and district the Hou e of Representatives of this state in compliance with constitutional requirements.

It is intended that this act and the districts described
herein completely encompass all the area within the state.
It is also intended that such districts contain all the in-

habitants in this state. It is · further intended that the
apportionment and districting provided for in this act
result in the creation of districts which are substantially
equal in population. It is also intended that no district
shall include any of the area included within the description of any other district.
The apportionment of representative districts and senate districts shall be deemed to be separate from each
other. The invalidity of the districts of one ( 1) house
shall not affect or require the redistricting of the other
house when the districts of the other house have been
found to be valid by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 3. ( 1) If the districts described in this act do
not carry out the purJ>oses thereof, because of unintentional omissions; duplications; ove1·Japping areas; erroneous nomenclature; lack of adequate maps or descriptions of political subdivisions, wards or other divisions
thereof, or of their boundary lines; street closings, changes
in names of streets, or other changes of public places;
alteration of the boundary or courses of waters or waterways, filling in of lands under water, accretion or other
changes in shorelines; or alteration of courses, rights-ofway, or lines of public utilities or other conditions, then
the Secretary of Stale, at the request of the Special Joint
Legislative Committee on Reapportionment shall, by order, correct such omissions, overlaps, erroneous nomenclature or other defects in the description l'lf districts so as
to accomplish the purposes and objectives of this act.
(2) In promulgating such orders, the Secretary of
State, in addition to achieving equality in the population
of districts and insuring that all areas of the state are
completely and accurate)y encompas ed in such districts,
shall be guided by the following standards;
(a) Gaps in the description of any district shall be
completed in a manner which results in a total descrip-

tion of that district in a manner which is consonant with
the description of adjacent districts and results in complete contiguity of districts;
(b) Areas of the state included within the descriptions
of more than one ( 1) district shall be allocated to the
district having the lowest population;
(c) Areas of the state not included within the de-

scriptions of any district shall be allocated to the adjacent
district having the lowest population;
( d) In the event that the area subject to corrected description or allocation as provided in subseclione (a), (b)
and ( c) of this paragraph is of such size or contains such
population that its inclusion ns a unit in any district ·
would result in substantial disparity in the size, shape or
population of such district, then the Secretary of State
may allocate portions of such area to two (2) or more
districts; and
(e)
tions
State
serve
avoid

In any allocation of area or correction of descripmade pursuant to this section, the Secretary of
shall, consistent with the foregoing standards, prethe contiguity and compactness of districts and
the unnecessary division of political subdivisions.

( 3) Copies of such orders shall be filed by the Secretary of State in his own office and in the offices of the
affected commissioners of election and registrars. The
Secretary of State may adopt reasonable rules regulating
the procedure for applications for orders under this section in the manner of serving and filing any notice or
copy of orders relating thereto.
(4) Upon the filing of such an order, the description of
any affected district shall be deemed to have been corrected in the manner provided in such order to the full
extent as if such correction had been contained in the
original description set forth in this act.

Section 4. The Attorney General of the State of Missiasi ppi is hereby directed to exhaust all options under
Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended
an~ extended, in seeking to effectuate this act.
Section 6. This act shall take effect and be in force if

it is finally effectuated under Section 6 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.
Approved: April 21, 1978
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION

PEGGY J. CONNOR, ET AL.,

)

PLAINTIFFS

)
)

j

and

)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR )

No. 3830 (A)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ·

}

vs.

)
)

CLIFF FINCH, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS

~

)

AFFIDAVIT OF HLLIAM A•.4.LLAIN

THE STAT~ OF MISSISSIPPI~
COUNTY OF HINDS

)

WILLIAM A. ALLAIN, after first being duly sworn, de~oses and says as
follows:
1.

I am Special Counsel for . the Defendants and the Special Joint

legislative Committee on Reapportionment in the above-styled and -ca~tioned
cause and I have been actively involved in the defense of this cause since
its inception.

I am further personally familiar with the efforts of the

defendants, the Special Joint Legislative Corrmittee on Reapportionment and
the Mississippi Legislature to respond to the Order of the United States
District Court inviting the ~ississippi Legislature to submit a plan for
court adoption, and I am personally familiar with their efforts to fashion
and effect~ate a statutory reapportionm~nt plan.
2.

I have reviewed the files and records ~aintained bj ~he Special

Joint Legislative Ccmmitte~ on Reapportionment tosether with the calendar
of events since the dacision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
this cause on r~ay 31, 1977, and my .review of said files, records and calendar
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of events reveals that the fol lowi_ng events and efforts took place and were
• made at the time and in the manner i ndi ca ted.

3.

On May 31, 1977, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed

the decision of the three-judge District Court implementing a statewide
single member district plan for the Mississippi Legislature since the districts fashioned by the Court contained excessively high population deviations
in both the House and Senate plans.

4.

On July 28, 1977, the Supreme Court of · the United States filed

its mandate with the Cl erk of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi for further proceedings in conformity with
its opinion, and on August 2, 1977, the District Court entered its order
requiring the parties and inviting the Mississippi legislature to file within

ninety days a complete plan for the reapportionment of the Mississippi
Legislature agreeable to the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court and
to the extent possible with the guidelines of the District Court.
5.

On Sunday, August• 7, 1977, counsel for the defendants met in

response to the District Court's order to prepare for the meeting with the
respective election commi-ttees of the Legislature to be held on the follow-

ing day.
6.

On August 8, 1977, a meeting of the members of the House Cammi t-

tee on Apportionment and Elections and the Senate Elections Corrmit~ee on
Elections was he1d in the office of the Attorney General of the State of
Mississippi for the purpose of discussing the invitation extended to t~e
Mississippi Legislature by the Court order of August 2, 1977.

On this same

date certain members of the Legislature and the Mississippi Attorney General
and members of his staff met with the Governor and his staff for the same
~urpose.

7.

On August

9, 1977, the Governor issued, by proc1a~ation, his

call to the members of the Mississippi Legislature to convene in special
session for the purpose of considering the invitation and responding to the
Court.

A copy of the p.roclamation is attached as Appendix 1.

8.

During the week of August 8, 1977, counsel for defendants and

legislative staff ~~rnbers conferred to prepare a resolution to be submitted
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to the Legislature to establish a Special Joint Legislative Study .Committee
on Reapportionment.
9.

During this same period of time, the Attorney General and other

counsel made contact with various demographic, computer and statistical
experts throughout the United States to discuss availability and possible
employment for the purpose of formulating reapportionment plans.
10 • . ·On August 12, 1977, the Mississippi Legislature convened the

First Extraordinary Session of 1977 and adopted s_

c: R. 502

wi1ich created the Special Joint Legislative Study Corrmittee on Reapportion-

ment {hereinafter referred to as "the Joint Corrmittee").

A copy of the

Resolution is attached as Appendix 2.
11.

On this same date, t,e House adopted H.C.R. 1. which requested

Congress to extend the deadline for a State to contract with the Bureau of
the Census

for the taking of a census count by preci nets.

This

reso 1uti on

was adopted on August 13, 1977, by the Senate.
12.

On Saturday, August 13, 1977; the newly created Joint Corrmittee

met and organized.
referred to as

II

Tiie

Joint Corrrnittee created a subcommittee (hereinafter

the Subcorrmi ttee") for the purpose of i ntervi. ewi ng and'

employing experts to assist in the formulation of reapportionment plans for
the Mississippi Legislature.

Further, the L'e gislature enacted H. B. 2

which authorized the Legislature to contra~t with the Census Bureau for the

taking of the 1980 census by block count for the state at large.
13.

On August 15, 1977, counsel for the defendants conferred in

preparation for a meeting with the Joint Committee to discuss procedures
necessary to res pond to the Court's i nvi tat ion.
14.

On August 16, 1977, the Joint Corrmittee met and was briefed by

counsel for the defendants.

The CoITT11ittee voted to employ special counsel

for the Joint Conr.1ittee to assist the Attorney General and his staff in
preparation of a reapportionment plan for Mississippi.

A staff director was

a 1so emp 1eyed, and counsel and ·staff con f e r':"'ed in reg a rd to the emp 1oymer.t
of certain experts.

The Attorney General continued telephone conferences and
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communications with experts to be intervie-1ed by the subcornnittee •
.

.·

15.

.

On August 17 and 18, 1977, counsel for defendants and the Joint

eo·r rmittee. by telephone conference and communications, made preparation for
a meeting of the subco~ttee and certain experts in Washington, D.C.

16.

On August 19 and Saturday, August 20, 1977, the subcommittee

interviewed in Washi _ngton. 0. _C. ce~tain experts in the field of fonnulating apportionment plans.

The chairr.1an of the Joint Cof'TIJlittee at that time

obtained a copy 9f census data far Mississippi c~pied directly from the

master tape in the
17.

Bureau

of the Census.

On. Sunday, August 21, 1977, counsel for defendants and 'the

Joint Committee conferred with the staff director regarding procedures for
gathering statistical data necessary for the formulation of a reapportionment plan.

The staff director met with certain experts retained during

the interviews in Washington, D. C.
18.

On August 22, 1977, retained counsel for the Joint Conmittee

met with the Mississippi Attorney General in Washington, 0. C.

The staff

director, associate counsel, and the chairman of the Joint Conmittee met
with certain experts to determine the best method for the programning and
utilization of the statistical census data.
19.

On August 23 and 24, 1977, ·retained counsel conferred with

merroers of the subcor.mittee and certain experts in preparation for a meeting and interviews to be held in Chicago, Illinois, on August 25, 1977.
20.

On August 25, 1977, retained counsel, the Mississippi Attorney

General, members of the subcommittee and staff director met in Chicago,
Illinois, and interviewed certain experts in the field ~f formulating
apportionment pl ans.
21.

On August 26, 1977, counsel for defendants and the Joint

Co:rmittee met with certain individuals to discuss the most advantageous
utilization of census data necessary for the development of the plan.
22.

On Saturday, August 27 and Sunday, August 28, 1977, counsel

for the defendants met and conferred for the purpose of preparing for a
meeting with the Joint Corrmittae to be held on September 7, 1977 •

•
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23.

On Septerriler 1-5, J977, counse1 ·and staff continued to prepare

for the Sep·tember 7, 1977, meeting of the Joint Comni ttee;

24. On Septerrber 1, 1977, the Chainnan of the Joint Conmittee met
with representatives of the Circuit Clerks' Association to discuss any problems
which might occur as a result of t.~e development of a reapportionment plan
based upon enumeration districts.

25.

On September 6, 1977, counsel for defendants met with the Chair-

man of the Joint Comnittee, conmittee staff and certain members of the
Legislature in further preparation for the meeting with the Joint Conmittee
on September· 7, 1977.
26.

On September 7, 1977, ·the Joint Cotm1ittee met with retained.coun-

sel and members of the staff of the Attorney General of Mississippi. The

comnittee discussed the ronnulation of a reapportionment plan and fur.ther
met with certain officials of the Bureau of ~ie Census, including Mr. Marshall
Turner, Chief of the Demographic Division of said bureau.
27.

On September 8 1 1977, counsel for defendants prepared memorandum

on meetings held on September 6 and 7, 1977.
28.

On September 12, 1977, counsel for defendants and the Joint Com-

mittee conferred with the Chainnan of th~ Joint Cor.mittee and staff director
in regard to procedures for formulating apportionment plans.

29.

On September 13, 1-977, retained counsel, the Mississippi Attorney
.
General and the staff director conferred in regard to the formulation of the
plans.
30.

On September 14, 1977, counsel for defendants and the Joint Com-

mittee met with the c011111ittee staff regarding the proposed tenative plans
and their compliance with the guidelines of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the preparation for the hearings to receive conrnents from legislators to be held on the 27th and 28th of September, 1977.

31. On September 20, 1977, counsel conferred with the Chairman of
the Joint Cornnittee and its staff director in regard to the completed drafts
of the proposed tentative reapportionment plans.

32. On September 21, 1977, a meeting was held with the Joint Committee, certain legislators and the Attorney General of Mississippi
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1,.

pre~aration for the l_e gislators' hearings on September 27 and 28, 1977.
33.

On September 22, 1977, a meeting of the Joint Committee was held

for the purpose of reviewing the proposed tentative plans.
34.

On September 23, 1977, a conference was held by counsel for

defendants and the Joint Corrmittee to discuss various legal ramifications
relative to the reapportionment plans and legal research of the Mississippi
constitutional and statutory provisions in regard thereto.
35.

On September 26, 1977, counsel for defendants and the Joint Com-

mittee conferred with experts and staff director in regard to the reapportionment plans as they relate to the legislators• hearings to be conducted on
September 27 and 28, 1977.
36.

On September 27 and 28, 1977, the Joint Conmittee conducted

hearings to secure corrments of legislators on the proposed tentative plans.
37.

On September 29, 1977, counsel for defendants and the Joint

Committee conferred in regard ta the corm1ents received from legislators at
the hearings _conducted on September 27 and 28. 1977.

38.

On Septent>er 30, 1977, counsel for the defendants and the Joint

Committee conferred with Gerald Jones, attorney for the United States Justice
Department, in regard to the tentative reapportiorvnent plans.

39.

On October 3 and 4, 1977, counsel for the defendants and the

Joint Cor.mi ttee conferred with the staff in pre para ti on for a meeting of the
Joint Cor.mittee to be held on October 5, 1977.
40.

On October 5, 1977, the Joint Corrmittee met with counsel and

staff and discussed the tentative plans and the input received during the
hearings for the legislators.

41.

Curing the week of October 3, 1977, notices of the public meet-

ings to be held October 11 and 12 1 1977, were sent to major newspapers
throughout the state, and ta assure their pub 1i ca ti on they were published

as paid legal notices.

In conjunction with such notices, copies of the

proposed reapportionment plans we~ sent to the circuit clerk of each county
and made available to the citizens thereof for their inspection.

The

notices requested the public to review the plans and present any testimony
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theY desired to the Joint Cor.mittee.

attached as Appendix 3.

A sample copy of a public notice is

Additionally, a news release was sent to radio

and television stations and other local newspapers throughout the ~tate, with
a request that. it be broadcast and published as a public service announce-

ment.

A sample copy of a news release is attached as Appendix 4.

Special

effort was made to_ generate as much p·ublicity as possible in _black co11T.1unities by having the notice and release published and broadcast by newspapers
and radio and television stations covering black communities.
42.

On October 6-10, 1977, counsel for the defendants and the Joint

Committee conferred with .the staff in preparation for the public hearings

to be conducted on October 11 and 12.
43.

On October 11 and 12, 1977, the Joint Committee met and conducted

pub 1i c hearings to receive comments- from the genera 1 pub 1i c in regard to the
tentative reapportionment plan.
44.

On October 13, 1977, counsel for the defendants and the Joint

Committee conferred with the Governor and his staff re1ati_ng to the call of

the Second Extraordinary Session 1977 to consider· a reapportionment plan
for Mississippi.
45.

On October 14, 1977, the Jo.int Car.mi ttee met and voted to

recomnend that the Legislature create .a reapportionment corrrnission for the
formulation of future reapportionment plans for the State.

Further, counsel

for the defendants and the Joint Cammi ttee met 'Ni th Gera 1d Jones and certain

members of his staff in regard to the tentative reapportionment plans.
46.

On October 15 and 16 (Saturday and Sunday) and 17, 1977, counsel

for defendants and the Joint Corranittee and staff prepared for pub1ic hearings
to be conducted on October 18~ 1977.

Public notices and news releases as

described above ,..,ere again circulated.
47.

On October 18, 1977: the Joint Comittee conducted public hear-

ings and the Legislature convened for the Second Extraordinary Session 1977
for the purpose of considering a reapportionment plan for Mississippi.
48.

On October 19-21, counsel for the defendants and the Joint Com-

mittee met with the Senate and House election comnittees and rner.bers of both
houses.

and explained the reapportionment plans for the Senate

and

House.
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49. · On October 21, 1977, the House adopted H.C.R. 3 which extended
.·
.·
the existence of the Joint Col'mlittee.
50 •.

On Saturday, October 22, 1977, counsel for defendants andthe

Joint Corrmittee conferred with Gerald Jones in Washington,

o. c.

in regard

to the reapportionment plans.
51.

On Sunday, October 23, 1977, counsel for defendants and the Joint

Cor.mittee conferred with the Chainnan of the Joint Committee and its director
and certain experts in preparation for continued _meetings with the Legislature in regard to the reapportionment plans.
52.

On October 24, 1977, counsel for defendants and the Joint Corm1it'

tee met with the election committees of the Legislature and conferred with

,

certain members of both houses in regard to the formulation of a final
reapportionment plan.

53.

During the week of October 24-28, 1977, S.C.R. 503 and H.C.R. 4

were reported and adopted by both houses of the Mississippi Legislature.

S.C.~. 503 and H.C.R. 4 are concurrent resolutions embodyi_ng a reapportionment plan for the Mississippi Legislature based upon census enumeration districts.

Further, during that same week the Legislature reported and/or

adopted several other important pieces .of legislation concernjng reapportionment, i.e., legislation extending the existence ·of the Joint Corrmittee (HCR 3),
and legislation establishing a C'Qll1i1-ission to reapportion the Legislature after
1980 (H.B. 3).

-- 54.

On November 1, 1977, the Joint Cor.rnittee staff began gathering

data for and commenced analyses of plans filed by plaintiffs and the Department of Justice.
55.

On November 2, 1977, counsel for the defendants and the Joint

Committee began their study of plaintiffs' and the Depart~ent of Justic~•s
plans.
56 • . On November 3 and 4, 1977, counsel conferred with Mr. Marshall
Turner, Chief of the Def'i10graphic Division of the Bureau of the Census,
·regarding availability of enumeration district splits to insure the accuracy
and possibility of using precincts instead of enumeration districts.

On

November 4, 1977, counsel conferred with the Chairman of the Joint Committee
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regar~ing plans for :eapportionment and court proceedings. ·
57.

On Saturday, Nov~mber 5, 1977, counsel reviewed reapportionment

plans and conferred with Mr. Del Dunn. a member of the Joint Conrnittee staff,
regarding the impact issue and conferred with the staff director regarding

maps of the plans of the plaintiffs and the Department of Justice.
58.

On Sunday, November 6, 1977, associate counsel met .with Professor

Richard Morrill in Seattle, Washington, to further analyze the plans of the
plaintiffs and the Department of Justice. ·

59.

On November 7, 1977, analyzation of the plans of the plaintiffs

and the Department of Justt ce by counsel and Professor Morri 11 continued.
60.

On November 8, 1977, counsel continued analysis of plaintiffs'

plans and conferred with experts and associate counsel in preparation for
the meeting with experts in Atlanta, Georgia, to be held on November 11,
1977, and in preparation for the meeting of the Joint Corrmittee to be held
November 16, 1977.
61.

During the second and third weeks of November, counsel conferred

daily with the corrmittee staff, experts and members·of the legislature and

the

Joint Cozrrnittee in preparation of the evidentiary hearing in tie United

States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, to corrrnence
on November 21, 1977.

These

conferences were held in Atlanta, Georgia;

Seattle, Washington; Jackson, Mississippi; and Washington, D.C.
62.

On November 21 and 22, 1977, the evidentiary hearing was conducted

on the reapportionment plar~.
63.

On November 23, 24 and 25, 1977, counsel conferred with experts

in regard to the District Court's indication of its preference for a reapportionment pl3n constructed on precinct lines as oppos~d to a plan based on
census enumeration districts.
64.

Ouri ng the week of November 28, 1977, counsel met with the Joint

Cor.unittee, corrrnittee staff and individual members of the Legislature and commenced work on the formulation of a precinct-based reapportionment plan by
moving the enumeration district lines to the nearest precinct lines and
obtaining census splits from the Bureau of the Census.
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65.

On December 1, J977, the Mississippi Legislature
reconvened the
.
~

recessed Second Extraordinary Session.
H.

a.

~

On that date the House reported

6, directing the county registrars to make administrative transfers .of

voters rather than a reregistration thereof.

66.

On December 2, 1977, H.B. 3 was adopted by the House.

67.

Ouri _ng the week of December 5, 1977, the L_egi s 1ature met and the

respective election corrmittees met and reported S.8. 2003 and H.B.9, both
bills being adopted during that same week.

These bilis embody the statutory

plans based on enumeration districts for the Senate and the House.

Further,

S.C.R. 507 was reported and adopted by the Legislature
during that same week
,
which directs the Secretary of State

to submit to the e·lectorate a cons ti tu-

tional amendment establishing a Reapportionment Commission.
68.

On December 12 and 13, 1977, the deposition of the Joint Commit-

tee Chairman was taken by the plaintiffs and plain~iff-intervenor as previously
authorized by the Court.
69.

During the last two weeks of December 1977, t~e conmittee staff

worked daily on the preparation of a reapportionment plan based on precinct

lines to submit to the Court.
70.

On January 3, 1978,

~,e Miss.issippi

Legislature convened the

1978 R_e gular Session.

71.

During the first t,..,o weeks of January 1978, the depositions of

the staff experts were taken ir. preparation for trial (i.e., Fortenberry,
Dunn, Webb, Hofeller and Morrill).
72.

During the \•1eeks of the 16th, 23rd and 30th of January 1978, the

c~rnmitte~ staff worked on formulating the precinct plan to submit to the
Court and counsel made preparation for trial which was to commence on
February 14, 1978.

73.

During the weeks of February 1, 6 and 13, 1978, the staff worked

on and ~,e Legislature reported and adopted S.C.R. 627 and H.C.R.'s 53 and
54.

These reso 1uti ans embody the basic preci net pl ans tendered the Court

during the February 14, 1978 hearing.

Numerous meetings of the respective

election corrrnittees were held throughout this period.
74.

On February 14. 1978, the evidentiary hearing was held before

the District Court with reg rd to t,"le reapportionment pl ans•

/

/

428

.

75·_ ~etween February 14, 1978, and the end of that month,: the staff
continued to work on and perfect the precinct plan filed with the Court during the February 14, 1978

hearing, ,,.,orking in close conjunction with the

Bureau of the Census; which was continuously providing the staff with population figures for the census enumeration district splits.
76.

D~ring the period of r~arch 1, 1978, through March 7, 1978, _the

Joint Committee; staff, the election corrmittees and the Legislature continued

-

perfecting the precinct plan previously filed with the Court at the February
14, 1978 heari_ng which ,,.,as reported and adopted as H.C.R. 116 by the legislature and filed with the Court on March 7," :19J8, together with supporting data.
77.

Inmediately upon filing H.C.R. 116, the Legislature returned to

the task of formulating a statutory precinct reapportionment plan for the
Mississippi Legislature to be effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as amended. This task had been interrupted by the
Legislature's desire to fonmJlate a court precinct plan in view of the District
Court's announced preference for such a plan.
78.

The House election committee reported to the House on March 22,

1978, H.B. 1491 (House statutory precinct plan), and the Senate election
conmi ttee, on .1arch 24, 1978, reported ·to the Senate S .B.

statutory precinct plan).

J098 (Senate

On March 23, 1978, the House ~dopted H.B. 1491.

79.

On Saturday, March 25, 1978, the Senate passed S.S. 3098.

80.

During the week of March 27, 1978, the House adopted S.S. 3098,

and the Senate adopted H.B. 1491.
81.

On April 7, 1978, the Legislature adjourned sine die.

82.

S.S. 3098 and H.S. 1491 were sent to the Governor, after having

been enrolled on April 4, 1978, and after consider,ng these bills, the
Governor signed them into law on April 21, 1978.

Copies of S. 8. 3098 and

H. S. 1491 are attached as Collective Appendix S.♦
83.

Ir.mediately thereafter the staff of the office of the Attorney

General of Mississippi corrmenced preparation of the submission of S.S. 3098
and H.S. 1491 to the Attorney General of the United States. pursuant to the
direction of the Legislature.

/
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On May 3, 1978, the S~ecial Master filed his suggested plan of

84,

reapportionment for the State of Mississippi.

85.

On May 9. 1978, the Special Master filed suggested alternatives

for the Senate.

On May 11. 1978, the Special Master filed a submission revising

86.

certain House . and Senate districts for Warren and Forrest Counties.

87.

On May 15, 1978, the District Court entered an order instructing

the Special Master to file a final proposal incorporating his plan in final
fonn so as to include the amendments.

Said orde·r provided that all parties

having objections to the Special Master's plan file such objections within
fifteen days after the Special Master filed his final plan and invited the
appropriate legislative coJTJTiittee to file objections to same, if any.

88.

On May 18, 1978, the Special Master filed with the Court the

above-mentioned reapportionment plan.
.

.

89.

Irrmediately thereafter, the Joint Committee staff, the office of

the Attorney General of Mississippi, and retained counsel for the comnittee
and defendants corrrnenced review and analysis of the plan filed
Master.

by

the Special

During this same period of time, th~ State was continuing to gather

supporting data for its Section 5 submission.
90.

On June 1, 1978, the State of Mississippi submitted to the Attorney

General of the _United States S.S. 3098 and H.B. 1491 together with extensive
and comprehensive supporting data for Section 5 clearance.

A copy of the Submis-

sion Statement (without its accompanying appendices) is at.tached as.Appendix 6.

91.

On June 2, 1978, the defendants and the Joint Committee filed

their objections to the plan previously filed by the Special Master.

92.

On June 12, 1978, the District Court entered an order requesting

the parties to meet ; n settlement conference within fifteen days of the entry
of said order in which they were requested to explore every reasonable possibility for the entry of a consent decree terminating this litigation.

93.

The Joint Corrvnittee and defendants continued to review the

Special Master's plan and the plar.s submitted

by

the plaintiffs and the Justice

Department in preparation for the meeting with plaintiffs and the Justice
Oepartmen t.

,I
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94. __QE_June 221 J978, attorneys for the plaintiffs, _Justi~e Department.
and the State met pursuant to the above-mentioned order of the District Court.
95.

On June 23, 1978, the Joint Cornr.1ittee met to consider the initial

proposals ~resented by plaintiffs ~nd the Justice Department during the nego-.
tiation session held on June 22, 1978.

Further 1 1:n the afternoon of the 23rd

another meeti_ng \·1as held with attorneys for the Joint Corrmi ttee, the d2fendants,
the Justice Department, and the plaintiffs.
96.

During the first full week of July, counsel far the defendants

and the Joint Committee continued to negotiate with counsel for the plaintiffs ana the Justice Department.

It was necessary during this period of

time to recall the Joint Corrmittee experts in order to analyze the proposals

presented and to rearrange certain districts in order to accorrrnodate such
proposals.

97.

On July 12, 1978, counsel for all parties and for the Joint

Conmittee again had a formal conference for the purpose of attempting to
finalize a compromise as to the reapportionment plans.
98.

After the above-referred to meeting, counsel for the parties and

Joint Corrmittee continued to negotiate and the · e~perts continued to re-draw
certain districts.

On July 25, 1978, counsel for all parties and the Joint

Corrrnittee again met for fomal negotiations.
99.

On July 26, 1978, counsel for the defendants, the Joint Commit-

tee and plaintiffs had an informal meeting for the purpose of furthering
the above-referred to negotiations.
100.

On July 27, 1978, counsel for the defendants and the Joint Com•

mittee met infonnally with counsel for the plaintiffs in furtherance of the

negotiations.

Further, notice was mailed to all members of the Joint Com-

mittee that a cor:mittee meeting would be held on August 2, 1978, at which
time the proposals of the plaintiffs and the Justice Department would be
submitted to the corrrnittee for final action.

Also the Mississippi Attorney

General sent a letter to the Attorney General of the United States requesting

a personal conference to discuss the Section 5 submission. A copy of tile
letter (dated July 26, 1978J frorn Attorney General A. F. Sur.:iler to Attorney

General Griffin Bell is attached as Appendix 7.
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101.

,1011.

Sy letter of July~~. l!:1/ts, bera1u vvuc~, '"'"•-· .... _ __

Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, responded to Attorney

General A. F. Sumner's request made to the United· States Attorney General
Griffin 8. Bell to meet with him personally • . Gerald Jones advised that a
meeting could be arranged with an appropriate representative of the Attorney
General to discuss S.B. 3098 and H.B. 1491.

A copy of this letter is

attached as Appendix 8.
102.

On July 31, 1978, Attorney General A. F. Surrrner, by letter of

that date, advised Gerald Jones that his response would not provide the
forum requested.
-103.

A copy

of

this letter is atta~hed as Appendix 9.

On August 1, 1978, Attorney General _A• . F. Surrrner was telephonically

advised by Gerald Jones that a letter from Assistant Attorney General Drew
Days, III,had been mailed wherein an objection had been interposed to S.B.3098
and H.S. 1491.
104.

!mediately upon the conclusion of the te_lephone conversation

referred to in Paragraph 103 above. Attorney General A. F. Su1m1er directed
his

Special Counsel in Washington, D. C. to file in the District Court of

Washington, D. C. a complaint for Section S declaratory relief.
this complaint is attached as Appendix 10.

A copy of

An amended complaint correcting

typographi ca 1 errors is to be fi 1ed on Augus·t 3, 1978.
105.

While I cited above only the key events and efforts which occurred

and were carried out ·on specific dates, I am further aware that throughout the
entire period of time since the Supreme Court's decision of May 31, 1977, that
the staff of the Joint Corrmittee, the attorneys for the defendants and the
Joint Committee and members of the Mississippi Legislature have worked continuously in a diligent, expeditious and competent manner in responding to
the Orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi by preparing plans, reviewi~ plans of plaintiffs and the Special
~~ster, participating in good faith in Court-directed settlement negotiations>
and concurrently drafting, enacting and pursuing under Section 5 the Legislatu:-e's statutory reapportionment plan which I believe to be best for the
peopie of the State of Mississippi.

Further, affiant saith not.

~ c....... c... ~ ' -

William A. Allain
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